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ABSTRACT 
The traditional approach to a digital investigation when a computer system is 
encountered in a running state is to remove the power, image the machine using a 
write blocker and then analyse the acquired image. This has the advantage of 
preserving the contents of the computer’s hard disk at that point in time. However, the 
disadvantage of this approach is that the preservation of the disk is at the expense of 
volatile data such as that stored in memory, which does not remain once the power is 
disconnected. There are an increasing number of situations where this traditional 
approach of ‘pulling the plug’ is not ideal since volatile data is relevant to the 
investigation; one of these situations is when the machine under investigation is using 
encryption. If encrypted data is encountered on a live machine, a live investigation 
can be performed to preserve this evidence in a form that can be later analysed. 
However, there are a number of difficulties with using evidence obtained from live 
investigations that may cause the reliability of such evidence to be questioned. This 
research investigates whether digital evidence obtained from live investigations 
involving encryption can be considered to be reliable. To determine this, a means of 
assessing reliability is established, which involves evaluating digital evidence against 
a set of criteria; evidence should be authentic, accurate and complete. This research 
considers how traditional digital investigations satisfy these requirements and then 
determines the extent to which evidence from live investigations involving encryption 
can satisfy the same criteria. This research concludes that it is possible for live digital 
evidence to be considered to be reliable, but that reliability of digital evidence 
ultimately depends on the specific investigation and the importance of the decision 
being made. However, the research provides structured criteria that allow the 
reliability of digital evidence to be assessed, demonstrates the use of these criteria in 
the context of live digital investigations involving encryption, and shows the extent to 
which each can currently be met. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INTRODUCTION   
As digital devices become ubiquitous, our day to day activities require more frequent 
interaction with digital systems, and as a result, more traces of our actions are left on 
these systems. Consequently, digital devices are often examined in order to infer what 
has happened in the real world. This process is referred to as a digital investigation.  
A digital investigation is defined as a process that formulates and tests 
hypotheses using digital evidence (see Chapter 2). These hypotheses are tested by 
examining digital evidence, which is defined as a set of reliable digital objects that 
support or refute a hypothesis (see Chapter 2). Digital evidence can be used for a 
variety of purposes, from investigating violations of acceptable use policies to 
criminal offences. Many digital investigations involve the latter and as a result the 
term ‘digital investigation’ is often used interchangeably with ‘forensic computing’. 
This latter term can be referred to specifically as a ‘forensic digital investigation’, 
which is a digital investigation with the additional requirement that the obtained 
digital evidence needs eventually to be presented in court.  
In digital investigations that involve seizing computer systems from the home 
or workplace of suspects during the course of the investigation, computer systems can 
be encountered while they are still powered on and running. The traditional approach 
to digital investigation has involved removing the power from these systems, i.e. 
‘pulling the plug’. This has the advantage of preserving the contents of the computer’s 
hard disk at that point in time, since after the power is removed, no data can be written 
to the disk. However, this has the disadvantage that this preservation of the disk is at 
the expense of volatile data such as that stored in RAM, which does not remain once 
the power is disconnected.  
There are an increasing number of situations where this traditional approach of 
‘pulling the plug’ is not ideal, for example: cases where large volumes of data are 
involved; where systems are ‘mission critical’; when relevant digital evidence is 
stored in memory only; and also when the machine under investigation is using 
  Chapter 1 
 
 2 
  
  
encryption, i.e. data is stored in a form that cannot be understood without the correct 
decryption key. This research investigates the effectiveness of the traditional approach 
to digital investigations when encryption is involved, and examines the advantages 
and disadvantages of a live investigation as an alternative to this approach. Live 
investigations involve examining a digital system while it is still running and using 
the operating system (the software that runs on the hardware and allows other 
programs to run) of the machine being investigated to acquire, analyse or present 
digital evidence. Live investigations are permitted by Principle 2 of the ACPO 
Guidelines1 and they are useful when encryption is involved since if physical access 
can be gained to a system at a point when the suspect is accessing the encrypted 
material, the investigator may be able to take control of the machine and will therefore 
also have access to the encrypted content.  
1.2 JUSTIFICATION  
As briefly described in the previous section and investigated in detail in Chapter 4, 
encryption poses a problem for the traditional approach to digital investigations and 
live investigations offer a simple mechanism to access the encrypted data in a form 
that can later be analysed. However, there are a number of difficulties with live 
investigations which are discussed in Section 2.4.4, for example, the difficulty in 
trusting the data supplied to live tools; the inherent intrusiveness of live techniques; 
the difficulty in verifying the output of live tools; and also ensuring that no evidence 
is missed. These difficulties mean that the reliability of evidence obtained using live 
investigation techniques could be called into question and, due to the lack of research 
and understanding of the subject, could result in digital evidence from live 
investigations being used when it should not be, or it not being used when it could be; 
either way, this could potentially result in an incorrect hypothesis being accepted.  
                                                 
1
 Principle 2 of the Association of Chief Police Officers’ Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based 
Electronic Evidence states, “In circumstances where it is necessary to access original data held on a 
computer or storage media, that person must be competent to do so and be able to give evidence 
explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions” (ACPO, 2007). 
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1.3 AIM  
Encrypted evidence can cause problems for traditional digital investigations and live 
investigations provide a means to access evidence while it is still in its decrypted 
form. However, as described earlier, digital evidence from live investigations is 
potentially problematic since there are a number of challenges to using it. The aim of 
this research is therefore to determine the role that live digital investigations can play 
in investigations involving encrypted evidence.  
1.4 RESEARCH HYPOTHESIS  
Given that a digital investigation formulates and tests hypotheses by examining digital 
evidence, and that digital evidence is defined as a set of reliable digital objects that 
support or refute a hypothesis, this research is concerned with determining whether 
digital evidence recovered using live techniques from systems using encryption can be 
shown to be reliable and therefore accepted as digital evidence as part of a digital 
investigation. The research hypothesis is therefore: 
 
Digital evidence obtained from live investigations involving encryption can be shown 
to be reliable. 
 
1.5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.5.1 General Methodology 
Digital evidence can be used for a variety of purposes and the decision of whether it is 
considered reliable depends on the situation and the person or persons making the 
judgement. This presents a problem in this research for assessing the reliability of 
digital evidence from live investigations, since adopting a subjective view of the 
reliability of digital evidence makes it extremely difficult to arrive at any conclusions. 
However, as described in Chapter 3, there are existing standards and requirements for 
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digital evidence2 and therefore it is assumed that reliability can be assessed against 
objective requirements. 
Based on this assumption, Chapter 3 proposes general requirements that can 
be used to assess the reliability of digital evidence. These are validated by comparing 
them to existing requirements and checking for consistency, and also demonstrating 
how current, accepted techniques for digital investigations satisfy them. Existing 
requirements are selected for comparison on the basis that they are well established, 
peer reviewed and/or used in practice. Requirements that disagree with those 
proposed are examined further to determine the cause of the discrepancy, since the 
difference may be due to existing requirements being specific versions of more 
general requirements. Also, since the definition for digital evidence is broad and 
accommodates its use in digital investigations as well as in the field of forensic 
computing, requirements that are specifically related to use of digital evidence in 
court are not considered to be appropriate for use in general requirements. 
The requirements derived in Chapter 3 are then examined in Chapters 4-7, 
where the extent to which they can be satisfied for live investigations is determined. 
Each chapter contains its own methodology section which describes the approaches 
used. Chapters 8 and 9 evaluate and conclude about the extent to which digital 
evidence from live systems using encryption can meet the proposed requirements, and 
therefore be considered to be reliable. 
 In addition to this overall research strategy, there are also a number of research 
tools that are used throughout the testing of this hypothesis, which are described in the 
following sub-sections.   
1.5.2 Use of Virtual Machines 
Virtualisation is a technique that “lets you run multiple virtual machines on a single 
physical machine, sharing the resources of that single computer across multiple 
environments. Different virtual machines can run different operating systems and 
multiple applications on the same physical computer” (VMWare, 2009). These 
                                                 
2
 They are mostly in the form of principles for forensic digital investigations. 
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‘virtual machines’ are used throughout this research. Their multiple uses in digital 
investigations are discussed in detail in Pollitt et al. (2008), but in this research they 
are mainly used to allow virtual test systems (guests) to be quickly built in different 
configurations and run on a single physical machine (host) without the need for 
multiple pieces of hardware. Virtual machines also provide the advantage of quick 
access to the hard drives of the virtual machines without needing to spend long 
periods of time creating disk images of physical drives. This is possible since the 
disks of the virtual machines are represented on the physical system’s hard drive as 
one or more files (.vmdk files in VMware) which can be opened in any forensic 
software package and are treated as physical disk images. The memory of the virtual 
machine is also represented on the host system as a file (.vmem files in VMware) and 
can also be acquired in this way. There are some limitations to using virtual machines, 
specifically the inability to virtualise some hardware (e.g. Firewire) and some 
differences when analysing images of the virtualised memory. These are discussed in 
more detail later. 
1.5.3 Use of Forensic Software to Examine Disk Images 
Throughout this research, disk images (or the .vmdk files from VMware virtual 
machines) are examined. This is performed using ‘forensic software’ and there are a 
number of products from which to choose. X-Ways Forensics was chosen as the 
primary tool since it is a fraction of the cost of EnCase and Forensic Toolkit (FTK) 
and offers all the functionality needed for this research. X-Ways Forensics can 
interpret the file systems used in this research (FAT and NTFS), allowing traversing 
of these file systems and also the recovery of deleted files. It also offers a ‘Data 
Interpreter’ function that is useful for converting embedded dates and times and other 
values. X-Ways Forensics can also be used for file comparisons and text or 
hexadecimal searches and extractions (Casey, 2004b). While EnCase and FTK are 
more commonly used for performing ‘real’ digital investigations, they offer no 
advantages in this research. 
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1.5.4 Development of Software Tools 
Also, throughout this research, software is written to perform a variety of tasks. No 
single language is used since each offer their own advantages and disadvantages. For 
example Java is used to develop Graphical User Interfaces, C is used where speed or 
low level access is a necessity, and Perl is used for text parsing and scripting routine 
tasks. 
1.5.5 Testing for Randomness 
On a number of occasions it is desirable to test for randomness, and in this case a 
variety of statistical tests are applied. Forster (2005) implements the Chi-Square test 
as part of an automated technique to identify encryption, since the technique is 
described as the only statistic that “was capable of isolating the pseudo-randomness of 
the encrypted file”. In this research an existing piece of software ENT, (Walker, 
2008), is used for testing for randomness and detecting encrypted data. ENT performs 
a variety of statistical tests for randomness including, the Chi-Square test and others: 
entropy, the reduction in size though compression, the mean value, the Monte Carlo 
value for Pi and the serial correlation co-efficient. Where these are used, they are 
discussed in more detail.  
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE 
This section describes the structure of the thesis. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a review of relevant literature and describes in greater detail some 
of the ideas introduced in this section. It discusses the differences between digital 
investigations and forensic digital investigations, which is important since additional 
requirements for evidence are imposed by the latter. It also defines digital evidence 
and discusses the importance of reliability. The traditional ‘pull the plug’ approach to 
digital investigations is also discussed, along with the challenges that this approach 
faces. One such challenge is encryption, which is discussed in detail, along with the 
approaches that can be used by investigators after the power has been removed to 
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attempt to gain access to encrypted evidence. The limitations of these approaches are 
also discussed. Live digital investigations are presented as an alternative approach, 
including the distinction between live acquisition and live analysis. Also, the 
problems with results obtained using live techniques are described.  
 
Chapter 3 explains the need to determine basic requirements for digital evidence in 
order to assess reliability. It also describes existing requirements and shows how live 
digital investigations cannot meet some of those currently in use. However, it then 
shows that some of the existing requirements cannot be considered to apply to digital 
evidence in general, since they are either specific to law or can be shown to be 
technologically specific means of satisfying other more general requirements. It is 
shown that live investigations may also be able to satisfy these general requirements. 
The chapters that follow then investigate the extent to which the derived general 
requirements of completeness, accuracy and authenticity can be satisfied for live 
investigations.  
 
Chapter 4 examines the completeness requirement and considers the likely success of 
existing offline approaches for attempting to access encrypted evidence. It also 
considers which of the approaches’ success is affected by the amount of the disk that 
remains in unencrypted form after the power is removed. Encryption products are 
categorised based on the locations on disk they encrypt, and for those categories 
where offline access is unlikely using existing approaches, it considers if a live 
investigation could offer a more complete and therefore reliable set of digital 
evidence, which would support the overall hypothesis of this research. 
 
Chapter 5 complements the previous chapter and examines how completeness could 
be adversely affected by performing a live investigation. Live tools are inherently 
intrusive and as a result could overwrite potentially relevant digital evidence. This 
chapter considers how to assess what evidence is lost by monitoring the changes 
caused to test systems when using various live investigation tools and techniques. The 
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results of testing in this way can be used to predict the data that will be overwritten 
and therefore the extent of the decrease in completeness of preserved digital evidence. 
This chapter identifies the limitations of current techniques for monitoring systems 
and develops a more comprehensive system monitoring methodology which is used to 
test a number of live tools and techniques, including running live acquisition and 
analysis tools, and also the effect of connecting to a system using various interfaces.  
 
Chapter 6 considers how the accuracy of results obtained from live investigations can 
be assessed. In traditional digital investigations, accuracy can be demonstrated since 
the techniques used are repeatable and can be performed by multiple examiners on 
multiple copies of the same digital data. In this research a distinction is made between 
the acquisition and analysis of digital evidence from live systems. The consequence of 
this is that once evidence is acquired, the accuracy of the analysis stage of a live 
investigation can be demonstrated using the same tried and tested means as current 
investigations i.e. repeatability. This chapter therefore focuses on how to assess the 
accuracy of the acquisition stage of a live digital investigation. This is achieved by 
first considering the nature of error in digital investigations, which then allows 
methods to be developed to assess this error.  
 
Chapter 7 examines how the authenticity of evidence obtained from live 
investigations can be demonstrated. In traditional digital investigations, the original 
physical evidence is always accessible and this contains the raw data from which 
digital evidence is extracted. Therefore, if the procedures used to recover digital 
evidence are thoroughly documented, it can always be shown how digital evidence 
was obtained from a physical piece of evidence that can be traced back to a person. In 
a live investigation, the original evidence may not be available after the power is 
removed; this section considers in this case how live acquired data can be 
demonstrated to originate from a particular piece of physical evidence.  
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Chapter 8 revisits the original requirements from Chapter 3 and evaluates the extent 
to which they have been satisfied in each of the previous chapters for live digital 
investigations involving encrypted evidence.  
 
Chapter 9 summarises the conclusions and contributions of this research and 
describes future work.  
 
1.7 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research tests the hypothesis that digital evidence obtained from live 
investigations involving encryption can be shown to be reliable, and demonstrates the 
strengths and weaknesses of performing live investigations of systems using 
encryption. The outcome of this is a set of requirements, which allows the reliability 
of digital evidence to be assessed. These requirements for digital evidence are clearly 
defined and the research as a whole acts as an example of how they can be used. 
These requirements could also be used in future to assess reliability of other types of 
digital evidence. 
 Also, in this research, categories of encryption products are validated and it is 
shown what affect these have on the locations on disk that become inaccessible when 
the power is removed. It is also shown how the categories affect offline approaches to 
attempting to gain access to encrypted digital evidence. The research therefore 
provides a demonstration of the increase in the amount of preserved evidence that a 
live investigation offers over the traditional approach, providing support for the use of 
live investigations.  
 This research also demonstrates the adverse affect that live investigations can 
have on the amount of preserved digital evidence. In the course of the research, a 
methodology and software tool is developed that simplifies the process of recording 
changes made to test systems. This allows the footprints of live tools to be 
determined, which is essential in minimising the loss of digital evidence due to 
actions of an investigator on a live system. This aspect of the research also has a 
number of additional future applications, including identifying locations of forensic 
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artefacts left by software, and also in computer security research for monitoring honey 
pots.  
 This research also provides a general definition for error in digital 
investigations, which is not available in current literature. This provides direction for 
the expression of error when presenting digital evidence. This definition of error is 
used to determine how error can be minimised in live investigations. The approach to 
this involves the development of a method that allows repeatability to be used to 
demonstrate the accuracy of live acquired copies of encrypted evidence. This involves 
acquiring specific information from the system at the same time as a decrypted copy 
of the encrypted evidence, which enables offline decryption of the static encrypted 
data. This is demonstrated in two ways: using the built in GUI of BitLocker and 
recovering decryption keys from a memory dump of a system running TrueCrypt.  
 Finally, it is shown how the physical origin of live acquired data can be 
demonstrated, even if the original data is unavailable, by integrating physical 
identifiers that are available before and after ‘pulling the plug’ into the acquisition 
process. 
 Many of these contributions have resulted in peer reviewed publications. 
Obtaining recovery keys in order to allow later access to Bitlocker encrypted data is 
discussed in Hargreaves and Chivers (2007) and Hargreaves et al. (2008). The latter 
also discusses the difficulty in gaining offline access to EFS encrypted files on 
Windows Vista. The key recovery approach to demonstrating accuracy of acquired 
digital evidence is discussed in Hargreaves and Chivers (2008b), where the ‘linear 
scan’ approach to key recovery is introduced. This key recovery approach is also used 
in Hargreaves and Chivers (2008a) to demonstrate how live imaging could be avoided 
in cases where it is impractical, such as when very large amounts of data are involved. 
Both papers on key recovery also include other aspects of this research, including the 
types of offline approaches that can be used for gaining access to encrypted evidence.  
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This background chapter has three sections. First, general background is provided for 
digital investigations and digital evidence. This is necessary since if reliability of 
digital evidence from live investigations is to be assessed, then definitions for ‘digital 
evidence’ and related terms such as ‘digital investigation’ must be clear. This section 
also discusses the challenges to the traditional approach to digital investigations. 
Secondly, one of the challenges to traditional digital investigations is discussed in 
detail: the challenge of encryption. This is introduced and approaches are described 
that can be used in attempts to gain access to encrypted digital evidence during offline 
examinations. Also, the difficulties and limitations of the approaches are described. 
Finally, live digital investigations are defined and discussed, including reviewing 
existing live investigation techniques and the challenges they face.  
2.2 GENERAL BACKGROUND 
2.2.1 Introduction 
This section introduces digital investigations and describes the specifics of forensic 
computing, both of which involve recovering digital evidence, which is also defined.  
This ‘back to basics’ section is necessary since terms such as ‘digital investigation’ 
and ‘forensic computing’ are often used interchangeably, even though there are 
important differences. The differences are particularly relevant in Chapter 3, where 
requirements for digital investigations are considered, and it becomes clear that 
different groups have different standards for judging the reliability of digital evidence. 
This section also describes the traditional ‘pull the plug’ approach to digital 
investigations since a live investigation is a different approach and it is important to 
clarify the differences. Finally, challenges to the ‘pull the plug’ approach are 
discussed which demonstrates its limitations and the necessity of a new approach.  
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2.2.2 Definitions and Digital Evidence Introduction 
Carrier (2006a) makes the distinction between a digital investigation and a digital 
forensic investigation since “many corporations and intelligence agencies conduct 
investigations and collect evidence that will not be entered into a court of law”. 
Despite ‘forensic’ meaning “of or relating to courts of law” (Oxford, 2008), the terms 
‘digital investigation’ and ‘forensic computing’3 are often used interchangeably. In 
this research a similar distinction is made as in Carrier (2006a). The following 
sections define the terms ‘digital investigation’, ‘forensic computing’ and ‘digital 
forensic investigation’. 
Digital Investigation 
Carrier (2006a) describes the goal of a digital investigation as to “make valid 
inferences about a computer’s history”, which is achieved by making observations 
and formulating hypotheses. Before hypotheses can be tested, digital data must be 
observed; but unlike the physical world it is not possible for us to view digital data 
directly and we rely on both hardware and software to report this information (Carrier, 
2006a). Therefore, before higher level hypotheses are formed about computers’ 
histories, more basic hypotheses are made stating that the observed data (reported by 
hardware and software) is equal to the actual data (Carrier, 2006a). Furthermore, as 
described in Sammes and Jenkinson (2007 p. 63), patterns of bytes can represent 
anything; meaning is only derived when rules are applied to interpret this raw data. 
Therefore, hypotheses also need to be formed which state that not only that the actual 
data is equal to the observed data, but also that the interpretation of this observed data 
is “consistent with the interpretation used to establish the patterns” (Sammes and 
Jenkinson, 2007 p.63). As described in Carrier (2006a) “at the lowest levels of 
abstraction, hypotheses will be used to reconstruct events and to abstract data into 
                                                 
3
 The term computer forensics is also used. However as described in Casey (2002 p.31), this is “a 
syntactical mess that uses the noun computer as an adjective and the adjective forensic as a noun, 
resulting in an imprecise term”. The term ‘computer forensics’ will therefore not be used in this 
research. 
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files and complex storage types. At higher levels of an investigation, hypotheses will 
be used to explain user actions and sequences of events”. Therefore, a digital 
investigation makes and tests both high and low level hypotheses.  
The definition used in Carrier (2006a) for a digital investigation is “a process 
that formulates and tests hypotheses to answer questions about digital events or the 
state of digital data” (Carrier, 2006a). However, digital events occur on a system, 
often as a result of interactions with another digital device, or as a result of 
interactions with the real world. Since these interactions affect the state of the 
computer system, they too are part of the computer’s history and it is sometimes 
necessary to infer what these interactions were. For example, it is necessary to 
determine if a web site was visited because a user manually typed in the web address 
or it was opened automatically by visiting another site. As a result, a digital 
investigation may need to answer questions not only about “digital events or the state 
of digital data” (Carrier, 2006a), but also about what real world events or other 
interactions caused digital events on the computer system to occur and therefore 
digital data to have its current state. Consequently, the definition used in this research 
for a digital investigation removes references to answering specific questions about 
digital data. This change allows any hypothesis to be tested during a digital 
investigation. Instead, to define specifically a digital investigation, it is highlighted 
that to test these hypotheses, digital data is examined. In this research, a digital 
investigation is therefore defined as ‘a process that formulates and tests hypotheses 
using digital evidence’. Digital evidence is discussed later in this chapter. 
Forensic Computing & Forensic Digital Investigation 
In order to define the forensic computing field, due to its relatively recent conception, 
it is useful to begin with definitions from traditional forensic science: “strictly 
speaking, Forensic Science is the application of science to law and is ultimately 
defined by use in court” (Casey, 2004a). Forensic computing could be defined based 
on this to be ‘the application of computer science to law’. Casey (2004a p.21) takes 
the approach of broadening the definition of forensic science to “the application of 
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science to investigation and prosecution of crime, or the just resolution of conflict”. 
The purpose of using this broader definition is in order to “encourage corporate digital 
investigators to apply the principles of Forensic Science”. While this is accepted as a 
worthwhile goal, this research does not use this broader definition of forensic science 
since it contradicts the more accepted definition of ‘forensic’ (“of or relating to courts 
of law” (Oxford, 2008)) and therefore defines forensic computing as the application 
of computer science to law. Based on this definition, the term ‘digital forensic 
investigation’, used in Carrier (2006a) can be used to describe a digital investigation 
which has the ultimate purpose of recovering digital evidence that could be admitted 
to a court of law. Here the principle from the definition of forensic computing 
(application to law) is taken and applied to a digital investigation, giving the 
definition for ‘forensic digital investigation’ of a process that formulates and tests 
hypotheses using digital evidence, where the results could be admitted to a court of 
law. Forensic digital investigations are therefore specific instances of digital 
investigations, which have the additional requirement of the results being admissible 
in a court of law. 
Digital Evidence 
Definitions 
Examining the definitions in the previous section, both digital investigations and 
forensic digital investigations use digital evidence to formulate and test hypotheses. 
This section considers alternative definitions for digital evidence and demonstrates 
why the definition in Carrier (2006a) is most appropriate. It is difficult to find a 
single, agreed upon definition of digital evidence, since it has a different meaning to 
different groups involved with digital investigations and those involved with the 
specifics of forensic computing. This difference is also evident when looking at 
multiple definitions of the word ‘evidence’; one is general: as a means to determine 
whether a belief or proposition is true; the other to establish facts in a legal 
investigation (Oxford, 2008). As discussed earlier, since the ‘forensic’ aspect is 
considered here to be a specific type of digital investigation, for ‘digital evidence’ to 
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be applicable to digital investigations and their forensic counterpart, a general 
definition of digital evidence is necessary. The following examples demonstrate the 
range of definitions that exist from different groups who conduct digital 
investigations. It also explains why a general definition of digital evidence is chosen. 
The Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence accepts members only 
from active law enforcement (Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2006) 
and their view of digital evidence tends towards the legal definition. Digital evidence 
is defined as “Information of probative value stored or transmitted in digital form” 
(Scientific Working Group on Digital Evidence, 2000). The word ‘probative’ is 
primarily a term in law meaning “affording provide proof or evidence” (Oxford, 
2008) and as a result, this definition suggests that the term ‘digital evidence’ should 
be used only in a legal context. 
Another definition that also focuses on the investigation of an offence is used 
in Casey (2004a p.12), “any data stored or transmitted using a computer that support 
or refute a theory of how an offence occurred or that address critical elements of the 
offence such as intent or alibi”. This definition also refers to evidence for legal 
purposes but does not restrict the use of digital evidence to proving an offence. It can 
also be used to support or further an investigation.  
A definition with a wider scope comes from the United Kingdom’s 
Association of Chief Police Officers. It does not use the term ‘digital evidence’ 
specifically, but defines ‘computer based evidence’ as “information and data of 
investigative value that is stored on or transmitted by a computer” (ACPO, 2007). The 
wider scope of this definition is primarily due to the vague term ‘investigative value’, 
but nevertheless it is an all encompassing definition.  
Sommer (1999) also states that in law, ‘evidence’ is “no more and no less than 
that which tends to persuade the court to a particular conclusion”. Even though this 
refers to persuading a court it does describe evidence as being used to come to a 
conclusion, which is more consistent with the general definition in Oxford (2008) of 
“determining whether a belief or proposition is true”. This is also supported elsewhere 
in Sommer (1999): “[evidence] is material which is used to establish the truth of a 
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particular fact or state of affairs” and in Miller (1992), “evidence is information used 
to decide whether disputed propositions are true”. 
A more precise definition for digital evidence that agrees with this thinking 
and avoids referring only to its use in court is presented in Carrier (2006a), which 
compliments the earlier definitions of digital investigation and digital forensic 
investigation. In Carrier (2006a), digital evidence is defined as “digital data that 
supports or refutes a hypothesis about digital events or the state of digital data”. This 
definition uses the more general definition of evidence and takes into account that 
digital evidence may be used outside of a legal or criminal investigative context and 
simply used to determine the correctness of a belief or idea. 
As discussed earlier, the specifics of hypotheses being about digital events or 
the state of digital data should be removed, since digital events are often 
representations of real events, e.g. the creation of a Windows Registry entry in 
TypedURLs is caused by the RegSetValue operation, which can be caused by a user 
typing text into the address bar of Internet Explorer. Therefore, hypotheses can be 
made not only about digital events but also the real world events that caused the 
digital events to occur. 
Also, Carrier (2005 p.4) uses a similar but slightly different definition for 
digital evidence: “a digital object that contains reliable information that supports or 
refutes a hypothesis”. This definition explicitly states that digital objects must contain 
reliable information in order to be used as digital evidence. In this research, this 
requirement is considered to be a necessary constraint, since if evidence is used to 
support or refute a hypothesis, then the use of unreliable data could lead to an 
incorrect hypothesis being supported. Therefore, since this definition specifies that 
digital objects should contain reliable information, and it does not exclude hypotheses 
about the real world, in this research a definition based on Carrier (2005 p.4) is used. 
Digital evidence is therefore defined in this research as a reliable digital object that 
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supports or refutes a hypothesis.4 However, this definition does have a limitation, 
which is the lack of clarity of the term ‘reliable’. Reliability of digital evidence is 
difficult to define and this is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
Abstracted nature 
A property of digital evidence that is outside the scope of its definition but is 
important to discuss, is that digital evidence is a representation of some physical 
evidence. Carrier (2003) describes that this is more than a just a simple 
physical/digital divide and explains how digital investigation tools translate data 
through multiple layers of abstraction5. This is necessary because “all data, regardless 
of application, are represented on a disk or network in a generic format, bits that are 
set to one or zero”6 (Carrier, 2003) and as Casey (2004a p.16) summarised, “we never 
see the actual data but only a representation”. Therefore, all digital objects are 
abstractions of something physical and if digital evidence is a reliable digital object 
that supports or refutes a hypothesis, digital evidence must also be an abstraction of a 
physical piece of evidence. (TechWeb, 2008) 
                                                 
4
 This definition is for digital evidence (singular). Another definition of digital evidence is also 
sometimes used in this research, where digital evidence (plural) is defined as ‘a set of reliable digital 
objects that support or refute a hypothesis’. 
5
 In general computer science, levels of abstraction determine “the level of complexity by which a 
system is viewed” (TechWeb, 2008) and abstraction layers in digital forensics have the same function. 
6
 This statement itself is an abstraction layer and hides details of how the binary data is stored on disk. 
Ones and zeros are not stored on disk since “only a flux change can create a signal, so every bit needs 
to be implemented by some kind of flux change; usually a reversal of magnetisation” (Sammes and 
Jenkinson 2007 p.108) and as a result a number of different encoding schemes are used to represent 
patterns of ones and zeros on disks. 
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2.2.3 Traditional Forensic Computing Approach 
The traditional philosophy of forensic computing can be best summarised by the four 
principles in the ACPO Good Practice Guide for Computer-Based Evidence  (ACPO, 
2007): 
 
• No action should change data held on a computer or storage media which may 
be relied on in court. 
 
• In circumstances where it is necessary to access original data held on a 
computer or storage media, that person must be competent to do so and be 
able to give evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of their 
actions. 
 
• An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to computer based 
electronic evidence should be created and preserved. An independent third 
party should be able to examine those processes and achieve the same result. 
 
• The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility for 
ensuring that the law and these principles are adhered to. 
 
The guide also contains further, more detailed instructions of how to conduct searches 
at crime scenes. The ACPO guidelines include advice for encountering computers that 
are switched on or computers that are switched off. If the computer is off then the 
guide states “do not under any circumstances switch the computer on”. This is 
because when a computer starts up a number of files and their metadata are changed, 
which could overwrite potential digital evidence.  
If a computer is encountered in a powered on state then until recently (before 
ACPO Version 4 in 2007) the advice was “If no specialist advice is available, remove 
the power supply from the back of the computer without closing down any programs.” 
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(ACPO, 2003) 7. This approach has become known as the ‘pull the plug’ method and 
is a simple and effective way to preserve the contents of the hard drive of a computer 
system. It is sometimes referred to in this research as a ‘traditional digital 
investigation’. This approach does have limitations: “It is accepted that the action of 
switching off the computer may mean that a small amount of evidence may be 
unrecoverable if it has not been saved to a storage medium but the integrity of the 
evidence already present will be retained” (ACPO, 2003). This will be discussed later. 
Once the computer is in a powered off state (either encountered in that way, or 
the power was removed) the physical equipment can be removed along with any other 
material at the scene which may be relevant (diaries, notebooks, manuals etc. (ACPO, 
2007)). Further steps can be found in guidelines from the National Institute of Justice 
(2004), that describe the detail of creating an exact duplicate of the hard drive of the 
seized equipment using a write blocker, which allows an investigator to “preserve and 
protect original evidence” (National Institute of Justice, 2004) by physically 
preventing any writes being made to the original hard drive. It is this duplicate that is 
then examined for digital evidence, since the duplicate can always be shown to be 
identical to the original. This is usually achieved using cryptographic hashes, where a 
mathematical function is applied to the whole data set to produce a fixed length bit 
string (Schneier, 1996 p.30). It is computationally infeasible to change the data in a 
way that will produce the same hash.  
2.2.4 Digital Investigation Methods and Process Models 
There are a number of process models for digital investigation based around both 
investigating computer security incidents, and also law enforcement procedures. 
There are also a number of abstract models that attempt to capture the general process 
of a digital investigation that can be applied equally to corporate investigations, 
incident response and law enforcement. 
                                                 
7
 This is still in ACPO 2007 but also contains “Where possible, collect data that would otherwise be 
lost by removing the power supply e.g. running processes and information about the state of the 
network ports at that time”. 
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Carrier (2002) does not explicitly present a process model, however, digital 
forensics is described as having three major phases: acquisition, analysis, 
presentation. While this is not presented in Carrier (2002) as a process model for 
digital forensics, it can be used to broadly describe the process. Acquisition is 
concerned with “sav[ing] the state of a digital system so that it can later be analyzed”. 
In the traditional forensic computing approach described in the previous section, this 
phase can include locating the physical evidence upon which digital evidence resides, 
powering off the system to preserve the contents of the hard drive, seizing the 
machine and securely transporting to a lab and then acquiring a duplicate of the 
contents of the hard drive. Analysis “takes the acquired data and examines it to 
identify pieces of evidence” (Carrier, 2002). The presentation stage “presents the 
conclusions and corresponding evidence from the investigation” (Carrier, 2002) and 
the format of this presentation will vary based on the context of the digital 
investigation (corporate/law enforcement). However, it is on the presentation of 
evidence that a decision is likely to be made about whether hypotheses are believed to 
be correct.  
 There are also a significant number of more detailed and more complex 
models (Baryamureeba and Tushabe, 2004, Carrier and Spafford, 2003, Farmer and 
Venema, 2004, Mandia et al., 2003, National Institute of Justice, 2004, Palmer, 2001, 
Reith et al., 2002, Beebe and Clark, 2005, Ciardhuáin, 2004). However, these can be 
approximately mapped to the acquisition, analysis, presentation model (see Appendix 
A) where many of the models expand stages to provide more detail. For example, 
Reith et al (2002) has preservation and collection stages which are both concerned 
with acquisition. As a result, in this research, the higher level Carrier (2002) process 
model of acquisition, analysis and presentation is used. 
2.2.5 Challenges to Traditional Digital Investigations 
This section describes some of the major challenges to digital investigations and also 
how in some cases there is a move away from the ‘pull the plug’ approach described 
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in the earlier sections, towards carrying out actions on the live system (described in 
detail later in Section 2.4). 
High Volume of Data 
“The amount of data that exists in digital form is growing rapidly” (Craiger et al., 
2005) and this rapid increase in storage capacity is considered one of the greatest 
challenges in digital forensics (McKemmish, 1999). This is because “larger disk 
capacities increase the time required for analysis and the difficulty and expense of 
collecting all disk evidence” (Adelstein, 2006).  
A related problem described in Roussev and Richard III (2004) is the 
exponential growth in storage capacity compared to the linear growth in input/output 
transfer speeds. This means that the imaging stage of an investigation remains an 
inherent bottleneck in the current forensic process.  
In addition to the problem of the increased storage capacity of individual 
machines, another issue is the number of machines that could be included in an 
investigation. This is a problem due to the limited scalability of the traditional 
forensic approach (Sommer, 2004), since for each machine that is to be included in an 
investigation, the machine must have the power removed, the hard drive imaged and 
then analysed. Home users may now have more than one computer in a household, or 
more than one per individual, resulting in an increase in the resources needed to 
conduct an investigation. In enterprise environments where investigations could span 
tens or hundreds of machines, the traditional approach is simply not feasible.  
Ubiquity of Digital Evidence 
In addition to the increase in the number of computer systems that may need to be 
included in an investigation, digital evidence can also be found on an increasingly 
diverse range of devices. Since the definition of digital evidence is a reliable digital 
object that supports or refutes a hypothesis, any device capable of storing digital data 
may contain digital evidence. These can include ‘traditional’ computer systems, 
Personal Digital Assistant (PDAs), mobile phones, digital cameras, MP3 players, 
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digital photo frames, storage media such as USB sticks, Compact Flash and Secure 
Digital cards.  
Different devices can store data in different ways and the traditional approach 
may not apply, for example, removing the power from a PDA may eventually cause a 
loss of data (ACPO, 2007).  
Evidence in Memory Only 
Another problem with the ‘pull the plug’ approach to digital investigations is that in 
some cases, evidence that is relevant to the investigation may not be stored on the 
hard disk of the computer system and may reside only in memory. Three examples of 
this are described in the following sections. 
Messaging applications 
Carvey (2004) describes a situation where a live messenger session is encountered in 
the course of responding to reports of missing children. In this case critical evidence 
from instant messaging applications could be lost if standard procedure was followed 
and the power was disconnected. By performing a live investigation, information can 
be retrieved that may be stored purely in memory such as IP addresses (as evidence of 
a direct connection initiated between instant messaging clients) and records of 
conversations which may not necessarily be logged to disk. Both types of evidence 
could be useful in furthering the investigation. 
 
Malware in memory 
It is possible for malware to reside only in the memory of a computer system. This is 
described in Burdach (2004): “sometimes the live procedure is the only way to 
acquire incident data because certain types of malicious code such as Loadable Kernel 
Module (LKM) based rootkits are loaded into memory only and don’t modify any 
files or directories.” While Burdach (2004) discusses mainly Linux systems, it also 
mentions that this also applies to Windows and “the Code Red Worm is a good 
[Windows] example where the malicious code was not saved to a file but was inserted 
into and then run directly from memory.” More recent examples are provided in Vidas 
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(2007), e.g. the SQL Slammer worm. While memory only malware may have limited 
effectiveness as it may not survive a reboot without compromising at least one 
software component that gets loaded on system boot (Hoglund and Butler, 2006 p.46), 
the possibility does exists that malware may reside in memory only, particularly on 
systems that remain powered on for extended periods of time. 
 It is also possible for defendants to use the ‘hacker’ or ‘trojan defence’ 
(Ghavalas and Philips, 2005, Vidas, 2007, Haagman and Ghavalas, 2005). For 
example, a suspect may deliberately download some malware “unrelated to material 
they are accused of possessing” (Vidas, 2007) and claim that the malware was 
responsible for that material. It may be possible to examine the hard disk and identify 
the nature of the malware and Kennedy (2006) describes how this can be done using a 
combination of antivirus software, MD5 hashes and a search for ‘triggers’ (events that 
will trigger its execution, e.g. Registry start-up locations). However, claims of 
memory only malware, or malware that has deleted itself are possible. 
Privacy Mode of Browsers 
Also, since the release of Google’s browser Chrome, which offers ‘Incognito Mode’ 
(Google, 2008) which prevents browsing and downloading histories from being 
logged, other browsers are also offering this functionality, including Internet Explorer 
8’s ‘InPrivate’ mode (Zeigler, 2008) and Firefox 3.1’s ‘PrivateBrowsing’ (Mozilla, 
2008). For Internet Explorer 8, Zeigler (2008) describes a number of pieces of data 
that are not recorded, e.g. addresses typed into the address bar. However, it also states 
that “new temporary Internet files will be deleted after the Private Browsing window 
is closed”. However, the approach in Mozilla (2008) specifically describes “not 
writ[ing] anything to disk” as one of the top level requirements, which implies that 
data needed for the session will be kept in memory only. Therefore, while some 
browsers are resorting to deleting data after the session, others are trying to implement 
a full memory only privacy mode and in these cases, pulling the plug would erase the 
only traces of recent browsing activity. 
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Size of Memory 
The ACPO (2003) guidelines state that “It is accepted that the action of switching off 
the computer may mean that a small amount of evidence may be unrecoverable if it 
has not been saved to a storage medium but the integrity of the evidence already 
present will be retained”8. However, as the sizes of RAM increase, with computer 
systems sold to home users having capacities of 4GB (Sutherland et al., 2008), the 
amount of potential evidence that is lost due to the traditional ‘pull the plug’ approach 
is significantly larger. 
Encryption 
Finally, another challenge facing the traditional digital investigation approach is the 
use of encryption as an attempt to conceal evidence from an investigation. This is 
discussed in detail in Section 2.3. 
2.2.6 Summary 
This section has defined a digital investigation as a process that formulates and tests 
hypotheses using digital evidence. This is performed by examining digital evidence, 
which is a reliable digital object that supports or refutes a hypothesis. Digital 
evidence must be shown to be reliable since if it is used to support or refute a 
hypothesis and is not reliable, this could result in an incorrect hypothesis being 
supported and ultimately an incorrect conclusion being drawn. This constraint of 
reliability is examined in Chapter 3. 
 This section has also discussed the traditional approach to digital 
investigations, where the power is removed from the system at the scene, preserving 
the contents of the disk at the expense of volatile memory. The advantages of this 
approach and how it addresses the need for digital evidence reliability are discussed 
later in Chapter 3. This section also presented the challenges that digital investigations 
currently face and specifically discussed situations where this ‘pull the plug’ approach 
                                                 
8
 However, this is not in ACPO (2007) 
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is inadequate since the discarded evidence from memory is important to the 
investigation. These challenges included situations where evidence is available in 
memory only, e.g. instant messenger applications, memory only malware, and certain 
browsers’ privacy modes. Finally, this section mentioned the use of encryption, which 
is the specific context in which live investigations are considered in this research, and 
is discussed in detail in the following section. 
2.3 ENCRYPTION AND DIGITAL INVESTIGATIONS 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section introduces encryption and describes how it causes problems for 
traditional digital investigations. The section also describes existing approaches that 
can be used to attempt to gain access to encrypted evidence. The section also explains 
how live investigations can help with the problem of encrypted evidence. 
2.3.2 Background 
According to Schneier (1996 p.1), cryptography is “the art and science of keeping 
messages secure”. However, it can be used not only to preserve the confidentiality of 
messages, but also of stored data. Encryption is a process which takes data (the 
plaintext) applies a mathematical function with a key and produces a ciphertext.  The 
reverse process, decryption, takes that ciphertext, applies a mathematical function 
with a key and produces the original plaintext.  
 Schneier (1996 p.4) describes that there are two general types of key based 
cryptographic algorithms: symmetric and asymmetric (also known as ‘public key’). In 
symmetric algorithms, the encryption key can be calculated from the decryption key 
(in most cases they are the same). In asymmetric algorithms, it is computationally 
infeasible for the decryption key to be derived from the encryption key, allowing one 
of the keys to be public without compromising the other. 
 Using these principles it is possible to encrypt network traffic, specific 
communications technology such as e-mail and also to prevent access to files stored 
on a media (Denning, 1999 p.306). It is this latter use with which this research is 
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concerned. Cryptography has many legitimate uses, and as stated in Wolfe (2003), 
“no investigator should make any judgement as to innocence or guilt merely because 
the suspect has chosen to protect his or her privacy using data encryption”.  
However, encryption can be used by the criminal elements of society to 
conceal evidence of crimes. Therefore, if encrypted material is encountered in the 
course of a digital investigation, it is usually desirable to gain access to the contents 
since “it is likely that many encrypted files will contain evidence as it is usually 
incriminating or unlawful material that suspects seek to hide in this way” (Forster, 
2005). Since it is desirable to access all parts of the disk to search for digital evidence 
that supports or refutes hypotheses, the use of encryption by the suspect has the 
potential to impede or even stop an investigation and certainly “has the effect of 
frustrating enquiries in the immediate period following the arrest of suspects and the 
seizure of computer equipment” (Home Office, 2006). The point is also made in 
Denning and Baugh (1999) that “even when decrypted material has little or no 
investigative value, considerable resources are wasted in reaching that determination”. 
Also, the use of encryption is increasing. A report from the Home Office 
(2006) states that in the two to three previous years “investigators have begun 
encountering encrypted and protected data with increasing frequency”. Several 
examples are provided where encrypted data has adversely affected investigations: 
 
Suspect charged with possession of a collection of images including extreme 
level 4 images (penetrative adult abuse) of babies and some level 5 images 
(sadism and bestiality). Encrypted files were seized that the police cannot 
access, giving rise to concern they may contain worse material. 
 
Suspect charged with possession of a huge amount of level 1 images (erotic 
posing with no sexual activity). These images were protected insecurely and 
were made intelligible. Other data remains encrypted and unintelligible. 
 
Three individuals were convicted for possession and making of indecent 
images. All were in possession of encrypted data to which they claimed to have 
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forgotten their passwords. That protected data and the imagery contained in it 
remains unintelligible. 
 
Mr A was convicted of attempting to procure a child aged 10 for sex and 
sentenced to three years imprisonment. He was in possession of encrypted files 
that remain unintelligible. 
 
Mr B was suspected of possession of indecent images. He was found to be in 
possession of 27 encrypted disks, none of which could be opened. 
 
Two individuals possessed a set of encrypted disks. Only a few of these could be 
accessed. They were sentenced on the basis of these. The rest remain 
unopened. 
 
There are also a number of examples in Denning and Baugh (1999) of the use of 
cryptography in cases involving criminal activity and terrorism. Those described 
below specifically describe where investigations have been “derailed” by the use of 
encryption. 
 
At one university,  the  investigation  of  a  professor  thought  to  be  trafficking  
in  child pornography was aborted because the campus police could not decrypt 
his files. 
 
An  employee  of  a  company  copied  proprietary  software  to a floppy  disk,  
took  the  disk home,  and  then  stored  the file  on  his computer encrypted 
under PGP. Evidently, his intention was to use the software to offer competing 
services, which were valued at tens of millions of dollars annually (the software 
itself cost over $1 million to develop). At the time we heard about the case, the 
authorities had not determined the passphrase needed to decrypt the files. 
Information contained in logs had led them to suspect the file was the pilfered 
software. 
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At Senate hearings in September 1997, Jeffery Herig, special agent with the 
Florida Department of  Law  Enforcement,  testified  that  they were  unable  to 
access protected files  within  a personal finance program in an embezzlement 
case  at  Florida  State University.  He  said  the  files  could  possibly  hold  
useful information  concerning  the  location  of  the  embezzled  funds. 
 
[It is] also reported that they had encountered unbreakable encryption in a US 
customs case involving an illegal, world-wide advanced fee scheme. At least 
300 victims were allegedly bilked out of over $60 million. Herig said they had 
encountered three different encryption systems. Although they were able to 
defeat the first two, they were unsuccessful with the third. The vendor told them 
that there were no back doors. 
 
As these cases show, stored data that is encrypted may not be accessible to an 
investigator. The following section describes methods that can be used when 
attempting to gain access to encrypted evidence in the course of a digital 
investigation.  
2.3.3 Addressing the Problem of Encrypted Evidence 
This section discusses possible approaches that can be used by those carrying out 
traditional digital investigations to attempt to gain access to encrypted evidence. 
Countermeasures to each approach are described in order to demonstrate the 
difficulties and limitations. 
Persuade or force the suspect to hand over their keys 
“The simplest and easiest method of overcoming encryption is to ask the suspect for 
the password(s)” (Craiger et al., 2005). As a result, any interview process should 
include asking the suspect for any passwords and encryption keys that are needed to 
access their system (Wolfe, 2003) as suspects may co-operate “as part of a plea 
bargain” (Denning and Baugh, 1999).  
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However, many suspects may decide not to reveal their passwords or could 
claim to have forgotten them (Barrett, 2005) and as a result in the UK, an offence has 
been created for failing to provide access to protected electronic information.9 This is 
described in Part III of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (2000) (RIPA) 
which makes it a criminal offence not to provide decrypted versions of encrypted files 
or the keys10. Legislation such as this may have limited effectiveness since many of 
the crimes that could be concealed by encryption carry longer sentences than refusing 
to disclose encryption keys: the maximum sentence for which in cases of national 
security is five years, or two years in other cases. Furthermore, technical means such 
as duress keys can be used whereby two keys can be used to decrypt data; one will 
reveal the true content, whereas the second ‘duress’ key reveals some prearranged 
innocent content.  
Locate unencrypted copies of the encrypted data 
During the encryption process, if the original data is deleted rather than wiped it may 
be possible to recover parts of the original copy of a now encrypted file 
(Zimmermann, 1998 p.159). More subtly, an encrypted file may have been written to 
disk during memory swapping operations, backed up to another media or stored 
temporarily on the disk in an unencrypted form while being processed (Casey, 
2002b). This is based on the premise that data cannot be processed while it is 
encrypted so must exist in a plaintext form to be manipulated in any complex way 
(Denning, 1999 p.309). 
 The success of this approach depends on the availability of locations in which 
unencrypted copies of data may be stored. As will be shown in Chapter 4, different 
                                                 
9
 Barrett (2005) discusses legislation such as RIPA Part III as one of a number of policy options, and 
concludes that it is the best solution rather than “outlaw the use of strong encryption”, “[allow] only 
those forms of encryption which are sufficiently weak or are implemented with backdoors so as to 
allow law enforcement to gain access”, “allow strong encryption but require that pass-phrases (or the 
keys themselves) be lodged with some central, trusted escrow agent”. 
10
 Part III was originally not activated but came into force on 1st October 2007 under Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (Commencement No. 4) Order 2007 and was used in a recent case R. v 
S & A [2008] EWCA Crim 2177 
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categories of encryption software can affect this, with some categories making the 
success of this approach unlikely. 
Locate copies of the key or passphrase on the disk or in the surrounding area 
An alternative to searching for the original data on the system is to attempt to locate 
the keys or passphrase on the disk or in the surrounding physical area. The success of 
this relies on the suspect recording the password somewhere to avoid forgetting it, 
encryption software writing the key to RAM which is then written to disk (Craiger et 
al., 2005) or the key being written to a temporary file in some other way. Automated 
tools such as the Forensic Toolkit (FTK) from Access Data (2008a) can generate a full 
list of all keywords on a suspect disk which can be imported into the Password 
Recovery Toolkit (Access Data, 2008b) which will try all the extracted keywords as 
passwords for encrypted data. Using this approach “if the user purposefully or 
unintentionally stored their pass phrase on disk or an application wrote the pass phrase 
to disk, it will be available in the keyword list” (Casey, 2002b). Also, users often use 
the same password for several accounts (Craiger et al., 2005) which may increase the 
chances that a residual copy could be found on the system and also “it may be useful 
for an agency to attempt to (legally) break passwords for other accounts to which the 
suspect has access to determine if the suspect uses a guessable password” (Craiger et 
al., 2005). Keys can also be backed up to various media. For example, BitLocker 
recovery keys can be displayed on screen, printed, saved to a USB drive or any other 
folder (Microsoft, 2006b) and locating these would allow investigators access to 
encrypted data since they are provided for the purpose of recovering encrypted data in 
case a user loses their USB key or forgets their PIN (Microsoft, 2006a). 
Therefore, in terms of countermeasures and precautions that a suspect could 
take, if large proportions of the disk have been encrypted and are inaccessible, it is 
less likely that copies of the passphrase or key will be found on the disk. If this is the 
case and keys have not been written down or backed up to insecure media then this 
approach is unlikely to be successful. 
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Intelligent password attacks 
This approach is based on the theory that “most people do not construct their keys in a 
way that makes them difficult to guess. Their main concern is being able to remember 
the keys themselves” (Wolfe, 2002). Users will often use passwords that have 
personal meaning since these are the easiest to remember, e.g. birthdays, 
anniversaries, names of children or pets etc. (Craiger et al., 2005). Automated tools 
can be used which will try common passphrases and passwords derived from a 
suspect’s personal details gathered during the investigation. These tools can also use 
standard and customised dictionaries in different languages. Many can be downloaded 
from the Internet that are specific to the user’s interests, e.g. sports teams, characters 
from TV, film and literature etc. (Craiger et al., 2005) These passwords can also be 
tried in various combinations and permutations (Casey, 2002b). 
Careful selection of passwords and passphrases will defeat intelligent 
password attacks and there is a great deal of literature on selecting appropriate hard to 
guess passwords such as Keith et al. (2006) which suggests not using dictionary 
words, or indeed anything that would be in any precompiled dictionaries and to make 
the password as long as possible. There are also encryption solutions that offer the 
facility to avoid using passwords or to supplement them with multi-factor 
authentication. For example, TrueCrypt allows the use of ‘key files’ where one or 
more files’ content is processed and combined with the user’s password to produce a 
key.  
Exhaustive key search 
It is possible to use automated tools to try all possible keys in an attempt to recover 
encrypted data. However, “as strong encryption becomes more widely used by 
criminals, it is infeasible to attack the encryption directly using brute force methods” 
(Casey, 2002b) and other methods should be attempted before resorting to a brute 
force approach (Casey, 2004a p.270). For example, the key size of the Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) is up to 256 bits, giving 1.16 x 1077 possible keys. Since 
no recent information could be found on time estimates for brute forcing modern 
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algorithms, a simple test was conducted and a brute force tool was developed with no 
optimisation and was capable of testing 267,000 keys per second11, meaning that to 
try all possible keys would take 1.38 x 1064 years. Therefore, if a suitably large key 
has been used then the chance of the keys being identified in a time that is useful is 
extremely unlikely.  
Vulnerabilities in an implementation 
It may be possible to use vulnerabilities in a particular encryption product 
implementation to recover information from an encrypted file. Some products contain 
‘back doors’ which allow the vendors to assist users in recovering data if their keys 
are lost (Wolfe, 2003). In the appeal of United States v Hersh [2002], the court heard 
that F-Secure provided law enforcement with partial source code allowing an 
encrypted container to be partially interpreted so that the names of the encrypted files 
were visible. In this case the names were consistent with the names of known child 
abuse images.  
If the suspect has used Open Source Software, provided it is up-to-date, then 
the chances of there being undiscovered, unfixed vulnerabilities are much lower 
(Raymond, 2001 p.31). The use of Open Source Software also means that any 
deliberate code introduced into a piece of software to provide a ‘backdoor’, would be 
public and the software would either be avoided or fixed. 
                                                 
11
 The brute forcing program was developed in the course of this research in C and tried 28,836,257 
keys in 1 minute 48 seconds on Windows XP, SP3 on an Intel Core 2, 1.86 GHz with 2GB of RAM. 
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Cryptanalysis  
Cryptanalysis is described as “the science of recovering the plaintext of a message 
without access to the key” (Schneier, 1996 p.5). Schneier (1996 p.5) describes six 
general types of cryptanalysis which are summarised below. 
 
Cipher text only: the cryptanalyst has access to several cipher texts of different 
plaintexts that have been encrypted with the same algorithm and key. 
 
Known plaintext: the cryptanalyst has access to the cipher text of several 
messages and also the original plaintexts. 
 
Chosen plaintext: The cryptanalyst is able to choose the plaintext that gets 
encrypted. 
 
Adaptive chosen plaintext: The cryptanalyst is able to choose the plaintext that 
gets encrypted and then submit further plaintexts for encryption based on 
previous results. 
 
Chosen cipher text: The cryptanalyst can choose different cipher texts to be 
decrypted and then has access to the plaintexts. 
 
Chosen key: The cryptanalyst chooses a relationship between a pair of keys, 
but does not know the keys themselves. The same plaintext is encrypted with 
both keys.  
 
Most current encryption products use public algorithms that have been, and are 
subjected to extensive research and scrutiny. For this reason, in this research, the 
encryption algorithms used are considered to be secure and cryptanalysis is not 
considered a viable option for data recovery. 
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Surveillance 
Either hardware or software surveillance techniques can be used to monitor a system 
in order to record the pass phrase that allows access to encrypted data. This can be 
used when a suspect is highly unlikely to co-operate. 
Software Surveillance 
Software surveillance techniques include key loggers and screen scrapers 
which record keyboard entry or the output of a graphics card respectively. 
These can be used to capture passwords or record the values in drop down 
menu based pass-code entry. Software based surveillance can capture 
information only after they have been launched. Since most are installed at the 
operating system level they are unable to capture passwords entered early on 
in the boot process (Wolfe, 2002). 
Hardware Surveillance 
Hardware key loggers are physical devices that sit between the computer and 
the keyboard and will capture any keyboard entry no matter what state the 
system is in (Wolfe, 2002). The captured passwords can either be stored in the 
device or transmitted on a designated radio frequency (Wolfe, 2002). Such 
devices can be obtained easily online or even high street shops for under £50 
(Maplins, 2008).  
 
Wolfe (2002) also points out that surveillance can take place before or after the initial 
seizure. The example is given of the former is United States v Scarfo [2001] where a 
key logger was installed on his machine covertly before the seizure in order to capture 
encryption passwords. In the latter, the machine is seized, imaged and then returned to 
the suspect with an installed key logger. In an unspecified case: “within three hours of 
returning his machine, the authorities had the needed keys and were then able to 
unlock the evidentiary copy of the encrypted hard disk” (Wolfe, 2002). 
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In the post-seizure case, surveillance could be defeated by a suspect who is 
aware not to enter their passwords after law enforcement has had unrestricted access 
to their machine. In the pre-seizure case hardware surveillance could be countered by 
exercising vigilance for suspicious devices attached to the system. Software 
surveillance could be detected by monitoring for suspicious processes and using both 
keyboard and mouse entry for pass phrase entry. The use of multi-factor 
authentication may also reduce the effectiveness of the surveillance approach. 
2.3.4 Summary 
As described in previous sections, the use of encryption by a suspect could present 
difficulties for those conducting digital investigations. Also the use of encryption is 
believed to be increasing. As shown in the previous section, there are a number of 
approaches for attempting to gain access to encrypted digital evidence, but there are 
countermeasures for each of the approaches.  
Another option available in some cases that was not covered in the previously 
discussed approaches is the use of ‘live investigations’. Live digital investigations are 
discussed in detail in the following section. 
 
2.4 LIVE DIGITAL INVESTIGATIONS 
2.4.1 Introduction 
This section defines live digital investigations. This is followed by examples of 
situations where live investigations are currently used and specific techniques are 
discussed in detail, including live acquisition and live analysis. In addition, when 
discussing analysis techniques, the nature of volatile memory and Windows operating 
system memory management are described. 
2.4.2 Defining Live Digital Investigation 
Section 2.2.3 described the traditional approach to a digital investigation, where the 
power is removed from a system in order to preserve the contents of the disk, but this 
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is at the expense of live memory. However, as previous sections have shown, some of 
that information located in memory could be useful or even essential for an 
investigation. 
 As described in Vidas (2007), “upon arriving on scene, a responder has two 
core choices, either interact with the system, or pull the plug”. A live investigation 
involves interacting with the system and takes into account the potential usefulness of 
volatile data that would be lost due to the ‘pull the plug’ approach. There are a 
number of definitions that highlight the difference between a live investigation and 
the traditional pull the plug approach (sometimes referred to as a ‘dead’ investigation, 
to complement a ‘live’ investigation). 
According to Carrier (2005 p.5), “A dead analysis occurs when you are 
running trusted applications in a trusted operating system to find evidence” and a live 
analysis is defined as “when you use the operating system or other resources of the 
system being investigated to find evidence.” However, in some cases this second 
definition conflicts with the first. In the case of bootable Linux CDs, the hardware of 
the suspect system is used, i.e. the resources of the system being investigated, but the 
investigation is also being performed in a trusted operating system using trusted 
applications, so from these definitions it is unclear where bootable Linux CDs would 
fit. 
Another definition from Mandia et al. (2003 p.27) simply states that “a live 
response is conducted when a computer system is still powered on and running.” This 
would suggest that a bootable Linux CD is indeed a live investigation.  
Carrier (2006b) offers another explanation of the terms ‘live’ and ‘dead’ 
analysis. Here “live analysis techniques use software that existed on the system during 
the time frame being investigated.” Carrier comments that using this definition, due to 
the fact that many hardware devices contain software (hard disk firmware), even 
imaging a disk on a trusted analysis machine would constitute a live investigation. In 
this research, the software embedded in hard disk controllers is ignored and disk 
imaging is not treated as a live investigation. Therefore, if the use of hardware and the 
software embedded within it is not considered to be a live investigation, since these 
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are the ‘other resources’ that are used by a bootable Linux CD, it does not constitute a 
live investigation either. As a result, a modified definition of using the operating 
system of the system being investigated to acquire, analyse or present digital 
evidence12 will be used to describe a live investigation. 
2.4.3 Current Live Investigation Techniques 
This section describes current live investigation techniques. Considering the high 
level view of the digital investigation process discussed in Section 2.2.4 (acquisition, 
analysis and presentation), first, tools are discussed that are referred to as ‘live 
investigation tools’, since they perform multiple stages of a digital investigation, 
acquiring and analysing data on the live machine. Following this, live acquisition 
tools are discussed, which just acquire data13. Live acquisition tools are discussed in 
terms of live disk acquisition and live memory acquisition. Also discussed are 
memory analysis tools, which are not usually run on the live system and are therefore 
not live tools, but they are important for analysing live acquired data from memory. 
However, analysis of live acquired disk images is not discussed as it uses the same 
analysis techniques as a standard digital investigation. 
Live Investigation Tools 
There are a number of live investigation tools that can be used to acquire and analyse 
information on a live system. The methodology for running such tools is best 
described in Wait (2008). This involves:  
 
1) establishing a trusted command prompt,  
2) establishing a method for transmitting and storing the collected information,  
3) running various tools and creating hashes of the output. 
                                                 
12
 Note the removal of ‘or other resources’ from the Carrier (2005) definition and the substitution of 
‘find evidence’ with ‘acquire, analyse and present digital evidence’. This is to reflect the high level 
process model of acquisition, analysis and presentation used to describe a digital investigation. 
13
 Live presentation tools are not discussed in this research as it is not a common term. However, by the 
definition used in this research, using VMware to boot a copy of a suspect’s machine to present as 
evidence in court would constitute a live presentation. 
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There are many tools that can be used in this way to gather information about a live 
system’s configuration and they are often grouped together into toolkits. They can 
also be scripted and written to CD so that the same tools are run in the same order for 
each investigation, e.g. FirstOnScene.vbs (Monday, 2004). Mandia et al. (2003, p.97, 
p.127) describes the live investigation tools for both Windows and Unix that should 
form the basis of any incident response toolkit. Table 1 shows the tools that are 
described as being essential for a Windows incident response toolkit. 
 
 
Tool Description Source 
cmd.exe A trusted copy of the command prompt. This will 
change for different versions of Windows. 
Built in 
PsLoggedOn A utility that shows all users connected locally and 
remotely. 
www.foundstone.com 
Rasusers A command that shows which users have remote-
access privileges on the target system. 
NT Resource Kit (NTRK) 
Netstat A system tool that enumerates all listening ports and 
all current connections to those ports. 
Built in 
Fport A utility that enumerates all processes that opened any 
TCP/IP ports on a Windows NT/2000 system. 
www.foundstone.com 
PsList A utility that enumerates all running processes on the 
target system. 
www.foundstone.com 
ListDLLs A utility that lists all running processes, their 
command line arguments, and the dynamically linked 
libraries (DLLs) on which each process depends. 
www.foundstone.com 
Nbtstat A utility that lists the recent NetBIOS connections for 
approximately the last 10 minutes. 
Built in 
Arp A system tool that shows the MAC addresses of 
systems that the target system has been 
communicating with, within the last minute. 
Built in 
Kill A command that terminates a process. NTRK 
Md5sum A utility that creates MD5 hashes for a given file. www.cygwin.com 
rmtshare A command that displays the shares accessible on a 
remote machine. 
NTRK 
 
Table 1: Live tools necessary to investigate a Windows system (Mandia et al. 2003, p.97) 
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One of the most popular collections of incident response tools is the Helix Live CD (e-
fense, 2008). This contains the tools described earlier and also specific toolkits that 
package together the tools. Helix 1.9a contains the following toolkits: Windows 
Forensic Toolchest (WFT), First Responder’s Utilities (FRU), Incident Response 
Collection Report, Agile Risk Management’s Nigilant32 which run the tools listed in 
Table 2.1 and various others. 
Live Acquisition: Disk 
The tools described above report specific information about a system, whereas disk 
acquisitions are traditionally bit stream copies of the entire drive of a system. 
However, Turner (2006) discusses alternatives to full disk acquisition and describes 
that there are multiple selective acquisition techniques: manual selective acquisition 
(the investigator chooses individual files for acquisition), semi-automatic selective 
imaging (investigator decides file types to acquire), automatic selective imaging 
(investigator selects only source and destination and evidence is automatically 
acquired according to pre-configured parameters related to the investigation). These 
will be discussed further in Section 4.2. 
There are a number of tools that can be used to acquire data from the disk of a 
live system. For example, on the Helix Live CD (e-fense, 2008), dd and FTK Imager 
are supplied. dd is a command line tool that can be used to acquire physical and 
logical drives. The version on Helix is part of George Garner’s Forensic Acquisition 
Utilities (FAU) (Garner, 2007). dd can be invoked using commands such as those 
shown below, which acquire the entire physical drive, and the C:\ partition 
respectively. 
 
dd if=\\.\PhysicalDrive0 of=E:\physical.dd  
dd if=C:\ of=E:\logical.dd 
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FTK Imager is a tool from Access Data (Access Data, 2007) that provides a Graphical 
User Interface for acquiring physical drives, logical drives and the contents of folders, 
as shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Screenshot of FTK Imager 
 
There are also other versions of dd with purposes specifically described as forensic 
acquisition, for example dcfldd (US Department of Defence Computer Forensic Lab 
Version) (Harbour, 2006). However, no tool currently implements the Semi-automatic 
or Automatic Selective imaging techniques discussed in Turner (2006). These tools 
can also be used to image virtual file systems, but not mounted network drives (unless 
they are copied as ‘contents of a folder’ using FTK Imager).  
 It is also possible to use these live disk acquisition tools to obtain decrypted 
copies of data that would otherwise be encrypted. Due to the nature of a live 
investigation (‘uses the operating system of the system under investigation’), if 
encrypted data is available to the operating system then it will also be available to live 
investigation tools and can be copied to external media. 
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Live Acquisition: Memory 
In addition to live acquisition of disks, it is also possible to acquire the live memory of 
a system. There are a number of techniques for achieving this: 
 
\\.\PhysicalMemory (user mode): Similar to \dev\memory in Linux, this object 
provides access to the physical memory of Windows XP (Vidstrom, 2006a). This can 
be accessed and copied using user-mode programs such as a modified version of dd 
(Carvey, 2007b). This has the advantage that no software needs to be installed on the 
system under investigation (Schuster, 2005). However, the main practical problem 
with this approach is that it requires administrator privileges on the live suspect 
machine (Schuster, 2005). User mode access to the \\.\PhysicalMemory object is also 
not possible unavailable under Windows Server 2003 SP1 onwards, including 
Windows Vista (Schuster, 2005).  
 
\\.\PhysicalMemory (kernel mode): Recently a number of options have become 
available that overcome the problem of lack of user mode access to the 
\\.\PhysicalMemory object. These allow imaging of the memory of a Windows Vista 
machine using a kernel mode driver to access the \\.\PhysicalMemory object 
(Schuster, 2008b). There are a number of implementations of this (Schuster, 2008b): 
 
WinEn: This is included with EnCase versions 6.11 onward. It is also included 
on the latest version (2.0) of the Helix Live CD (e-fense, 2008). 
 
mdd (Stotts, 2008): The Memory DD tool from ManTech is open source and 
available on SourceForge (ManTech, 2008).  
 
win32dd (Suiche, 2008b): This tool is also open source but uses more kernel 
mode functions, including writing the output file, rather than mdd, in which 
“the [kernel] driver is only used to get \Device\PhysicalMemory handle 
(Suiche, 2008a). 
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Firewire (IEEE 1394): Firewire devices use Direct Memory Access (DMA) meaning 
they can access the memory of a system without using the CPU (Carvey, 2007b). 
Bolieau (undated) describes a way to use this property to obtain an image of a 
machine’s physical memory. This approach allows imaging of memory, even if a 
machine is locked. However, the technique is more difficult to configure and use than 
the \\.\PhysicalMemory tools and the target system must have a working Firewire 
port. There are also documented problems in Vidstrom (2006b), e.g. dumping the 
Upper Memory Area (UMA) and it can cause a fatal error and blue screen if non-
existent memory addresses are accessed (Schuster, 2008a).  
 
Process Memory Acquisition Tools: In addition to the acquisition of full memory 
dumps there are also software tools that can dump the memory used by a specific 
process. Examples of such tools include pmdump (Vidstrom, 2002) and userdump 
(Microsoft, 2007c). 
 
Cooling + Reboot: This approach is described in Halderman et al (2008) and explains 
that even though data in RAM does decay when the power is removed, “retention 
times can be increased by cooling” (Halderman et al., 2008). By cooling RAM chips 
to -50ºC using an inverted can of compressed air and using a warm or cold reboot, the 
bit deterioration may be reduced sufficiently so that by rebooting the system to a 
custom operating system with a minimal memory footprint (network based or on 
USB) the contents of RAM can still be imaged, albeit with some bit errors. This has 
the advantage of providing a trusted operating system in which to perform imaging. 
At time of writing the tool from Halderman et al (2008) (ram2usb) was not available 
but an alternative that uses the same principles is available from McGrew (2008). 
There are also additional problems to the bit errors: it is possible that the machine has 
been configured not to boot to network or USB, preventing an operating system from 
being loaded that can perform the memory imaging. It is also possible that the 
machine may perform a destructive memory test when 
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a number of variables that affect whether data from memory can be recovered using 
this technique and at present this remains an experimental approach.  
 
Cooling + Physical Removal of RAM Chips: This approach is also described in 
Halderman et al. (2008) and uses the same cooling approach. At -50ºC data is 
described to persist for several minutes, allowing the RAM chips to be physically 
removed from the system and placed in a second machine. This second system would 
be booted to an operating system with a minimal memory footprint which may allow 
previous memory contents to be acquired. This solves the problem of the suspect 
machine not booting to network or USB and a system can be used that does not 
perform a destructive memory test. However, it would require a compatible system in 
which to place the RAM chips.  
 
Crash Dumps: A system can be configured in advance through the Windows Registry 
or Start-up and Recovery settings to create a full dump of its memory to disk on a key 
press (on PS\2 keyboards14) (Microsoft, 2007e). This has the significant advantage 
that the entire system is halted when the contents of RAM are being written (Carvey, 
2007b), this means that this is a true ‘image’ of memory rather than a ‘smear’, since 
the data is not constantly changing as it is being copied. However, it is necessary to 
reboot the system for the Registry change to take effect (Microsoft, 2007e) and as a 
result is unlikely to be practically of use since systems are unlikely to be found in this 
configuration. There is also a further limitation described in Huebner et al. (2007) that 
“the key sequence used to generate the crash dump is insecure and could be 
intercepted by an application program”. 
 
Hibernation File: When a Windows system is put into hibernate mode, the system’s 
state is stored in hiberfil.sys file. Using the Sandman Framework the hibernation file 
can be converted to a flat, dd style image (Suiche and Ruff, 2008). Using the 
                                                 
14
 It can also work with USB keyboards but only on Windows Server 2003 and it is necessary to install 
a hotfix for Kbdhid.sys driver 
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hibernation file to obtain an image offers the significant advantage that the system is 
completely stopped, so the acquired memory image is completely coherent and does 
not suffer the same ‘smearing’ as other techniques. Since the hibernation file is 
examined offline, it is not possible for malware to hide from an analysis. It is also 
counterproductive for malware to prevent itself from being written to the hibernation 
file as the malware would then not resume running when the system restarts from the 
hibernation file  
However, if the system’s power is disconnected and the hibernation file later 
imaged, the hibernation file may be significantly out of date; alternatively, the 
investigator intentionally putting the system to sleep will overwrite data in the current 
hibernation file on the disk. Ruff and Suiche (2007) also states that there is “no 
guarantee that 100% of physical memory has been saved”. Also, as will be seen in 
Chapter 4, the hibernation file is not available when certain types of encryption 
product are in use. 
 
Hardware Devices: Carrier and Grand (2004) describes a PCI card that can be fitted 
to a PC which can dump memory to an external storage device. Since this approach is 
hardware based it does not rely on potentially untrusted code. However, the hardware 
needs to be installed before an incident occurs (Carvey, 2007b) and as a result this is 
unlikely to be an option. 
Memory Image Analysis: Introduction to Memory and Memory Structures 
While live investigation tools described earlier can be used on a live machine to 
acquire, analyse and present information about the system, more recent approaches to 
live investigations separate out the acquisition of data from live systems and the 
analysis and presentation of the information (Walters and Petroni, 2007). The state of 
the art of memory analysis techniques is discussed in the next section and this section 
provides the necessary background. This section describes the nature of Random 
Access Memory (RAM) in physical terms and also in terms of how data is organised 
logically by the Windows operating system. 
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Physical: 
Random Access Memory (RAM) has two main types, static and dynamic. Dynamic 
RAM, which is used in modern computers as the main temporary storage consists of a 
collection of ‘cells’, where each cell contains a transistor and capacitor (Tanenbaum, 
1999 p.152). These capacitors charge and discharge, representing the binary values of 
one and zero. The capacitors will discharge naturally and in order to maintain a state 
of one, each must be refreshed every few milliseconds (Tanenbaum, 1999 p.152). It is 
for this reason that when the power is disconnected from a system the data in memory 
is lost. 
 
Logical Organisation: 
Computers are “electronic devices capable of storing and processing information in 
accordance with a predetermined set of instructions” (Oxford, 2008). These 
predetermined set of instructions are referred to as ‘programs’ and when they are run 
on a computer they are organised in memory as processes (Russinovich and Solomon, 
2005 p.6). Each process is a “container for a set of resources used when executing the 
instance of the program” (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.6) and each is assigned 
memory in which to execute and store data.15 
 Processes do not generally access addresses in physical memory directly. 
Instead, each process is assigned its own ‘virtual memory’ space. This provides each 
process with “the illusion of having its own large, private address space” (Russinovich 
and Solomon, 2005 p.14) and allows the operating system to control and protect 
memory locations, ensuring that processes do not overwrite the operating system or 
each other’s data. When accessed, these virtual addresses are converted into the 
physical addresses of the computer’s memory by the system’s memory manager. The 
virtual address space is divided into blocks that are referred to as ‘pages’ (default size 
                                                 
15
 Processes do not actually run, since only threads can run (Florio 2005). Processes contain one or 
more threads which are scheduled and executed by the system. However, processes are discussed in 
this section on memory structures since all threads of a process shares the process’s virtual address 
space (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.13). 
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4k) and the references used to map virtual addresses to physical memory addresses are 
stored in Page Tables (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.425). 
These virtual addresses may map not only to physical memory, but can also 
reference data stored on disk in ‘page files’. These page files exist since “most 
systems have much less physical memory than the total virtual memory in use by the 
running processes” (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.15). To overcome this 
problem, pages from memory that are not currently in use can be written to page files 
stored on disk which frees up pages in memory for processes currently executing. 
Stored data in page files can be paged back into memory when needed. 
Each process is represented in memory by an Executive Process or 
EPROCESS block (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.289). An EPROCESS block 
contains a number of pieces of information and also pointers to other data structures; 
full details are provided in Maclean (2006) and Russinovich and Solomon (2005 
p.291-293). A summary of important offsets in the EPROCESS block that are 
referenced in this section is shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2: Simplified structure of an EPROCESS block describing locations of important information in Windows XP SP2. 
 
As shown in Figure 2, the EPROCESS block contains various pieces of information 
about the process, including the Process ID and links to the previous and next process 
(a double linked list (Florio, 2005)). The first part of the EPROCESS block contains a 
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sub-structure, a Kernel Process (KPROCESS) block or Process Control Block (PCB). 
This also contains information about the process, including a pointer to the start of the 
process’s Page Directory (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.428). 
Each process has a single Page Directory, which keeps track of all Page Tables 
for that process. The Page Directory contains Page Directory Entries (PDEs) which 
point to the locations of Page Tables for the process (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 
p.428). Page Tables then contain Page Table Entries (PTEs) which point to the correct 
page in physical memory. A 32-bit virtual memory address therefore has three 
separate components:  
 
1) The Page Directory Index (10 bits) which finds the Page Directory Entry that 
points to the correct Page Table. 
2) The Page Table Index (10 bits), which locates the correct Page Table Entry which 
points to the desired page in physical memory.  
3) The Byte Index (12 bits), which points to the desired byte in the selected page in 
physical memory.  
 
This is shown diagrammatically in Russinovich and Solomon (2005 p.427) and a 
simplified version is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: The relationship between Page Directory, Page Tables, and Pages of physical memory. 
 
In addition to the Page Tables that keep track of a process’s virtual memory, there is 
also another data structure that has a similar function. The EPROCESS block also 
contains references to a set of Virtual Address Descriptors (VADs) which keep track 
of “which virtual addresses have been reserved in the process’s address space and 
which have not” (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.448). These are used to improve 
performance of the system by avoiding constructing Page Tables for allocated 
memory until the pages are accessed and a page fault occurs. Then the VADs are used 
to look up the accessed address range and to create a Page Table Entry.  
Memory Image Analysis: Techniques 
Recent approaches to live investigations separate the acquisition of data from live 
systems from the analysis of that data (Walters and Petroni, 2007). This involves a 
memory acquisition of the live system, followed by an offline analysis of the memory 
dump to recover information from it. This section describes some of the memory 
analysis techniques that are currently available. 
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String searches:  
Early analyses of memory dumps consisted of simply extracting text strings (Carvey, 
2007b p.88). This is achieved using tools such as strings (Russinovich, 2007), grep 
(on Linux) or bintext (Foundstone, 2000) and enables searches for passwords, IP and 
e-mail addresses and other text strings. The difficulty with evidence obtained in this 
way is that it is difficult to attribute to a specific process (Carvey, 2007b p.89).  
 
Process Enumeration:  
As described in the previous section, processes are linked to each other by a double 
linked list. Therefore if one EPROCESS block can be found in memory, the Forward 
Link (FLINK) and Backwards Link (BLINK) pointers can be used to enumerate all 
processes in the memory dump.  
 This approach relies on locating an EPROCESS block. There are a number of 
methods described for achieving this. Burdach (2005) explains how to find process 
blocks by searching for two processes that link to each other. Burdach (2005) states 
that two processes that link to each other are smsss and csrss16. These are found using 
a simple string search, checking for one which has a link to the other. However, when 
this was tested, more than 100 references to these strings were found making cross-
checking difficult. Maclean (2006) describes an alternative approach, where the 
‘system’ process’s Page Directory Base is consistent whenever Windows boots, 
pointing to 0x00039000. However, in experiments conducted as part of this research 
and as shown in Figure 4, this was not always the case17.  
 
                                                 
16
 smss – session manager subsystem, csrss – client server runtime server subsystem 
17
 The test was conducted on a Windows XP, SP2 system using VMware. The PDB at offset 0x18 
points to 0x00319000 
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Figure 4: PDB at offset 0x18 of the system process does not point to 0x00039000 but to 00319000 
 
An alternative approach exploits that the system process usually has a Process ID of 4 
(at offset 0x84 of the EPROCESS block). Using a simple Perl script a memory dump 
can be scanned for this pattern and the ‘System’ EPROCESS block located, as shown 
in Figure 5. 
 
 
/\x04[\x00-\xFF]ff\x53\x79\x73\x74\x65\x6d\x00\x00/gsm 
Figure 5: Regular expression used in Perl script to locate ‘System’ process with command line output showing found system 
process. 
 
Once a process is identified, all others can be enumerated from the EPROCESS 
FLINKs and BLINKs. However, these are virtual addresses, and as described in the 
previous section, need to be translated to the real physical addresses. There are also 
further complications in that data may have been paged out to disk. In this case the 
virtual memory address will point to an address in one of the pagefiles. This is 
described in detail in Kornblum (2007).  
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However, there are limitations to this enumeration approach. Processes that 
have ended will be unlinked from the list and while information in the EPROCESS 
blocks may still be available in memory, it will not be recoverable using this approach 
(Schuster, 2006). Also, processes could be deliberately unlinked from this list and 
would not appear in a list of enumerated processes (Vidas, 2007). This is an approach 
known as Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) that can be used for hiding 
malware.  
 
Process Carving: 
Schuster (2006) provides an alternative to the process enumeration approach that is 
similar to file carving in disk images. This approach scans through a memory image 
testing for valid process and thread structures using a 20 rule criteria. This is 
implemented in PTFinder.pl. There is also another implementation of this approach in 
Carvey (2007b p.104), lsproc.pl, which is limited to identifying processes rather than 
threads. 
 
VAD Tree Based Process Recovery: 
Another useful memory analysis technique is the recovery of memory that belongs to 
a specific process. As discussed earlier, the VAD tree provides access to areas of 
memory assigned to a process. The root of the VAD tree is stored in the process’s 
EPROCESS block at offset 0x11C. From this pointer the VAD tree can be traversed 
and the areas of memory assigned to the process can be extracted (Dolan-Gavitt, 
2007).  
Like the process enumeration approach described earlier, VAD nodes can be 
unlinked from the tree, since “memory reads appear to use the page directory to 
access memory first, and the VAD is only consulted if a page fault occurs” (Dolan-
Gavitt, 2007), which will hide the nodes from an analysis such as this. The VAD tree 
is also only available in processes that are still running and the pointers to the VAD 
root are zeroed when the process exits (Dolan-Gavitt, 2007). Also, the VAD root 
offset  has changed in Windows Server 2003 and Windows Vista (Schuster, 2007). 
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Memory Image Analysis: Toolkits 
Offline memory analysis is an extremely fast moving field and there are additional 
techniques that are available that have not been discussed in previous sections. These 
include identifying open ports, open files, recovering parts of an executable that has 
been run etc. These memory analysis techniques come from a variety of authors but 
are being combined into toolkits, meaning that an investigator does not need to rely on 
a collection of different tools in order to analyse memory dumps. 
 Responder is a commercial product that is “the industry's first live memory 
and runtime analysis platform for Windows operating systems”, (HBGary, 2008b) and 
allows an investigator to view the physical and virtual memory structures in a memory 
dump in a graphical environment.  
 The leading open source toolkit for memory analysis is the Volatility 
Framework which is “a completely open collection of tools, implemented in Python 
under the GNU General Public License, for the extraction of digital artefacts from 
volatile memory (RAM) samples” (Volatile Systems, 2008). Volatility allows a 
number of different analyses to be performed on a memory image from Windows XP 
SP2 and SP3 systems. These different analyses are shown in Table 2 (from Volatility 
1.3 Beta help file). 
 
Volatility command Information Obtained 
connections      Print list of open connections. 
 connscan         Scan for connection objects. 
 datetime         Get date/time information for image. 
 dlllist          Print list of loaded DLLs for each process. 
 dmp2raw          Convert a crash dump to a raw dump. 
 dmpchk           Dump crash dump information. 
 files            Print list of open files for each process. 
 hibinfo          Convert hibernation file to linear raw image. 
 ident            Identify image properties. 
 memdmp           Dump the addressable memory for a process. 
 memmap           Print the memory map. 
  Chapter 2 
 
 53 
  
  
 modscan          Scan for modules. 
 modules          Print list of loaded modules. 
 procdump         Dump a process to an executable sample. 
 pslist           Print list of running processes. 
 psscan           Scan for EPROCESS objects. 
 raw2dmp          Convert a raw dump to a crash dump. 
 regobjkeys       Print list of open Registry keys for each process. 
 sockets          Print list of open sockets. 
 sockscan         Scan for socket objects. 
 strings          Match physical offsets to virtual addresses. 
 thrdscan         Scan for ETHREAD objects. 
 vaddump          Dump the VAD sections to files. 
 vadinfo          Dump the VAD info. 
 vadwalk          Walk the VAD tree. 
 
Table 2: Analysis techniques that can be performed using the Volatility framework . 
 
As can be seen in Table 2, the Volatility Framework allows much of the information 
obtained using live investigation tools such as pslist to be obtained from an acquired 
memory image. Separating acquisition from analysis in this way simplifies 
overcoming some of the challenges to live investigations described in the next section 
and in detail in Chapter 3. 
2.4.4 Challenges to Live Digital Investigations  
As previous sections have shown, there are limitations to the traditional approach to 
digital investigations. It has also been discussed how live investigations tools can 
preserve digital evidence that would otherwise be lost. However there are a number of 
challenges to using live digital investigations which are discussed in this section.  
Trusting Results 
One of the biggest difficulties in performing live investigations is the ability to trust 
results. Mohay et al. (2003) states that “any system being examined live should be 
considered to be hostile until proven otherwise.” Unfortunately some part of the 
  Chapter 2 
 
 54 
  
  
system will need to be trusted; at the very least, the software used to mount a CD of 
trusted binaries (Burdach 2004). Carrier (2006) goes as far as saying that “the only 
difference between live and dead analysis is the reliability of results.” While this is 
not the case based on the definition of live analysis used in this research, it certainly is 
one of the most difficult issues to address, particularly in Windows environments 
where such extensive use is made of Dynamic Link Libraries (Carvey 2004). 
There are two main concerns regarding trust. The first is that the operating 
system could be modified in some way to provide false information (Kenneally and 
Brown 2005, Carrier 2006). This presents two possibilities: 1) a malicious root kit 
could be responsible for the creation of incriminatory evidence and hide all traces of 
itself, thus implicating an innocent user. 2) a root kit could be installed intentionally 
with the purpose of hiding parts of the disk from an investigator performing a live 
analysis. The second concern is that logic bombs, “booby traps” (Mohay et al. 2003, 
p.135) or “electronic mines” (Farmer and Venema 2004, p.5) could be placed on a 
system and used to destroy or corrupt evidence if triggered. 
Intrusiveness of Techniques 
A common concern with live investigations is that compared to a traditional 
investigation they are highly intrusive. Due to the inherent volatility of digital 
evidence it is very easy for it to become contaminated (Adelstein 2006) and the write 
blocking approach used in traditional forensics is not possible during live 
investigations (Nikkel 2005). As a result terms such as “modifying as little as possible 
on the system” (Carvey 2004) and “minimally invasive” (Hargreaves et al. 2006) are 
used when discussing live investigations. 
 Ultimately there is “no way to avoid making changes, since in order to 
conduct a live examination it is necessary to deploy tools on the live system to capture 
data, and such tools will make changes to the running system” (Sutherland et al., 
2008). The amount of change caused will vary, depending on hardware and software 
configurations (Vidas, 2007), but even when attempting one of the simplest of live 
responses, capturing a memory image, “no software tool is capable of capturing the 
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image of memory without, by the very act of its own execution, changing the content 
of memory” (Huebner et al., 2007). 
Verification of results 
One of the fundamental principles of digital investigation described by Pollitt (1995) 
is that examination results should be verifiable and repeatable. Compared to the ease 
at which results can be verified in traditional forensics by repeating the same 
procedure on a duplicate image of the original evidence, verifying certain results from 
a live investigation is difficult.  
As mentioned in earlier sections, recent approaches to live digital 
investigations separate acquisition from analysis. Once evidence has been acquired 
from a live system, the extracted data has the same properties as evidence obtained 
from a traditional investigation and can be exactly copied and any analysis techniques 
used can be repeated on duplicate copies by independent examiners. Therefore, the 
problem lies in the repeatability and verifiability of the acquisition stage of a live 
investigation since “the evidence gathered represents a snapshot of a dynamic system 
that cannot be reproduced at a later date” (Adelstein 2006). As a result the acquired 
image can be verified only against itself rather than the original media (Casey and 
Stanley 2004) which prevents the correctness of data from the acquisition stage being 
easily demonstrated. This could result in the challenges to the integrity of the acquired 
evidence, potentially affecting its weight in court or even preventing it from being 
admissible (Kenneally and Brown 2005). 
Ensuring a Complete Set of Evidence 
Another concern with live investigations is that it can involve selective file copying 
rather than creating a full image (Kenneally and Brown 2005). This could result in 
challenges claiming that a piece of digital evidence that proved innocence was not 
captured. Certainly putting first responders in a position where they need to identify 
relevant digital evidence is significantly different from their current role of identifying 
and preserving physical evidence upon which digital evidence may reside.  
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2.4.5 Summary  
This section has defined a live digital investigation as a digital investigation which 
uses the operating system of the system being investigated to acquire, analyse or 
present digital evidence. It has reviewed a number of live investigation techniques, 
including the live acquisition of disks and memory. Specifically, it has discussed that 
if a system is encountered that contains encrypted data, then it is possible to use live 
acquisition techniques to acquire that data in an accessible form prior to the machine 
being powered down. In addition to disk acquisition techniques it has been shown that 
memory analysis techniques can be used in an offline or ‘dead’ environment to obtain 
information from memory images acquired from live systems. This means that it is 
possible to separate out the acquisition and analysis stages of a live investigation, 
where previously ‘incident response’ tools had to be used to perform both acquisition 
and analysis using the operating system of the system under investigation. The 
importance of this will be discussed later in Chapter 6. Finally, the challenges to live 
investigations were described which show that while the acquisition of encrypted data 
seems a simple solution there are a number of problems with results obtained using 
live techniques: the difficulty in trusting the results, its inherent intrusiveness, the 
difficulty in verifying results and ensuring that no evidence is missed. 
 
2.5 CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In summary, this chapter has covered a broad range of topics. The first section 
discussed how digital investigations are different from forensic digital investigations, 
which is an important distinction due to the additional requirements imposed by the 
latter, i.e. that evidence must be admissible in a court of law, which will be subject to 
localisation.  
 It has also been discussed that both digital investigations and their forensic 
counterpart are centred on the recovery of digital evidence which has been defined as 
a set of reliable digital objects that support or refute a hypothesis. The specific 
constraint of ‘reliable’ has been shown to be important since if digital data is used to 
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support or refute a hypothesis and is not reliable, then this could result in an incorrect 
hypothesis being supported and ultimately, an incorrect conclusion being drawn. 
 The traditional ‘pull the plug’ approach to digital investigations has also been 
discussed. This involves the power being removed from running systems at the scene, 
which preserves the contents of the disk, but at the expense of volatile memory. This 
section has also presented the challenges that digital investigations currently face and 
specifically discussed situations where the ‘pull the plug’ approach is inadequate. One 
situation in particular, the use of encryption, has been discussed in detail. It has been 
shown that the use of encryption is increasing and while there are a number of 
approaches for attempting to gain access to encrypted digital evidence, there are 
countermeasures for each of the approaches. 
 Live digital investigations were introduced as an alternative approach and 
were discussed in detail, including being defined as ‘a digital investigation which uses 
the operating system of the system in question to acquire, analyse or present digital 
evidence’. While discussing a number of live investigation techniques, including the 
live acquisition of disks and memory, it was shown that if a system is encountered 
that contains encrypted data then it is possible before the machine is powered down to 
use live investigation techniques to acquire data in a form that can later be analysed. 
Live investigation tools were also discussed and it was shown that much of this 
functionality can now be achieved using an offline analysis of live acquired memory 
images, meaning that the acquisition and analysis stages of a live investigation can be 
separated. 
 Finally in this chapter, while it has been described how acquiring encrypted 
data from live systems seems a simple solution, it has also been shown that there are a 
number of problems with results obtained using live techniques: the difficulty trusting 
results, their inherent intrusiveness, the difficulty in verifying results and ensuring that 
no evidence is missed. The significance of these challenges will be discussed in the 
next chapter where the reliability of digital evidence is considered. 
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CHAPTER 3: ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF 
DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter proposed definitions for digital investigations, live digital 
investigations and digital evidence. A digital investigation was defined as a process 
that formulates and tests hypotheses using digital evidence. It is also possible that a 
digital forensic investigation may be performed where there is also the additional need 
for the results to be admissible in court.  
Both digital investigations and more specific forensic digital investigations are 
performed by examining digital evidence, which is defined as a set of reliable digital 
objects that support or refute a hypothesis. The limitation of this definition of digital 
evidence was explained in Chapter 2 to be that reliability is not defined. Due to the 
difficulty in defining and therefore assessing reliability of digital evidence directly, 
this chapter describes how reliability can be assessed using a set of proposed general 
requirements. These proposed requirements are validated by showing how they are 
either compatible with existing requirements or that existing requirements are specific 
means of satisfying those proposed.  
 The chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 explains why requirements 
are necessary in order to assess the reliability of digital evidence and Section 3.3 
proposes general requirements that can be used to assess this reliability. These 
proposed requirements are then validated in Section 3.4 by comparing them to 
existing requirements. It is shown that while those that already exist are valid in a 
particular context, they cannot be considered to be general requirements, but they are 
specific ways of satisfying the proposed general requirements. Section 3.5 explains 
the proposed requirements further and discusses how they are satisfied by the 
technical and procedural measures used in traditional digital investigations. It also 
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revisits the challenges that live digital investigations face (described in the previous 
chapter) and determines how these relate to the identified requirements. 
3.2 ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
Digital evidence was defined in Chapter 2 as a set of reliable digital objects that 
support or refute a hypothesis. Therefore, digital objects should only be used as 
evidence if they are reliable. Defining reliability is extremely difficult as dictionary 
definitions describe ‘rely’ as being “depend on with full trust”, where ‘trust’ is a “firm 
belief in someone or something” (Oxford, 2008). Since belief is subjective, this makes 
independent, objective judgements of trust and therefore reliability difficult.  
 In other literature, Casey (2002a) describes that “reliability refers to the 
consistency of a measuring or recording process. A perfectly reliable process will 
record the same value when repeated measurements of the same entity are taken.” 
This definition of reliability makes no reference to the process producing correct 
results, only that they are consistent. If a digital object is used to support or refute a 
hypothesis, more is needed than consistency. In this research reliability is not used as 
a measure of consistency, but as a measure of quality.  
 Rather than attempting to explicitly define reliability in the context of digital 
investigations, an alternative approach can be taken: “where reliability cannot be 
assessed directly, there must be some indirect way of assessing reliability” (Miller, 
1992). An approach to achieve this is described in Pollitt (1995) which describes the 
purpose of developing standards for forensic computing as being “to ensure quality”, 
to “describe that which is the minimum acceptable level of performance” and to 
“serve as a guarantee to those not involved, of reliable results”. Therefore, it is 
assumed that the reliability of digital evidence can be assessed indirectly, by meeting 
certain standards or requirements, and is effectively defined in terms of those 
requirements.  
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3.3 PROPOSED REQUIREMENTS FOR DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The previous section showed that the reliability of digital evidence can be assessed 
indirectly by assessing it against certain standards or requirements. There are a 
number of existing standards and requirements for digital evidence and they are 
discussed in Section 3.4. However, as will be shown later, none are suitable as general 
requirements for digital evidence. However, the requirements found in Miller (1992) 
for assessing the reliability of machine generated evidence e.g. a breathalyser or 
speedometer, are considered to have the potential to apply to digital evidence, and it is 
hypothesised that these principles can be adapted into general requirements to assess 
the reliability of digital evidence.  
3.3.2 Requirements in Miller (1992) 
Miller (1992) states that in cases where reliability of evidence cannot be assessed 
directly, the reliability of the source of the information is assessed instead. It also 
states that “in assessing the reliability of the source of information, several factors 
apply”, which are: “the source must be authentic” and “it must be possible to assess: 
a) the accuracy with which the source has recorded the information, b) whether the 
source accurately reproduces the information, and c) how complete the information 
is” (Miller, 1992). These are summarised below as authenticity, accuracy and 
completeness.  
 
Authenticity: Miller (1992) does not define authenticity; however, the assessment of 
authenticity is divided into a number of questions, which are: 
 
1. “How is it possible to verify the authenticity of input to a machine”? 
2. “How is it possible to verify the authenticity of the output of a machine”? 
3. “How can the question of deliberate tampering with information stored in a 
system be dealt with”? 
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According to Miller (1992), the authenticity of the output of a machine can be verified 
if a human being is “able to confirm that the output is from the machine in question” 
and “that the output is the result of one particular process if several processes are 
performed by the system”, i.e. it needs to be shown that the output was produced by 
running a particular process. Verifying the authenticity of the input to a machine is 
described as being more complex since information may be provided from other 
machines, large volumes of data may be involved and the sources may be human or 
machine. Miller (1992) gives the example of an accounting system which generates an 
auditing trail that records transactions carried out on the system. It is designed so that 
it is possible for a human to verify the authenticity of the information recorded by the 
system. However, there is no example that can be related to digital investigations. 
Also, tampering with evidence is not discussed in detail, only that “deliberate 
tampering with information stored in a system or the deliberate entry of false 
information into a system” needs to be considered.  
 
Accuracy: Miller (1992) also divides this into two parts: 
 
1. It must be possible to assess the accuracy of the information supplied to the 
machine 
2. It must be possible to assess the accuracy of the information produced by the 
machine 
 
In Miller (1992) ‘accuracy’ is not defined, but it is described that in accounting 
systems, manual procedures can be used to verify the accuracy of information 
supplied to a machine. However, the difficulty arises when more complicated systems 
are considered where the input to one machine may be the output from another.  
 
Completeness: Miller (1992) states that “if a decision is to be made on the basis of 
incomplete information, the decision may prove to be incorrect. The completeness of 
the information depends, in part, upon what decision is to be made”, e.g. in some 
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cases a bank statement showing current balance is sufficient, but for accounting 
purposes more details may be needed. One difficulty described is that machine 
generated evidence “may be unfamiliar in format or presentation [so] it may be 
difficult for a non-expert to form an opinion about whether it is complete information 
for the purposes of adjudicating a dispute.” 
3.3.3 Application of the Requirements to Digital Evidence 
One difficulty in applying the requirements in Miller (1992) directly to digital 
evidence is that it is unclear what would constitute a ‘machine’. In Miller (1992) 
‘machines’ are not explicitly defined, but they are described as being used to “process 
data” and “are not limited to computers or calculating equipment” and when 
describing the requirements of accuracy and authenticity of information, machines are 
described in terms of their input and output. It is also stated that they can obtain 
information from various sources, including information supplied by a human being; 
and information supplied by or obtained from another device. Examples include 
automatic video cameras and digital watches. Dictionary definitions of ‘machine’ also 
do not help in explaining what they may be, e.g. “an apparatus using mechanical 
power and having several parts for performing a particular task” (Oxford, 2008), since 
this excludes non-mechanical devices, i.e. digital devices. It is therefore necessary to 
consider how the machines in Miller (1992) relate to digital investigations.  
As described in Chapter 2, a digital investigation is a process that formulates 
and tests hypotheses using digital evidence. It can also be considered as a series of 
smaller processes, for example, the acquisition, analysis and presentation of digital 
evidence. In this research, the machines in Miller (1992) are considered to be 
equivalent to the processes that make up a digital investigation, since the machines in 
Miller (1992) process data and have inputs and outputs, as do the processes that make 
up a digital investigation. The remainder of this section discusses how the 
requirements in Miller (1992) can be applied to digital evidence.  
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Authenticity 
The dictionary definition of ‘authentic’ means “of undisputed origin; genuine” 
(Oxford, 2008) and therefore this requirement is concerned with being able to prove 
where a particular piece of digital evidence came from. Authenticity in Miller (1992) 
is broken into three parts and is first concerned with the authenticity, or origin, of the 
input to a process. The input to the first stage of a digital investigation (acquisition) is 
digital data which, as described in Chapter 2, is an abstraction of something physical 
e.g. data from a hard disk is actually an interpretation of changes in magnetisation on 
its surface (Sammes and Jenkinson, 2000 p.93-102). As a result, the ultimate origin of 
a piece of digital evidence is something physical and therefore digital evidence should 
be traceable back to an original physical piece of evidence. 
The second part of the authenticity requirement in Miller (1992) is that it must 
also be possible to assess the authenticity of the output from a process. Since the 
origin of the output of a process is the process itself, this means that it should be 
possible to demonstrate that the output data was the result of performing a particular 
process, i.e. to demonstrate what process was used to produce a specific output. This 
is equivalent to the example given in Miller (1992) of a person being able to verify 
that the output is from the machine (process) in question.  
Miller (1992) also states that “there is also always the question of how to deal 
with deliberate tampering with information stored in a system or the deliberate entry 
of false information into a system”. Therefore, accusations of tampering, i.e. 
“interfering without authority” (Oxford, 2008) with a piece of digital evidence should 
be refutable.  
In this research the requirement of authenticity for digital evidence is therefore 
a combination of the three aspects of authenticity in Miller (1992) and can be 
summarised as: it should be possible to demonstrate the origin of digital evidence, 
both in terms of coming from a particular piece of physical evidence and also being 
produced by running particular processes. In addition, accusations of tampering 
should be easily refutable.  
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Accuracy 
‘Accurate’ means “correct in all details” (Oxford, 2008), where ‘correct’ is defined as 
“free from error; true; right” (Oxford, 2008). This requirement has two parts in Miller 
(1992), where both the accuracy of the input and output of a process should be 
assessed. The requirement in Miller (1992) is not that the information supplied to or 
produced by a process needs to be accurate, i.e. free of error, but that the accuracy 
must be capable of being assessed. This is important given that proving absolute 
correctness is not possible since “all digital evidence has some degree of uncertainty” 
Casey (2002a), which is also supported in Palmer (2002) which describes that “there 
is error in every analytical method” and that “error rates in analysis are a fact. They 
should not be feared, but they must be measured”.  
 Given that digital evidence is an abstraction of some physical evidence that is 
translated through a number of layers of abstraction, and that error can be introduced 
at each abstraction layer (Carrier, 2003), it is important that at each abstraction layer 
the possible error is measured and understood. In addition, since this is a requirement 
that will be used to determine if digital evidence can be considered to be reliable, 
assessment on its own is insufficient; there must also be a measure of error that can be 
used to decide if a piece of digital evidence can be considered accurate, and therefore 
reliable. However, due to the different uses of digital evidence, the measure of error 
that is acceptable will depend on the context in which it is used and the decision to be 
made. Therefore, it is not possible to fix a measure of error that is acceptable. 
Therefore the requirement must be that the error must be acceptably small for the 
current investigation. Error in digital investigations is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 6. In this research the requirement of accuracy means that: it should be 
possible to assess the amount of error associated with all techniques used to obtain 
and process digital evidence, and that amount of error should be acceptable in the 
context of the current investigation. 
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Completeness 
Rynearson (1989) cited in Carrier (2006a) points out that “everything is evidence of 
some event. The key is to identify and then capture evidence related to the incident in 
question”. A consequence of this is that due to the diverse range of investigations and 
types of digital evidence, the person performing the investigation is best placed to 
decide what to include to ensure that evidence is ‘complete’ and only they can justify 
this decision. This means that the ‘completeness of preserved evidence’ is ultimately 
subjective. However, using their previous experience and knowledge of the current 
case, the investigator should be well positioned to determine and to justify what 
evidence needed to be preserved for this particular case. Once the evidence is 
presented, it is then up to those making a decision about the evidence to determine if it 
is sufficient. Therefore, similarly to accuracy, the completeness requirement is: it 
should be possible to assess which digital evidence is preserved and which is lost, and 
the maximum amount of digital evidence relevant to the investigation should be 
preserved. 
3.3.4. Summary 
This section has proposed general requirements for digital evidence. These were 
based on those described in Miller (1992) for ‘machine generated evidence’ but have 
been adapted by considering the processes that are part of a digital investigation to be 
equivalent to machines in Miller (1992). The three requirements in Miller (1992) have 
been discussed and it was explained how they apply to digital investigations. The 
proposed requirements are:  
 
Authenticity: it should be possible to demonstrate the origin of digital evidence, both 
in terms of coming from a particular piece of physical evidence and also being 
produced by running particular processes. In addition, accusations of tampering 
should be easily refutable, 
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Accuracy: it should be possible to assess the amount of error associated with all 
techniques used to obtain and process digital evidence, and that amount of error 
should be acceptable in the context of the current investigation. 
 
Completeness: it should be possible to assess which digital evidence is preserved and 
which is lost, and the maximum amount of digital evidence relevant to the 
investigation should be preserved. 
 
3.4 EXISTING REQUIREMENTS FOR DIGITAL EVIDENCE 
3.4.1 Introduction 
This section examines current requirements that are often used for digital evidence 
and digital investigations. It first shows that there are existing requirements that 
specifically agree with those proposed; however, the explanations of the principles 
differ. It also shows how some other existing requirements cannot be satisfied for live 
investigations, but that this is due to them assuming the use of traditional digital 
investigation approaches. It also shows that many of these current requirements are 
actually specific means of satisfying the general requirements proposed in the 
previous section. In order to show this, a number of sets of existing requirements are 
discussed. Subsection 3.4.2 discusses a set of requirements that specifically agree with 
those proposed. The remaining subsections then discuss a number of other sets of 
requirements, but since many present similar requirements they are divided here into 
the following subsections: evidence should not be altered, results should be accurate, 
processes should be repeatable, records of processes should be maintained, 
information should be authentic, and only what is authorised should be seized. 
3.4.2 Requirements that Agree with those Proposed 
One set of requirements that need to be mentioned individually are those in Sommer 
(1998) since they are also adapted and developed from Miller (1992). Sommer (1998) 
describes three general principles for evaluating evidence that state that evidence 
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should be authentic, accurate and complete. The explanations of these principles are 
as follows: 
 
Authentic: It should be possible to show that evidence is “specifically linked to the 
circumstances and persons alleged – and produced by someone who can answer 
questions about such links.” 
 
Accurate: It should be possible to show that evidence is “free from any reasonable 
doubt about the quality of procedures used to collect the material, analyse the material 
if that is appropriate and necessary and finally to introduce it into court – and 
produced by someone who can explain what has been done.” 
 
Complete: It should be possible to show that evidence “tells within its own terms a 
complete story of particular set of circumstances or events.” 
 
These are significantly different to the explanations proposed for using these as 
general requirements for digital evidence; however, the sentiments in each are similar. 
Linking evidence to the alleged persons is achieved by connecting digital evidence to 
some physical evidence, which is then connected to a person. Also, in the proposed 
requirements it is explicitly stated that accusations of tampering should be refutable, 
which is necessary since without it, it would be difficult to link digital evidence to the 
persons alleged. Sommer (1998) states that the evidence should be free from any 
reasonable doubt about the quality of procedures used to collect, analyse and 
introduce the material to court. This expression of the requirement demonstrates that 
these were written for forensic digital investigations, since ‘introduce it into court’ is 
used rather than ‘present’. Also, the measure of acceptable error used in Sommer 
(1998) is ‘free from any reasonable doubt’. For requirements to be truly general they 
must take into account the variety of uses of digital evidence, and as a result 
specifying that the ‘amount of error should be acceptable in the context of the current 
investigation’ is considered more appropriate. The completeness requirement in 
Sommer (1998) specifies that evidence should tell the complete story of a particular 
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set of circumstances or events. The proposed requirement states that it should be 
possible to assess what has been preserved and lost, which allows an assessment to be 
made about whether the evidence does tell a complete story.  
Therefore, despite the different explanations of the same three requirements of 
authentic, accurate and complete, those proposed agree in principle with those in 
Sommer (1998). However, for the purposes of assessing reliability of digital evidence 
from live investigations, the proposed requirements provide more explicit criteria 
describing what is necessary for digital evidence to be considered reliable. In addition 
to this set of requirements, there are also other requirements that are found in various 
pieces of literature. 
3.4.2 Evidence should not be altered 
This requirement is found in various forms in Pollitt (1995), ACPO (2007) and Mocas 
(2004). This is a relatively simple requirement to satisfy for systems that are 
encountered in an offline state, since the hard drive of the machine to be examined 
can be connected to the imaging/analysis machine through a physical write blocker 
which allows access to the contents of the drive while preventing any writes being 
made to the disk (Lyle, 2006). However, for machines that are encountered in a 
running state, it is possible to satisfy this requirement if only the hard drive of the 
machine is considered to be capable of containing relevant digital evidence. If the 
memory of the system is considered to be a potential source of digital evidence then 
this requirement is impossible to satisfy for a live machine regardless of whether a 
live investigation is performed since ‘pulling the plug’ on a live machine will change 
and in most cases rapidly clear the contents of RAM (Vidas, 2007, Halderman et al., 
2008). 
Chapter 2 discussed the necessity of live investigations and showed that in 
some cases digital evidence in memory can form an essential part of the investigation. 
As stated in Walters and Petroni (2007), “volatile memory is a critical component of 
the digital crime scene and as such, should also be integrated into every phase of the 
digital investigation process used to analyze that crime scene”. Once we accept that 
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the RAM of a machine is part of the digital crime scene and can contain potentially 
relevant digital evidence, performing any sort of live investigation makes it 
impossible to satisfy this requirement. This is because “there is no way to avoid 
making changes, since in order to conduct a live examination it is necessary to deploy 
tools on the live system to capture data, and such tools will make changes to the 
running system” (Sutherland et al., 2008). The requirement to ‘change nothing’ is also 
heavily criticised in Casey (2007), which states that “conforming to such a standard 
may be impossible in some circumstances and, therefore, postulating this standard as 
the ‘best practice’ only opens digital evidence to criticisms that have no bearing on 
the issues under investigation”. Casey (2007) also draws comparisons with physical 
world forensics, citing an example of destructive DNA testing that is still considered 
to be forensically sound, and therefore the requirement of “change nothing is … 
inconsistent with other forensic disciplines”. However, it does go on to accept that 
“the acquisition process should change the original evidence as little as possible and 
any changes should be documented and assessed in the context of the final analytical 
results”.  
 The difficulty in satisfying this requirement is acknowledged in both ACPO 
(2007) Principle 2 (“where a person finds it necessary to access original data held on a 
computer or on storage media, that person must be competent to do so and be able to 
give evidence explaining the relevance and the implications of their actions”) and in 
Mocas (2004) which states “changing some data of the target machine may be 
unavoidable”. Mocas (2004) goes on to describe types of interference with evidence 
as ‘non-interference’ and ‘identifiable interference’, where the former does not change 
the original data set and in the latter, the original data set is changed but the changes 
are identifiable. 
 Not altering evidence therefore should not be used as a general requirement 
for all digital investigations. However, by revisiting the requirements proposed in the 
previous section, the requirement to not alter evidence can be considered to be a 
specific means of satisfying two of the proposed general requirements. First, by not 
changing any evidence and being able to demonstrate this, it is simple to show the 
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authenticity of the digital evidence since it can be compared to the data on the original 
physical device and shown to be the same, thus demonstrating the origin of the digital 
evidence. Also, if evidence is not changed and this can be shown to be the case, then 
it is simple to make arguments about the completeness of the preserved evidence, 
since if nothing has been changed or overwritten then the evidence is as it was when it 
was first encountered and the maximum amount of evidence possible was preserved. 
Not altering any evidence is therefore considered as a specific mechanism to 
demonstrate authenticity and completeness.  
3.4.3 Results should be accurate 
Pollitt (1995) states that “examination results should be accurate”, but does not 
expand on this requirement. This could be interpreted as meaning that results need to 
be completely free from error. This is discussed in Casey (2002a) where accuracy 
relates to how closely data represents actual events and concludes that “all digital 
evidence has some degree of uncertainty and an expert should be capable of 
describing and estimating the level of certainty that can be placed in a given piece of 
evidence.” Accuracy is therefore accepted as being an important requirement, but only 
as described in the proposed requirements, where the accuracy must be capable of 
being assessed, thus allowing a human judgement to be made on whether the error is 
acceptably low, depending on the context in which the digital evidence is used. In 
Pollitt (1995) or any other requirements where one hundred percent accuracy is 
implied, it is a specific instance of an accuracy requirement, that is likely to be 
unachievable.  
3.4.4 Processes should be repeatable 
This requirement is described in various forms in Pollitt (1995), Sommer (1999), 
Mocas (2004) and ACPO (2007). This requirement is problematic to satisfy for many 
aspects of live digital investigation, particularly the acquisition stage. As discussed in 
Walters and Petroni (2007), for live investigations, “we can never reproduce the exact 
same inputs to the exact same tools, thereby making it difficult to prove the 
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correctness of any results that have been gathered”. To determine if this is a 
requirement it is necessary to consider what repeatability achieves; if a technique is 
repeatable, multiple parties can perform the same actions on the same data and show 
the results are consistent. This actually does not achieve or test accuracy but assesses 
the precision of the technique18 since it makes the assumption that the process 
produces correct results. Accurate results can be demonstrated by performing different 
processes19 on the same data and showing the results to be the same, thus increasing 
confidence that the results are correct. The requirement for the use of repeatable 
processes is therefore considered as a means of assessing the accuracy of the results 
and satisfying the accuracy requirement proposed earlier. 
3.4.5 Records of processes should be maintained 
ACPO (2007) states that “An audit trail or other record of all processes applied to 
computer-based electronic evidence should be created and preserved”. This allows 
applied processes to be repeated by others which demonstrates accuracy of results, as 
discussed in the previous section. It also allows the requirement of authenticity to be 
addressed since it records the processes that have been used to recover digital 
evidence from some physical piece of evidence.  
 A similar requirement stating that “there should be a clear chain of custody or 
continuity of evidence” is described in Sommer (1998, 1999), and can involve 
recording the physical items recovered from the original scene. This again 
demonstrates authenticity in terms of the origin of a piece of digital evidence since it 
demonstrates where the physical evidence from which digital evidence was recovered 
was obtained. It also involves recording persons who have had access to the evidence 
                                                 
18
 Oxford (2008) describes the difference between precision and accuracy: “Strictly speaking, precise 
does not mean the same as accurate. Accurate means ‘correct in all details’, while precise contains a 
notion of trying to specify details exactly: if you say ‘It’s 4.04 and 12 seconds’ you are being precise, 
but not necessarily accurate (your watch might be slow)” 
 
19
 using a different tool or manually examining the original data (Carrier 2003) 
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which can be used to demonstrate authenticity by limiting those who have access to 
evidence and therefore reducing the risk of accusations of tampering. 
Audit trails of processes applied and continuity of evidence can be used with 
digital evidence obtained from live investigations and are important for addressing the 
requirement of authenticity. However, since they provide evidence of authenticity 
they are not independent requirements.  
3.4.6 Information should be authentic 
This is a requirement in Mocas (2004), which explains that “it is often important to 
connect a person to a piece of information”. The need for digital evidence to be 
traceable back to an original piece of physical evidence was discussed earlier and 
shown to be part of the authenticity requirement. 
3.4.7 Only that which is Authorised Should be Seized 
Mocas (2004) describes the ‘minimisation’ requirement where in some cases “the law 
does not authorize the government to seize items which do not have evidentiary 
value”. This requirement is specific to forensic digital investigations and is also 
specific to particular regions’ legal systems. Therefore, this should not form part of 
general requirements for digital evidence. This example of a region specific 
requirement further demonstrates why it is necessary to develop requirements for 
digital investigations in general rather than for forensic digital investigations, since 
involving specific legal requirements for a particular region would make the reliability 
of digital evidence region specific. If necessary, it is easier to impose additional 
requirements on general ones in order to address the particulars of local legislation, 
rather than to write exceptions.  
3.4.8 Summary 
There are a number of different proposed requirements for digital evidence and digital 
investigations. However, they can be shown to be compatible with, or be specific 
mechanisms to satisfy the requirements proposed in Section 3.3.3 of authenticity, 
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accuracy and completeness. This supports the claim that the proposed requirements 
can be used as general requirements to indirectly assess the reliability of digital 
evidence.  
 
3.5 SATISFYING THESE REQUIREMENTS 
3.5.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the requirements for digital evidence proposed in Section 3.3.3 
and how traditional digital investigation techniques satisfy them. It also explains why 
these traditional approaches to satisfying these requirements cannot be used during 
live investigations. Digital investigations are discussed here as they are described in 
Chapter 2; where the stages of a digital investigation can be summarised as 
acquisition, analysis and presentation. In condensed form, a traditional digital 
investigation involves seizing a piece of physical evidence e.g. a computer, at some 
location, which is taken from the scene and stored at a secure location. At some point 
a disk image is created of the hard drive of the machine and verified against the actual 
disk contents using a cryptographic hash e.g. MD5 or SHA1. The disk image is then 
examined using forensic software e.g. EnCase, FTK etc. and the results presented in a 
report. The following subsection describes how the proposed requirements are 
satisfied by this traditional digital investigation process.  
3.5.2 Authenticity 
The requirement for authenticity described in Section 3.3.3 was it should be possible 
to demonstrate the origin of digital evidence, both in terms of coming from a 
particular piece of physical evidence and also being produced by running particular 
processes. In addition, accusations of tampering should be easily refutable. In a 
traditional digital investigation it is possible to demonstrate that digital evidence came 
from a particular piece of physical evidence since generally a full disk image of a 
drive is obtained and examined. The cryptographic hash, (e.g. MD5) of the disk image 
can be compared to that of the contents of the physical drive from which it came and 
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shown to be identical, thus demonstrating that the disk image and therefore digital 
evidence extracted from it originated from the seized physical evidence. This physical 
evidence can be traced back to a physical location by examining documentation of the 
original seizure. Accusations of tampering can be minimised though the principle of 
‘continuity of evidence’, where it is documented who has had access to the physical 
evidence and at what stage. Also, any tampering with the evidence can be detected 
from the point at which a hash of the evidence is first recorded. 
 In a live digital investigation, continuity of evidence is still possible after the 
initial seizure. However, the proof that digital evidence came from a particular 
physical piece of evidence may not be possible in the same way. This is because data 
may have been volatile, and after acquisition at the scene from a live machine, no 
longer exists, e.g. it was wiped when the power was removed. Therefore, 
demonstrating authenticity of live acquired evidence currently relies on documenting 
the process and trusting those performing the seizure to report the origin correctly.  
3.5.3 Accuracy 
The requirement for accuracy described in Section 3.3.3 was it should be possible to 
assess the amount of error associated with all techniques used to obtain and process 
digital evidence, and that amount of error should be acceptable in the context of the 
current investigation. In a traditional digital investigation the accuracy of the results 
can easily be assessed since the original physical evidence is accessible. This allows 
the accuracy of the acquisition stage of a digital investigation to be assessed by any 
number of people who can re-acquire the disk image and compare the cryptographic 
hash of the new image to that of existing disk images. 
 The accuracy of the analysis stage is more complicated and relies on multiple 
examiners (e.g. prosecution and defence) being able to perform the same analysis on 
the same raw data. They are able to use the same tools on the same raw data and 
check the results are the same, which ensures that the tools were used correctly and 
were operating normally. Also, accuracy can be determined for each interpretation of 
raw data though manual verification or using multiple tools (Carrier, 2003). From the 
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abstractions of the raw data, multiple examiners can perform their own high level 
analyses and come to their own conclusions about the evidence. These conclusions 
may or may not agree  
 In a live digital investigation, in many cases, the acquisition stage can be 
performed only once, meaning the assessment of accuracy using repeated acquisitions 
is not possible. Also, running tools that acquire, analyse and present results all on the 
live system means that no assessment of accuracy of any stage is possible through 
repeatability. This is because the output from the acquisition stage (i.e. the input to the 
analysis stage), is not preserved and therefore the raw data is not preserved to be 
inspected by multiple parties. As described in Chapter 2, this problem can be 
addressed by separating out the acquisition and analysis stages of a live digital 
investigation. For example, a memory image can be acquired from a live machine, 
followed by an analysis of that memory image which takes place ‘offline’ in a trusted 
environment. Here the accuracy of the results of analysis can be determined using the 
same repeatability method as a traditional digital investigation. However, the problem 
of determining the accuracy of the acquisition stage remains.  
3.5.4 Completeness 
The requirement for completeness described in Section 3.3.3 was it should be possible 
to assess which digital evidence is preserved and which is lost, and the maximum 
amount of digital evidence relevant to the investigation should be preserved. For 
traditional digital investigations, this is satisfied by adhering to guidelines that 
predetermine the scope of what potentially relevant digital evidence should be 
preserved, e.g. preserving and acquiring the entire hard drive but discarding data in 
memory: “it is accepted that the action of switching off the computer may mean that a 
small amount of evidence may be unrecoverable if it has not been saved to a storage 
medium but the integrity of the evidence already present will be retained” (ACPO, 
2003). 
 In a live digital investigation the preservation of potentially relevant digital 
evidence is more complicated. Since any tools that are used will make changes to the 
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system under investigation (Sutherland et al., 2008) and it is difficult to determine 
what has been altered, it is therefore difficult to assess what has been preserved and 
lost, and therefore if the maximum amount of relevant digital evidence has been 
preserved. This requirement is therefore difficult to satisfy and there is presently no 
way of addressing this problem.  
3.6 Challenges to Live Investigations 
The challenges to live investigations identified in Chapter 2 were: the difficulty 
trusting results, inherent intrusiveness, difficulty in verifying results and ensuring no 
evidence is missed.  
In Chapter 2, the concerns regarding trusting results were that the operating 
system could be modified to provide false information (either hiding malware that 
was responsible for incriminating material on the system, or an anti-forensic rootkit 
deliberately installed to hide data from a live investigation) or that ‘logic bombs’ 
could be placed on the system which could destroy evidence if triggered. Relating 
these to the proposed requirements, it can be seen that the former (OS modification) is 
concerned with the accuracy requirement for digital evidence, since both malware and 
anti-forensic rootkits could mean that the acquired data contains error. The latter 
(logic bombs) is concerned with the completeness of the preserved evidence since the 
use of a logic bomb would make it difficult to assess what evidence has been lost and 
could result in evidence being erased which would obviously decrease the 
completeness of the preserved evidence.  
The inherent intrusiveness of live techniques is also a completeness problem, 
since as tools and techniques make changes to a system, it becomes more difficult to 
assess what data is preserved and what is lost, and this could result in a decrease in the 
amount of preserved relevant digital evidence. 
Verification of results is challenging in live investigations since it is difficult 
to supply the exact same inputs to tools (Walters and Petroni, 2007), particularly at 
the acquisition stage. When related to the proposed requirements, the difficulty in 
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verifying results means that it is a problem assessing the accuracy of results of live 
investigations. 
Ensuring that no evidence is missed could be problematic for live 
investigations if partial acquisitions are performed. Since the entire hard disk would 
not be preserved, it is possible that challenges could be raised about the completeness 
of the preserved digital evidence and that something that was relevant was not 
collected. However, this is only a challenge where not all data on a system is collected 
and partial acquisitions and live investigations are not synonymous.  
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has discussed the 'reliability' aspect of digital evidence; including the 
difficulty in defining reliability and also that measuring it directly may not be 
possible. It has also shown that the reliability of digital evidence can be measured 
indirectly by evaluating it against a number of requirements. This chapter has 
examined the requirements in Miller (1992) for machine generated evidence and 
shown how they can be applied to digital evidence. The proposed requirements and 
their explanations are: 
 
Authenticity: it should be possible to demonstrate the origin of digital evidence, both 
in terms of coming from a particular piece of physical evidence and also being 
produced by running particular processes. In addition, accusations of tampering 
should be easily refutable. 
 
Accuracy: it should be possible to assess the amount of error associated with all 
techniques used to obtain and process digital evidence, and that amount of error 
should be acceptable in the context of the current investigation. 
 
Completeness: it should be possible to assess which digital evidence is preserved and 
which is lost, and the maximum amount of digital evidence relevant to the 
investigation should be preserved. 
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These are proposed as general requirements for digital evidence and have been 
validated by comparing them against a number of existing requirements which were 
shown either to be compatible with, or to be specific mechanisms of satisfying those 
proposed. This chapter has also explained how the proposed requirements are satisfied 
in traditional digital investigations and how live digital investigations cannot satisfy 
them in exactly the same way. 
The remainder of this thesis considers the extent to which these three 
requirements can be satisfied by live investigations that involve encrypted evidence, 
and therefore determines to what extent digital evidence obtained from live 
investigations can be considered to be reliable. 
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CHAPTER 4: COMPLETENESS AND ENCRYPTION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous section described the necessity for and details of the requirements used 
to assess the reliability of digital evidence. This section examines the ‘completeness’ 
requirement in the context of digital investigations involving encrypted evidence. 
Completeness was explained as it should be possible to assess which evidence is 
preserved and which is lost, and the maximum amount of digital evidence relevant to 
the investigation should be preserved. This chapter examines how the type of 
encryption on a system can affect the completeness of evidence recovered from an 
offline or ‘dead’ investigation. It considers if live investigations could increase the 
amount of evidence preserved and therefore increase the completeness and offer a 
more reliable set of digital evidence than traditional digital investigations. 
 
4.2 BACKGROUND 
This chapter examines the latter part of the completeness requirement described above 
and in Chapter 3 and therefore considers how the maximum amount of relevant digital 
evidence could be preserved. The difficulty with this requirement is identifying which 
digital evidence is potentially relevant to the investigation. There have been attempts 
to define the types and location of digital evidence that are specific to different types 
of investigations. For example, guidelines from the National Institute of Justice (2001) 
identify fourteen ‘crime categories’, a selection of which are shown in Table 3 to 
illustrate the types of digital evidence that can be examined.  
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Crime Category Common findings 
Child Exploitation Chat logs, data time stamps, digital camera software, e-
mail/notes/letters, games, graphic editing and viewing software, 
images, Internet activity logs, movie files, user created directory 
and file names that classify images. 
Computer Intrusion 
 
Address books, configuration files, e-mail/notes/letters, executable 
programs, Internet activity logs, Internet protocol (IP) address and 
usernames, Internet Relay Chat (IRC) logs, source code, text files. 
E-mail Threats/ 
Harassment/Stalking 
Address books, diaries, e-mail/notes/letters, financial/asset records, 
images, Internet activity logs, legal documents, telephone records, 
victim background research. 
 
Table 3: A selection of ‘common findings’ from three of the fourteen different crime categories in NIJ (2001). 
 
While these are useful broad starting points, since individual cases have specific 
requirements, these ‘crime categories’ can be used as guidelines only, and cannot 
contain exhaustive lists that define the scope or completeness of digital investigations.  
 The question of ‘completeness of evidence’ is particularly relevant when 
discussing the investigation of large volumes of data; particularly when the idea of 
‘partial’ or ‘selective’ acquisition is suggested. A selective acquisition occurs when 
the decision is made “not to acquire all the possible information during the capture 
process” (Turner, 2006). In the case of selective acquisition, completeness is an issue 
since it is difficult to know “that you have captured everything relevant to the case 
under investigation or have not missed evidence of other offences” (Turner, 2006). It 
is also possible that evidence that proves the suspect’s innocence was missed. 
 Kenneally and Brown (2005) examines in more detail the potential problems 
of selective acquisition, e.g. data that is not collected is inaccessible to the defence 
and could be relevant. Kenneally and Brown (2005) heavily focuses on case law from 
the United States to argue in favour of what is described as ‘risk sensitive digital 
evidence collection’, i.e. a selective acquisition, and also uses examples from physical 
forensic science. It is suggested that ‘reasonableness’ should be used to determine the 
scope of an investigation; “just as it would be unreasonable to expect that 
investigators cordon-off an entire building, mercury fulminate hundreds of offices for 
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latent fingerprints and seize every file cabinet during the course of a robbery scene 
investigation”, “the reasonableness standard takes into account cost and capabilities, 
and does not require perfection.” This example of seizing entire buildings in physical 
forensic science examples is often used, “complete bit-by-bit captures of huge targets 
may be completely impractical, in the same sense that capturing the state of an entire 
building is impractical in a (non-digital) forensics investigation involving a murder” 
(Richard_III and Roussev, 2006). 
While the issue of the completeness of selective acquisitions is interesting and 
is likely to be highly relevant for the future of digital investigations, it is considered to 
be outside the scope of this research. This work assumes that access to encrypted 
evidence is desired to ensure completeness. While it does not go as far as Forster 
(2005), where it is assumed that data that has been encrypted is likely to be of 
evidential value since “it is usually incriminating or unlawful material that suspects 
seek to hide in this way”, it is assumed that encrypted data is potentially relevant and 
it is necessary to gain access in order to determine if it is, or is not relevant to the 
investigation. Therefore, if encrypted data from a system is preserved in a form that 
can be analysed rather than being lost or rendered inaccessible then completeness is 
taken to be increased.  
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
This section describes the methodology that is used to examine encryption software 
and determine how a traditional digital investigation would be affected if such 
software was in use. The general methodology section describes the way in which the 
different products are categorised, which allows generalisations to be made about the 
locations on disk in which evidence is rendered inaccessible by encryption software. 
This is followed by the experimental methodology section which describes how the 
amount of evidence that is left in an accessible form is quantified.  
4.3.1 General Methodology 
To determine whether the completeness of preserved digital evidence (that would 
otherwise be in encrypted form) will increase if a live investigation is performed, it is 
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necessary to know whether the encrypted evidence is likely to be accessible if a live 
investigation were not performed and offline or ‘dead’ approaches were used instead 
(described in Chapter 2). Since there are a large number of different encryption 
products available, in order to generalise about the success of offline approaches and 
therefore the need for a live investigation, it is necessary to categorise encryption 
products in some way. 
 An existing method of categorisation is described in WinMagic (2005), which 
separates encryption software into four categories. These categories are:  
 
Manual File Encryption: A user selects a single file for encryption;  
Folder Encryption: all files contained within a particular folder are automatically 
encrypted;  
Virtual Drive Encryption: A virtual drive is created which is stored as a single file on 
the user’s file system. All data stored on that virtual drive is automatically encrypted. 
Data is decrypted on a block basis rather than by file;  
Disk Encryption: This encrypts all data on the disk including the operating system 
itself.  
 
These categories can be considered to define the scope of the encryption, since the 
category distinctions are made based on how much data is encrypted, a single file, 
folder, virtual drive or the entire disk. As more of the disk is encrypted, a live 
investigation will allow the preservation of more data that would otherwise be lost. 
However, there are techniques that can be used to attempt to gain access to encrypted 
data offline without performing a live investigation, which were described in Section 
2.3.3. The success of some of these approaches was dependant on what data on disk 
remained in unencrypted form. Since products are categorised based on this property, 
depending on which locations remain unencrypted, some product categories may not 
require a live investigation to be performed. Table 4.2 that follows discusses whether 
the success of each of the offline approaches is affected by the category of product in 
use.  
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Approach Discussion Success can be 
generalised depending 
on category 
Obtain keys from 
suspect 
This is dependent on the co-operation of the suspect, which is too case specific to 
generalise with regard to encryption product categories. 
n 
Locate 
unencrypted data 
Since plaintext can be found on disk, the amount of the disk that is accessible to an 
offline investigation is relevant and the success of this approach may be able to be 
generalised based on the product category. 
y 
Locate copies of 
the key/password 
Locating copies of the key is dependant on the key backup mechanism of the 
specific product in use, for example, BitLocker keys can be printed or stored on USB 
key or any other folder (Microsoft, 2007d), TrueCrypt full volume encryption 
requires that a TrueCrypt recovery CD is created (TrueCrypt, 2008e). However, as 
described in Chapter 2, the disk can be scanned for strings which may include any 
saved copies of the typed password, whether stored accidentally or on purpose. 
Therefore, the amount of disk available affects the amount strings that can be 
extracted and tried as possible passwords.  
y 
Intelligent 
password attacks 
The success of this approach depends on the complexity and length of the password 
used and the technical capability of the suspect. Password attacks can be speeded up 
using rainbow tables, where information is pre-calculated for specific sets of 
passwords. However, for longer passwords this is not feasible and it is necessary to 
be selective about the passwords tested. Intelligent password attacks are therefore 
dependent on the availability of information upon which to select likely passwords. 
Therefore the amount of the disk that is accessible to the investigator will have an 
effect on the success of this approach.  
y 
Exhaustive keys 
search 
As described in Chapter 2, brute force attacks are not feasible on modern algorithms. 
Therefore the success of this approach depends on a specific implementation using 
an insecure algorithm. 
n 
Vulnerabilities in 
implementations 
This is, by definition, implementation specific.  n 
Cryptanalysis As described in Chapter 2, in this research, the algorithms used are considered not to 
be vulnerable to cryptanalysis. The success of this approach would be dependant on 
a specific implementation using an insecure algorithm. 
n 
Surveillance This is case specific; however, the type of encryption may have an effect on the type 
of surveillance that can be used. For example pre-boot encryption such as Bitlocker 
prevent the use of software based key loggers but hardware versions can still be 
used. However, this is not considered in this research. 
n 
 
Table 4: Descriptions of whether the success of offline approaches to gaining access to encrypted digital evidence depends on the 
product category. 
 
Therefore, the success of three of the approaches described is affected by the locations 
on disk that are accessible to an offline investigation, and therefore the type of 
encryption product in use.  
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As can be seen in Table 4, the first approach that could be affected by product 
category is ‘locating unencrypted data’. For this there are two situations to consider. 
The first is whether the encryption software itself leaves plaintext data on the disk. 
This can either be as a result of failing to erase the original plaintext or by the creation 
of temporary files when data is decrypted. The second situation to consider is whether 
other applications that use the encrypted data while it is in decrypted form create 
copies of plaintexts that will be later accessible to an offline investigation. Metadata 
about files may also be left, even if the contents are not. This will be specific to the 
application that opens the encrypted data, e.g. notepad, Microsoft Word etc. Despite 
this, it is possible to identify particular locations on disk that could contain evidence 
that could be useful when using the described approaches, which are shown in Table 
5. 
For the second approach, ‘locating copies of passwords’, there are a number of 
likely candidate locations that may provide other passwords used by the suspect. 
These include the pagefile and also saved passwords from Internet browsers etc. 
These are also described in Table 5. 
The third and final approach ‘intelligent password attacks’ relies on collecting 
personal details about the suspect, from which likely passwords can be constructed. 
For this approach, a number of locations may be of use, for example browsing history 
and personal files. This is discussed in Table 5. 
 To determine whether the offline approaches are likely to be successful, it is 
investigated whether particular locations on disk remain accessible after the power is 
removed. Table 5 that follows describes different locations and content on disk that 
may be use in gaining access to the encrypted material on the disk. These locations 
are based on those in WinMagic (2005); however, some additional locations have 
been added that are specific to the encrypted data recovery techniques discussed in 
this chapter.  
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Location Description 
Temporary Files A temporary file is “a file created either in memory or on disk, 
by the operating system or some other program, to be used 
during a session and then discarded” (Microsoft, 2002). If a file 
that is encrypted is opened by some piece of software for editing 
or viewing then it is possible that a temporary file in decrypted 
form could be created which is not erased at the end of the 
session. Therefore, access to temporary files may mean access to 
copies of the plaintext. 
Pagefiles Pagefiles exist because RAM is a limited resource and when the 
total memory needed on a system exceeds what is available, data 
that is not immediately needed is ‘paged out’ of memory and 
stored on the disk (Microsoft, 2004). When the data is needed it 
is paged back into memory. 
 Pagefiles may contain a number of different types of 
useful information; they may contain temporary decrypted 
copies of encrypted data, passwords from memory that have 
been paged to disk, or data from memory from other applications 
that may help with intelligent password attacks. 
Slack space There are two types of slack space (Carrier, 2005 p.187). 
  
1. Between the exact end of the file and the end of the sector in 
which the file ends, which can contain data from memory (buffer 
slack or RAM slack). 
 
2. Between the last sector that contains part of the file and the 
last sector of the cluster, which can contain data from previous 
files that resided on that part of the disk (cluster slack).  
 
This is shown below diagrammatically (Sammes and Jenkinson, 
2007). 
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 Sector 1 Sector 2 
450 512 
buffer slack 
File 1 Free 
 
 
 
S.1 S.2 S.3 S.4 S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 
Cluster 
cluster slack 
 
Slack space is important since it may provide access to deleted 
data which could be deleted plaintext or data that could be used 
to construct passwords. 
The Recycle Bin When files are deleted, they are first moved to the Recycle Bin. 
The file is renamed using the convention 
<DRIVELETTER><#>.<ORIGINALEXTENSION> e.g. 
‘d1.txt’. Its original name and path is stored in an INFO2 file in 
a folder named ‘recycled’ (Microsoft, 2007a). These files may 
be deleted plaintext or contain information that could be used to 
construct passwords. 
Deleted Files When the Recycle Bin is emptied, only then are files actually 
deleted. Even then, files are not actually erased. The space that 
the file occupied is marked as free and can be overwritten by 
new data stored to disk. The files are therefore still accessible 
after deletion for an undetermined but non-zero amount of time. 
The Windows Registry The Windows Registry is “a central hierarchical database used 
… to store information that is necessary to configure the system 
for one or more users, applications and hardware devices” 
(Microsoft, 2002). The Registry is stored as a number of ‘hive’ 
files, which are “files that contain a Registry sub-tree” 
(Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.263). 
 The Registry could contain a number of useful pieces of 
information, including hashes of some passwords used by the 
suspect, programs run and recently accessed files (which may 
point to encrypted files). 
Users Folders, e.g. This is where the majority of user data is likely to be stored. 
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C:\Documents and 
Settings\User 
Also applications should write their configuration data (e.g. 
browser caches) to these folders (Gajic, 2008). Encryption 
software may therefore use this location to store temporary files. 
Also, user data can be used to obtain information upon which to 
base intelligent password attacks. Alternatively user data may 
contain passwords intentionally stored by users to assist in 
remembering them. 
Hibernation file The hibernation file contains the complete state of the system at 
a specific point in time, including the memory (Ruff and Suiche, 
2007). Therefore, it could contain passwords or plaintext that 
was stored in memory at the time of the hibernation.  
Hidden partitions This is a “portion of the hard disk that an operating system, such 
as Windows, does not recognize or display a file system for” 
(WinMagic, 2005) and therefore could be used to conceal data 
since it is not accessible through normal use of the system. 
Free space between 
partitions 
Between partitions and at the end of the disk is free space, since 
partitions can be created with gaps in between. It is also possible 
to conceal data in these locations.  
 
Table 5: Locations on disk that may assist in providing access to encrypted data. 
 
WinMagic (2005) makes specific predictions about the availability of some of these 
locations for the different encryption scope categories. The diagrams used in 
WinMagic (2005) are shown in Figure 6, and are summarised in Table 6. 
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Figure 6: Graphics from WinMagic (2005) showing the availability of locations on disk 
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Location Expected Availability of Location 
 Single File Folder Virtual Drive Full Disk 
Temporary Files available possible possible encrypted 
Paging Files available available available encrypted 
Slack Space available available encrypted encrypted 
The Recycle Bin available encrypted encrypted encrypted 
Deleted Files available available encrypted encrypted 
User folders20 unspecified unspecified unspecified unspecified 
The Registry available available available encrypted 
Hibernation and Sleep Files available unspecified unspecified encrypted 
Hidden Partitions available unspecified unspecified encrypted 
Free Space between Partitions available available unspecified encrypted 
 
Table 6: Predictions of availability of unencrypted data to an offline analysis (WinMagic, 2005).  
 ‘Possible’ is entered if data in these locations may or may not be encrypted e.g. for temporary files, it depends in where they are 
generated. Also, ‘unspecified’ is entered where there were no claims made about the availability of data in a particular location. 
 
In order to determine the correctness of these predictions of availability of particular 
locations, experiments are set up to examine these locations on disk images from 
systems that have been running a variety of different encryption software from the 
different categories.  
4.3.2 Experimental Methodology 
For most categories examined, three products are used, with the exception being 
‘folder encryption’ where only one product could be found to belong to the category. 
The selection of products is based on the extent of their use or if they are particularly 
of interest. Random sampling from a sample frame could be used but since statistical 
techniques are not being applied and only inductive conclusions are drawn, random 
sampling is not considered necessary. Furthermore, this testing provides additional 
information that may be of use to the community21 other than just for the purpose of 
                                                 
20
 This location was not discussed in WinMagic (2005) but has been added here since it may be useful 
for intelligent password attacks. 
21
 E.g. the location of temporary files generated by the encryption software 
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this research. If products were chosen for testing at random and they were not in 
popular use, then this additional information would be of little further use.  
The tests are carried out on copies of a baseline virtual machine running 
Windows XP SP2. The use of virtual machines was discussed in Chapter 1. The 
baseline virtual machine used in this case has the following disk map: 
 
Figure 7: Disk map of the test drive used, showing start and end sectors of the different partitions. 
 
Each product under test is examined in its own virtual machine. The general 
procedure used for each product examination is detailed below. 
1. The baseline virtual machine is cloned to a new folder and booted. 
2. The encryption product on test is installed on the machine (in the full disk 
encryption cases this also involves encrypting the disk and in the case of 
virtual disks, the creation, formatting and mounting of a virtual disk). 
3. A new folder named ‘test’ is created on the virtual system (on the desktop for 
most but on the virtual drive in the appropriate cases). 
4. The programs gentest22 and gentemp23 are also copied to the test folder. 
5. A command prompt is opened on the virtual system and gentest is run from 
the test folder with the parameters gentest 600 b 1, which produces a 
                                                 
22
 The program gentest was written in C and produced a number of plaintexts of a specified size. The 
parameters passed are gentest [size] [unit (m/k/b)] [number of files]. The program 
produces files containing the text “This is the plaintext” preceded by a unique line number. This was 
inspired by (Farmer and Venema 2004 p.172) 
23
 The program gentemp is also written in C and represents the worst case in terms of temporary file 
generation. This program simply creates an exact duplicate of the file it opens and places it in the folder 
from which the program was called. It then fails to delete the generated temporary file. The parameters 
passed are gentemp [path + name of file to open] 
0 63 
62 
6136830 
6136829 
7148925 
7164989 
7261380 
8388607 
7164990 
7261379 7148924 
Partition 1 
FAT32 
2.9 GB 
Partition 2 
FAT32 
494 MB 
Partition 3 
Unformatted 
47.1 MB 
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single 600 byte file, which is just larger than a sector (512 bytes) and has both 
buffer and cluster slack. 
6. The virtual machine is paused (after a short time in order for writes to the 
virtual disk to take place). 
7. The file representing the hard disk of the virtual system is examined in X-Ways 
Forensics and the disk examined for evidence of the plaintext file. If it is 
found then its location is documented. 
8. Each of the techniques listed below are applied to test for the presence of 
plaintext data in each of the locations specified earlier. The design of this 
procedure allows all locations to be examined sequentially in the order 
described in Table 7 without needing to revert to the virtual machine to the 
baseline snapshot. 
Location Method Used 
Temporary Files To test if temporary files are accessible, the developed software 
gentest is used. This simply creates a duplicate of the opened file in 
the directory from which it is called. This represents the most 
extreme form of temporary file generation, where the entire file is 
duplicated. Temporary files are generated in the location of the test 
file and also in the root of the C:\ drive. 
Paging Files The file on disk representing the virtual machine’s hard disk is 
loaded into X-Ways Forensics and the PageFile examined. If the 
contents are accessible (which is obvious since text is usually 
visible somewhere) then the Pagefile is considered to be 
‘accessible’. Also, where possible, attempts are made to use the 
encryption product under test to deliberately encrypt the pagefile.   
Slack Space As mentioned earlier, files are generated that are not multiples of 
the sector size. In these cases gentest 600 b 1 is used to 
generate a 600 byte file that just stretches across two sectors. The 
buffer and cluster slack of the original (where possible) and the 
encrypted file are examined before and after encryption. Also the 
general accessibility of slack space on other files on the disk is 
determined. 
The Recycle Bin Where possible the plaintext file is sent to the Recycle Bin and is 
accessed offline through X-Ways Forensics. If the contents of the 
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file can be read then the Recycle Bin is considered to be accessible. 
Encrypted files are also sent to the Recycle Bin and the contents 
examined. 
Deleted Files The Recycle Bin is emptied and the sectors in which the plaintext 
file previously existed examined and the ‘this is the plaintext’ 
string searched for. Also, in cases where the plaintext is erased by 
the encryption software, the sectors are examined and if non-text 
strings are encountered then the ENT program (Walker, 2008) used 
to test for statistical randomness (to check plaintext data was not 
simply permutated or substituted). Other files on the disk are also 
deleted to infer about the general accessibility of deleted files.  
The Registry The hive files that make up the Windows Registry (SYSTEM, 
SAM, SOFTWARE, DEFAULT, NTUSER) are opened in X-Ways 
Forensics. If the hives can be mounted and explored then they are 
considered to be accessible. 
User folders The folder C:\Documents and Settings\Chris is examined and if the 
folder can be browsed then it is considered to be accessible. A 
deliberate attempt is made to encrypt a file from this location. A 
sample file C:\Documents and Settings\Chris\Cookies\index.dat is 
used as a test case to determine whether it can be encrypted (this 
file is known to be reported as ‘in use’ by Windows). 
Hibernation Files The default Windows hibernation file is stored in C:\hiberfil.sys. If 
this file can be accessed in the disk image then the hibernation file 
is considered to be accessible. 
Hidden Partitions As described earlier, the disk of the virtual test system is set up so 
that there are several partitions. Partition 3 is unformatted and is 
therefore not visible to Windows but is manually filled with the test 
string “Hidden partition”. X-Ways Forensics is used to attempt to 
view the partition and if this is successful then it is considered to 
be accessible.  
Free Space between Partitions As described earlier, the disk is set up with space between 
partitions. This is edited manually in the baseline image to contain 
the text “space between partitions”. If after encryption this text is 
visible using X-Ways Forensics then this area of the disk is 
considered to be accessible. 
 
Table 7: Techniques used to test for the presence of plaintext data in various locations. 
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4.4 RESULTS 
4.4.1 Single File Encryption Results 
AxCrypt 
This is an open source, single file encryption product that uses AES encryption with 
128 bit keys (Axantum Software, 2008). It integrates with Windows Explorer and 
encryption is performed by right clicking a file and selecting encrypt, as shown in 
Figure 8. An encrypted file is opened by double clicking which then decrypts the file 
and opens it with the default program. 
 
 
Figure 8: AxCrypt and Windows Explorer right click integration providing the option for encryption and decryption. 
 
The results for the offline examination of an AxCrypt system are described in  
Table 8. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files Temporary files were produced by both the decryption process and 
by the software gentemp. ‘Pulling the plug’ while the plaintext file 
was open revealed a temporary copy of the plaintext file in the 
C:\Documents and Settings\Chris\Local Settings\Temp\axcrypt\... 
Also, temporary files produced using the gentemp program were 
accessible. 
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Paging Files An examination of the disk image showed that the pagefile was 
accessible to the offline analysis. Attempts to encrypt the pagefile 
with AxCrypt failed. 
Slack Space When encryption was applied to the test files, the buffer slack of 
the original plaintext was filled with zeros but the cluster slack was 
found to contain data from the files previously stored in that 
location. However, other than the manually encrypted files, other 
files’ buffer slack and cluster slack was accessible. 
The Recycle Bin An examination of the disk image showed that the contents of the 
Recycle Bin were accessible to the offline analysis. Attempts to 
encrypt the Recycle Bin were not successful. However, encrypted 
files that were sent to the Recycle Bin remained encrypted.  
Deleted Files AxCrypt encrypts to a new file and by default erases the original 
plaintext. The original sectors containing the plaintext were 
examined and found to contain random data. However, other files 
on the disk that were not encrypted and were deleted were 
accessible. 
The Registry An examination of the disk image showed that the Registry hive 
files were accessible to the offline analysis. Attempts to encrypt the 
hive files were not successful. 
User folders Individual files in user folders could be encrypted but this had to be 
done manually. However, attempting to encrypt C:\Documents and 
Settings\Chris\Cookies\index.dat failed. 
Hibernation Files The hibernate file, hiberfil.sys was available to an offline analysis. 
Attempts to encrypt this file were not successful.   
Hidden Partitions Other partitions were available to the offline analysis and could not 
be encrypted. 
Free Space between Partitions Free space between partitions was available to an offline analysis. 
 
Table 8: Results from AxCrypt. 
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GNU Privacy Guard (GNUPG) (for Windows) 
This is a free, open source implementation of the OpenPGP standard (Koch, 2007) 
which includes a full replacement for PGP that can be used on messages or on files. 
The software also provides right click integration with Windows Explorer for file 
encryption, as shown in Figure 9. The results of the offline encryption of GNU 
Privacy Guard are shown in Table 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Windows Explorer integration of GNU Privacy Guard. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files When the encrypted file was accessed, a decrypted copy was 
created in the same directory as the encrypted file. When access to 
the file is no longer required, it needs to be either re-encrypted or 
manually erased. Temporary files were therefore accessible to an 
offline analysis. The same is true for any temporary files produced 
by software used to view the decrypted files. 
Paging Files The pagefile was accessible to an offline analysis and could not be 
encrypted.  
Slack Space The buffer slack of the encrypted file consisted of zeros and the 
cluster slack contained data from files that were previously stored 
in that location.  
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The Recycle Bin The Recycle Bin was accessible to an offline analysis. 
Deleted Files GNUPG encrypted the files to a new location and left the originals 
in place. GNUPG does not provide file erasing capabilities. 
Therefore, if plaintext files are deleted, they are likely to be 
available to an offline analysis unless manually erased using 
separate software. 
The Registry The Registry hive files were available to an offline analysis. 
User folders Individual files in user folders could be encrypted but this had to be 
done manually. Attempting to encrypt C:\Documents and 
Settings\Chris\Cookies\index.dat failed. 
Hibernation Files Hiberfil.sys was available to an offline analysis. 
Hidden Partitions Additional partitions were available to an offline analysis. 
Free Space between Partitions This was accessible to an offline analysis. 
 
Table 9: Results from GNU Privacy Guard. 
 ‘Encrypt Files’ 
The mechanism by which this software operates is slightly different but it still 
involves manual single file encryption. Instead of Windows Explorer integration, it 
uses a separate program that accesses the files on the disk. Through this single 
interface, file encryption is performed, as shown in Figure 10. The results of the 
offline examination of Encrypt Files are shown in Table 10. 
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Figure 10: The Encrypt Files software providing access to files on disk and the option to encrypt or decrypt those files.. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files The Encrypt Files software was used to convert files between 
encrypted and decrypted states. The availability of the plaintext 
depends on the ‘Source File Action’ option, used to re-encrypt the 
file each time, which is either ‘leave’, ‘delete’ or ‘shred’. From inside 
the software, once a file was decrypted it could be opened with other 
software. Any temporary files generated by other software were in 
unencrypted form and were accessible unless these additional copies 
were manually encrypted or erased.  
Paging Files The pagefile was accessible to an offline analysis and could not be 
encrypted using Encrypt Files. 
Slack Space The buffer slack was zeroed and the cluster slack contained data 
previously stored at that location. In general the file slack of files on 
the disk was still accessible.  
The Recycle Bin The Recycle Bin was accessible to an offline analysis. However, 
using the interface of Encrypt Files, files that had been previously 
sent to the Recycle Bin could be manually encrypted.  
Deleted Files Several options were provided for plaintext: ‘leave’, ‘delete’ or 
‘shred’. The default option is ‘shred’ which overwrites the original 
plaintext. However, when the ‘delete’ option was used, it was found 
that deleted files could be accessed.  
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The Registry The hive files that make up the Registry were available to an offline 
analysis and could not be encrypted using Encrypt Files. 
User folders Files in user folders could be manually encrypted but need manual 
decryption before they could be used. Index.dat could not be 
encrypted.  
Hibernation Files The hibernate file was available to an offline analysis and could not 
be encrypted using the software.  
Hidden Partitions Additional partitions were available to an offline analysis and could 
not be encrypted using Encrypt Files.  
Free Space between Partitions This was accessible to an offline analysis and could not be encrypted 
using Encrypt Files.  
 
Table 10: Results from Encrypt Files. 
Summary of Single File Encryption 
For all the single file encryption products, the majority of locations remained 
accessible to an offline analysis. Files had to be manually encrypted and decrypted 
and existed fully on disk in one of these states. For AxCrypt and GNU Privacy Guard 
files were decrypted to temporary files in order to be accessed, and while Encrypt 
Files did use temporary files, the actual file’s state changed between encrypted and 
decrypted and the availability of the previous state is dependent on the ‘source file 
action’ selected (shred, leave or delete). Any temporary files produced by other 
software were also accessible. The temporary files produced by the encryption 
software may or may not be erased after use, depending on the implementation. If the 
temporary files were not erased but deleted, then they would be accessible in 
unallocated space but are susceptible to being overwritten by new data. Also, only the 
logical file was encrypted and the cluster slack remained accessible.  
AxCrypt erases the plaintext file after encrypting and Encrypt Files provides 
the option to ‘shred’ the plaintext file. However, GNU Privacy Guard had neither and 
the plaintext file needs to be either manually deleted or erased with other software. 
The availability of the original plaintext is therefore implementation specific.  
 Due to the manual encryption process, these programs could not be used to 
encrypt the pagefile, hibernation file or Registry. Also, since the encryption is 
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designed for single files, both hidden partitions and free space between partitions 
could not be encrypted with this type of encryption software. Some files in the user 
folders could be encrypted, but any files in use by Windows e.g. \Cookies\index.dat 
could not be encrypted because the manual file decryption does not allow the 
operating system transparent access to the file.  
Regarding the approaches for attempting to access encrypted evidence 
discussed earlier, in terms of locating unencrypted copies of encrypted data, for these 
manual file encryption packages the availability of the original plaintext is 
implementation specific, depending on whether the original is deleted or wiped.  
 Encrypted files are decrypted in their entirety to files on disk while in use 
(either taking the form of temporary files (AXCrypt, GNUPG) or the file is changed to 
its decrypted form permanently (EncryptFiles)). The temporary files then are either 
deleted or erased after use. Temporary files generated by other applications are likely 
to be deleted only, since other applications are not aware of the sensitive nature of the 
files they have opened, and as a result may useful for obtaining unencrypted copies of 
encrypted data. 
 In terms of locating passwords, due to limitations of the scope of the manual 
file encryption software, any files that have not been manually encrypted are 
accessible, and text from them can be used as possible passwords. The inability of this 
type of encryption software to encrypt locations such as the Registry hives means that 
these locations can be used to obtain possible passwords or personal data from which 
passwords can be derived.  
  Chapter 4 
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4.4.2 Folder Based Encryption Results 
Encrypting File System (EFS) 
The Encrypting File System (EFS) provides the ability to encrypt files on NTFS file 
systems. When files in NTFS are flagged as encrypted, as shown in Figure 11, they 
are transparently encrypted without the need to enter a password or provide keys since 
this information is recovered from the Registry using the user’s Windows logon 
password (Microsoft, 2006c). 
 
 
Figure 11: Advanced attributes allowing the encryption of files using EFS. 
 
It is also possible to flag an entire folder as encrypted, meaning that files stored within 
that folder will also be automatically encrypted. When a file is encrypted, both 
symmetric and asymmetric encryption is used and when the file is stored with the 
structure shown in Figure 12 (Microsoft, 2006d). 
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Figure 12: The structure of an EFS file (Microsoft, 2006d). 
 
The results for the offline examination of EFS systems are described below in  
Table 11. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files Temporary files generated inside the encrypted folder were also 
automatically encrypted. However, if the temporary files were 
generated in a folder that did not have the ‘encrypted’ attribute, 
then they were accessible to an offline analysis. In addition, there is 
a related implementation problem; when a single file is encrypted, 
a temporary copy is made of the plaintext named EFS0.TMP. 
When encryption is completed the file is deleted but not erased 
(Carrier, 2005 p.290). This can result in additional temporary 
copies of the plaintext being available on the disk. 
Paging Files The encrypted attribute could not be applied to the pagefile in 
Windows XP. However, “Windows Vista also supports encryption 
of items previously either impossible or not easily accomplished in 
Windows XP” (Morello, 2007). This includes the pagefile, and due 
to this significant difference between operating systems, another 
experiment was performed. It was eventually possible to encrypt 
the pagefile under Windows Vista using EFS.  
Slack Space The buffer slack of encrypted files consisted of random data, which 
is assumed to be encrypted. However, the cluster slack was not. 
The cluster slack was unchanged after encryption and contained the 
Logged Utility  
Stream Attribute 
00 01 00 00 
Data Attribute 
80 00 00 00 
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contents of previously deleted files. 
The Recycle Bin Contents of the Recycle Bin were generally accessible. When 
encrypted files were deleted they were moved to the Recycle Bin 
and the existence of the files and their metadata was available. 
However, the contents of the files remained encrypted. This is 
because the files were not actually moved and the encrypted data 
remained in the same location on disk, but the Parent ID of the 
entries in the Master File Table (MFT) were updated to reflect that 
they were now in the Recycle Bin. 
Deleted Files Once the Recycle Bin was emptied, the encrypted data from the 
deleted files was still present on the disk until overwritten by new 
data. However, recovery of deleted EFS files from unallocated 
space is difficult since carving is ineffective due to the content 
consisting of random data. Recovery therefore relies on finding the 
MFT entry for the deleted files.  
The Registry The Registry hive files could not be encrypted with EFS. 
User folders The encryption attributes were applied to the folder C:\Documents 
and Settings\Chris, but there were a number of files and folders 
that could not be encrypted because they were ‘currently in use’, 
including NTUSER.DAT, and index.dat in the cookies folder.  
Hibernation Files The hibernation file could not be encrypted with EFS. 
Hidden Partitions Any partitions that were not visible to Windows could not be 
encrypted with EFS.  
Free Space between Partitions Free space between partitions could not be encrypted with EFS 
since is not a file or folder and EFS encryption attributes could not 
be applied.  
 
Table 11: Results from EFS. 
Summary of Folder Based Encryption 
Only one product was found to belong to this category without examining file system 
level encryption from other operating systems, e.g. Private Folders in Ubuntu 8.10 or 
FileVault in Mac OS X. In terms of recovering unencrypted copies of encrypted data, 
the encryption mechanism may or may not produce temporary copies in decrypted 
form, depending on whether the ‘encrypted’ attribute is applied to a single file or the 
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folder in which a file is stored. Temporary unencrypted copies of the encrypted data 
that are generated by other applications may or may not be available depending on the 
location in which they are produced.  
 Due to limitations in the scope of EFS, a number of locations that could 
contain information for password attacks are available, including pagefile, deleted 
files, the Registry and certain files in user folders.  
4.4.3 Virtual Disk Based Encryption Results 
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) 
PGP Corporation (2008) provides a range of products that offer different 
combinations of features. One of the features is PGP Virtual Disk which allows files 
and folders to be stored in a single encrypted file which can be mounted as a regular 
drive letter. This feature was examined in PGP Desktop 9.5.3. A container file was 
created and mounted as G:\, as shown in Figure 13. The plaintext file was generated in 
the root of the virtual drive. The results of the examination of PGP Desktop are 
described in Table 12.  
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Figure 13: PGP interface for creating a new virtual disk. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files When temporary files were generated on G:\ they were not 
accessible to an offline analysis using X-Ways Forensics. However, 
gentemp was also run from the Desktop and the temporary file 
produced there was accessible. Temporary files were therefore 
accessible if they were produced outside of the encrypted 
container.  
Paging Files The pagefile could not be successfully configured to reside on the 
virtual encrypted disk. Therefore, the pagefile was always outside 
the virtual disk and therefore accessible to offline analyses. 
Slack Space An examination with X-Ways Forensics revealed that both the 
buffer and cluster slack on the virtual disk were encrpyted, but 
slack space on C:\ was still accessible. 
The Recycle Bin The Recycle Bin on the live system is a combination of the hidden 
‘Recycled’ folders from all available hard disks (Microsoft, 
2007a). Files deleted from the virtual drive appeared in the Recycle 
Bin on the live system. However, to an offline analysis, contents of 
the ‘Recycled’ folder on C:\ were accessible but not from the 
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virtual drive.  
Deleted Files Files that were deleted on the virtual drive were in unallocated 
space on that drive. However, to an offline analysis, the 
unallocated space in the container was also encrypted and therefore 
deleted files from G:\ were inaccessible. However, deleted files on 
C:\ were accessible until they were overwritten. 
The Registry The hive files that make up the Windows Registry were accessible 
to an offline analysis and could not be encrypted. 
User folders The path for ‘My Documents’ could be changed to the mounted 
encrypted drive. However, only the Pictures and Music folders 
were moved and application data and other settings remained on 
C:\.  
Hibernation Files The hibernation file was accessible to an offline analysis. 
Hidden Partitions Hidden partitions were available. 
Free Space between Partitions Free space was also accessible.  
 
Table 12: Results from PGP. 
BestCrypt 7.20.2 
Like PGP, BestCrypt “creates and supports encrypted virtual disks, which are visible 
as regular disks with corresponding drive letters” (Jetico, 2008). The BestCrypt 
interface is shown in Figure 14 and the results from experiments shown in Table 13. 
 
 
Figure 14: BestCrypt interface for creating a new encrypted container. 
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Location Results 
Temporary Files Temporary files generated inside the virtual disk were not available 
to an offline analysis. However, plaintext was found if temporary 
files were generated on drive C:\.  
Paging Files It was not possible to successfully configure the pagefile to reside 
on the encrypted virtual drives. As a result, the pagefile was stored 
on C:\ and was therefore was accessible to an offline analysis.  
Slack Space The slack space of data stored on the virtual disk was encrypted 
and inaccessible but slack space on the remainder of the hard disk 
was available to an offline analysis. 
The Recycle Bin Deleted files went to the Recycle Bin on the live system. To an 
offline analysis the recycled folder on C:\ was accessible, but the 
recycled folder of the virtual drive was not accessible. 
Deleted Files Deleted files on the container were not accessible to an offline 
analysis. 
The Registry The hive files that make up the Windows Registry were accessible 
and could not be encrypted. 
User folders The path for ‘My Documents’ could be changed to the mounted 
encrypted drive. However, only the Pictures and Music folders 
were moved and application data and other settings remained on 
C:\. 
Hibernation Files The hibernation files were accessible. 
Hidden Partitions Hidden partitions were accessible. 
Free Space between Partitions Free space between partitions was accessible. 
 
Table 13: Results from BestCrypt. 
Cryptainer 
This is a free encryption product that allows the creation of 25 MB container files, 
with a non-free option available that allows larger containers (Cypherix, 2008). 
Cryptainer can be run in ‘portable’ mode from a USB stick, meaning that it does not 
need installation. Cryptainer Virtual Drives are mounted as removable drives rather 
than fixed. The Cryptainer interface is shown in Figure 15 and the experimental 
results shown in Table 14.  
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Figure 15: The Cryptainer interface. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files Temporary files generated on the virtual drive were not found 
during an offline analysis. However, files generated on the rest of 
the hard disk were accessible. 
Paging Files The pagefile could not be set up on a removable drive. 
Slack Space The slack space of the container was encrypted but any slack space 
on the rest of the hard disk was accessible. 
The Recycle Bin The Recycle Bin of the hard disk was accessible but files deleted 
on the virtual removable drive did not go to the Recycle Bin 
(removable media do not have recycled folders (Fellows, 2005)).  
Deleted Files Deleted files could not be found during an offline analysis. 
The Registry The Registry was available during the offline analysis. 
User folders The path for ‘My Documents’ could be changed to the mounted 
encrypted drive, however, only the Pictures and Music folders were 
moved and application data and other settings remained on C:\. 
Hibernation Files The hibernation file was accessible during an offline analysis. 
Hidden Partitions The hidden partitions were available during an offline analysis. 
Free Space between Partitions The free space between partitions was available during an offline 
analysis.  
 
Table 14: Results from Cryptainer. 
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Summary of Virtual Disk Encryption 
All plaintext data created on the virtual disks was encrypted and no original plaintext 
was available. Also, when temporary files were produced on the encrypted virtual 
disk they were not accessible. However, any plaintext data duplicated outside of the 
encrypted virtual disk was accessible to an offline analysis.  
 Regarding the availability of data that could be used for password attacks, the 
pagefile could not be configured successfully to reside on the encrypted virtual disk. 
While the option could be set for it to be on a virtual drive, the pagefile was never 
actually generated since it was generated before the virtual disk was mounted. 
Therefore, data from the pagefile could be used for password attacks. The Windows 
Registry was also available, allowing attacks to be mounted to determine the Windows 
password which may help with determining the password of the virtual disk. It could 
also be used to identify the names and other metadata of files stored in an encrypted 
container from lists of recently accessed files. Also, while some paths in user folders, 
e.g. My Pictures, My Music could be moved to point to the virtual drive, Internet 
browser caches and other application data could not be moved to the virtual drive.  
 So while encrypted containers protect more locations and are less likely to 
leave plaintext on the disk, it is still possible for this to occur. Also many locations are 
accessible that could assist in identifying passwords to the encrypted virtual disk or 
metadata about the files on them.  
4.4.4 Full Disk Encryption Results 
CompuSec 
CompuSec is a free Full Disk Encryption product for Windows and Linux. After 
installation and running through a wizard, the hard disk is encrypted. It also has pre-
boot authentication where a username and password needs to supplied before the 
system will boot, shown in Figure 16. The results from examining CompuSec are 
shown in Table 15. 
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Figure 16: CompuSec Pre-boot authentication. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files All temporary files generated were not available to an offline 
analysis. 
Paging Files The pagefile was not accessible. 
Slack Space Slack space (RAM or cluster) was not accessible. 
The Recycle Bin The recycled folder was not accessible. 
Deleted Files Deleted files were not accessible. 
The Registry The Registry was not accessible. 
User folders User folders were not accessible 
Hibernation Files The hibernation files were not accessible. 
Hidden Partitions The partition structure was visible but random data was found in 
all partitions. 
Free Space between Partitions Free space was also encrypted. 
 
Table 15: Results from CompuSec. 
BitLocker 
BitLocker is the Full Volume Encryption feature built in to specific versions of 
Windows Vista. It uses the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to encrypt the 
system partition using the Full Volume Encryption Key (FVEK). The FVEK is 
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encrypted with AES using the Full Volume Master Key (FVMK). This key is then 
protected in a variety of means, depending on the mode in which BitLocker is used 
(Microsoft, 2006b). BitLocker operates in one of five modes, as shown in Table 16: 
 
TPM only This is the simplest scenario and the Volume Master Key 
is encrypted by a key protected by the Trusted Platform 
Module (TPM). The system will boot with no user 
intervention, but the disk is encrypted and will be 
inaccessible if moved to another system or viewed offline 
using another operating system (Microsoft, 2006b). This 
means that any disk image produced using standard 
techniques will produce an encrypted image. 
TPM & PIN Keys are protected by the TPM and a 4–20 digit PIN must 
also be entered with the function keys for every boot or 
when resuming from hibernation (Microsoft, 2006b). 
TPM & USB Keys are protected by the TPM and a USB storage device 
that contains a start-up key that must also be provided for 
each boot (Microsoft, 2006b). 
TPM & PIN & USB This mode is only available after Windows Vista Service 
Pack 1 and offers ‘‘an additional multi-factor 
authentication method’’ (Microsoft, 2008b). 
USB only This can be used if a TPM is not enabled or not present. 
Startup keys are stored on a USB stick and must be 
provided in order for the system to boot. In this case the 
keys take the form of a 124 byte, hidden, read-only file, 
which by default has a file name of the format 
XXXXXXXX-XXXX-XXXX-
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX.BEK, where X is a 
hexadecimal digit (Microsoft, 2006c). 
 
Table 16: Modes of BitLocker. 
 
The following results in Table 17 are from running Windows Vista Ultimate with 
BitLocker on a virtual machine. Since the virtual machine does not have a TPM the 
system is configured in USB only mode. However, virtual machines also do not 
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recognise USB devices on start-up, and as a result the recovery key needs to be 
supplied to boot the machine. However, this does not affect the results. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files Temporary files generated on C:\ were not accessible. However, 
since only the C:\ partition was encrypted, if temporary files were 
generated on F:\ they were accessible to an offline analysis. 
Paging Files The pagefile on C:\ was not accessible. However, if a pagefile was 
generated on F:\ then it was accessible.  
Slack Space Slack space on C:\ was not accessible but could be accessed on 
unencrypted partitions.  
The Recycle Bin The Recycle Bin of the encrypted drive was not accessible but 
could be accessed on the unencrypted partitions.  
Deleted Files After files were emptied from the Recycle Bin, if they were 
originally on an encrypted partition then they were inaccessible, 
but it may be possible to access files deleted from an unencrypted 
partition if the data was not overwritten.  
The Registry The Registry was not accessible.  
User folders The user folders were not accessible. 
Hibernation Files The hibernation file was not accessible.  
Hidden Partitions The hidden partition could not be encrypted and was therefore 
accessible24. (Hynes, 2008) 
Free Space between Partitions The free space between partitions could not be encrypted and was 
therefore accessible.  
 
Table 17: Results from BitLocker. 
TrueCrypt V6.0a 
TrueCrypt is a “software system for establishing and maintaining an on-the-fly-
encrypted volume” meaning that “data are automatically encrypted or decrypted right 
before they are loaded or saved, without any user intervention” (TrueCrypt, 2008d). 
TrueCrypt offers a number of advanced features, including hidden volumes, whereby 
                                                 
24
 This has changed as of Windows Vista Service Pack 1 and other partitions can also be encrypted 
(Hynes 2008) 
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two passwords can be use to decrypt the volume; one decrypts prearranged innocent 
content, the other the real content. TrueCrypt has become a popular tool for 
encrypting data with over 8 million downloads (December 2008) (TrueCrypt, 2008a). 
At the time of writing TrueCrypt is at Version 6.1a, having last been updated in 
December 2008 (TrueCrypt, 2008f). From Version 5.0 onwards, TrueCrypt provided 
the option to encrypt the system partition/drive with pre-boot authentication 
(TrueCrypt, 2008f).  The results from examining TrueCrypt 6.0a are shown in Table 
18. 
 
Location Results 
Temporary Files All temporary files were not available to an offline analysis. 
Paging Files The pagefile was not accessible. 
Slack Space Slack space was not accessible. 
The Recycle Bin The Recycle Bin was not accessible. 
Deleted Files Deleted files were not accessible. 
The Registry The Registry was not accessible. 
User folders User folders were not accessible. 
Hibernation Files Hibernation files were not accessible. 
Hidden Partitions The partition structure was visible but all partitions contained 
random data. 
Free Space between Partitions Space between partitions contained random data. 
 
Table 18: Results from TrueCrypt. 
Summary of Full Disk Encryption 
These tests revealed a subtle difference between Full Disk Encryption (FDE) and Full 
Volume Encryption (FVE), where in the case of BitLocker (a FVE product), only 
volumes/partitions are encrypted, meaning that some plaintext could be accessible to 
an offline analysis on other partitions and between partitions. Use of Full Disk 
Encryption meant that all partitions and the space between were encrypted. However, 
even the use of Full Disk Encryption did not mean the entire disk was encrypted, 
since code needed to decrypt the drive was accessible. Therefore, Full Disk 
Encryption encrypts all partitions and the space in between, whereas Full Volume 
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Encryption encrypts only the partitions. If this distinction is made between Full Disk 
and Full Volume Encryption then there are actually five categories of encryption 
product rather than four.   
For all the Full Disk Encryption products examined, no plaintext data was 
found to be accessible to an offline analysis. Also, no locations were available that 
could have produced data that could be used to launch password attacks. However, 
with Full Volume Encryption products it is possible that plaintext could be located on 
the unencrypted partitions. 
 
4.5 EVALUATION 
This chapter has categorised encryption products into five types based on the scope of 
the encryption. It has considered how three of the eight approaches for gaining access 
to encrypted evidence that were discussed in Chapter 2 are affected by the scope of 
the encryption and therefore the category of product in use. The limited number of 
approaches considered is due to four of the five remaining approaches being 
dependent on specific product implementations or the individual investigation. 
Research into these could therefore not be generalised and in order to keep track of 
whether particular approaches would be successful at gaining access to encrypted 
information, it would be necessary to create a database of individual encryption 
products. This would need to include information such as whether a product uses an 
insecure algorithm, and could therefore be used to determine if offline access to 
encrypted data would be later possible. Producing and maintaining such a database 
has many potential problems including keeping the information up to date and 
controlling access. This is considered to be outside the scope of this research. There 
are also difficulties in generalising for approaches that are investigation specific e.g. 
persuade the suspect to provide decryption keys. In some cases this may be possible, 
but in others a suspect may be uncooperative. Predicting this is difficult and error 
prone and therefore is not useful in determining if a live investigation preserves more 
digital evidence in accessible form than relying on offline approaches.  
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 The remaining approach of surveillance is likely to be generalisable based on 
the scope of the encryption in use, e.g. it may not be possible to install surveillance 
software when Full Disk Encryption is in use. However, this is not considered in this 
research since there is limited public information on software surveillance techniques 
in use, and in all cases hardware techniques are possible. 
 This chapter has also assumed that if encrypted evidence is preserved in a 
form that is accessible then completeness has been increased. However, this has the 
limitation of failing to consider loss of evidence due to live techniques applied, which 
is considered in Chapter 5. 
 
4.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown that there are different categories of encryption software that 
can be found on a system. Broadly speaking, each category leaves different locations 
available to an offline examination. It has examined the four categories in literature 
and found a subtle distinction that means Full Disk Encryption should be separated 
into Full Disk Encryption and Full Volume Encryption, which encrypt the entire disk 
25or entire partition respectively. Therefore, five categories of encryption product have 
been identified.  
Section 4.4.1 showed that the use of manual file encryption means that any 
data that has not been manually encrypted can be examined by an investigator. 
Furthermore, the manual decryption process prevents many files from being encrypted 
in this way. If manual encryption is found on a system then a significant amount of 
information is available in order to attempt to gain access to the encrypted material. 
Furthermore, for the three products examined, if data was available to a live 
investigation, if the power was removed instead of performing a live acquisition, the 
unencrypted data would still be available. This was because the temporary copies of 
the encrypted data were stored as files on the disk of the system. However, it is 
                                                 
25
 With the caveats discussed earlier about the software needed to decrypt the drive remaining 
unencrypted. 
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possible that other single file encryption products could store data in memory instead 
of on disk. Therefore, it may be possible that a live investigation is not necessary for 
this category, but this is likely to be product specific. 
 Section 4.4.2 showed that folder based encryption allows a folder to be given 
the ‘encrypted’ attribute, meaning that all files created or moved to that folder are 
automatically encrypted. While there are limitations to the files and locations that can 
be encrypted in this way, the limitations are far fewer than for manual file encryption. 
Due to the folder encryption implementation that was examined (EFS) the keys 
needed to decrypt files are stored on the system under investigation26, albeit encrypted 
using the user’s logon password as a key. Therefore the security of EFS protected files 
is dependant on the password used by the suspect. Password cracking software such 
as OphCrack (Objectif Sécurité, 2008) and Cain (Oxid.it, 2008) can be used to 
perform dictionary, brute force and rainbow table attacks on the password hash from 
the Registry in an attempt to recover it. Once the password is obtained, this can be 
used in conjunction with the encrypted version of the user’s private keys stored in the 
Registry to gain access to the encrypted files. Therefore, attacks on EFS encrypted 
files (the only folder based encryption examined) are possible, but are dependent on 
the strength of the password used and the specific settings of how the password 
hashes are stored27. (Pilon, 2005, Irongeek, 2007) 
 Virtual disk based encryption prevents access to the plaintext of files stored on 
the virtual disk and the original copies of files are not accessible since files are 
automatically encrypted when they are created (see Section 4.4.3). Also no temporary 
files were generated by the decryption process since data is decrypted in blocks into 
memory as it is needed. However, temporary files produced by other applications, if 
generated outside of the container, may be accessible to an offline analysis. Since the 
pagefile cannot be encrypted in this way, unencrypted data may also be found here 
                                                 
26
 Only if the machine is not part of a domain, in which case there may be cached password hashes 
stored in HKLM\SECURITY\CACHE\NL$1 to NL$10 and a dictionary attack can still be used (Pilon 
2005, Irongeek 2008) 
27
 See Hargreaves et al. (2008) for details of the differences between password cracking on Windows 
XP and Windows Vista. 
  Chapter 4 
 
 116 
  
  
and in the hibernation file. There are also opportunities for password recovery from 
the pagefile and hibernation file, along with several areas in the user data folders, e.g. 
browser cache, which were not relocated when the ‘My Documents’ folder was 
moved to the encrypted virtual disk. It may be possible to move some application data 
to an encrypted location, but this would need to be manually configured inside the 
software in question. The Windows Registry was also available, potentially allowing 
names of files created inside the container to be obtained from lists of recently 
accessed files or programs run. Therefore, there is some information available that 
could be used to launch attacks on virtual disk based encryption products and success 
of these attacks is based on the password used for the virtual disk and on which 
applications have been used to open the encrypted data.  
This research has highlighted a difference between Full Volume and Full Disk 
Encryption. In Section 4.4.4 it was shown that for Full Volume Encryption 
information on the partition that is encrypted is inaccessible. However, if there are 
multiple partitions and the other partitions are not encrypted then there may be 
temporary files available or information that can be used as the basis for intelligent 
password attacks. Volume slack is also available which may contain information from 
previously deleted partitions that could be recovered. However, it is also possible that 
Full Volume Encryption could be used with only a single partition which fills the 
disk. In this case the situation is the same as Full Disk Encryption.  
 Full Disk Encryption is also discussed in Section 4.4.4. Full Disk Encryption 
products prevent the offline approaches considered here from being used. In some 
cases a password attack could be launched, but a disk that has been fully encrypted 
cannot be used to recover information upon which to launch an intelligent password 
attack. The success of offline approaches is therefore much less likely when Full Disk 
Encryption products are in use. Even with the introduction of legislation requiring the 
disclosure of keys (United Kingdom, 2000), some products even offer duress 
key/hidden operating system functionality allowing one key to disclose the true 
operating system and another to reveal a false one (TrueCrypt, 2008c). There are other 
practical approaches, for example, locating unencrypted copies of backup data or 
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locating recovery keys on paper or CD that allow the decryption of the drive. 
However, these are case dependent, product specific, and are not guaranteed solutions. 
Therefore, in some cases (particularly Full Volume and Full Disk Encryption) 
offline approaches have been demonstrated to be unlikely to succeed and in these 
cases the completeness of the preserved evidence will be significantly reduced. Even 
with other product categories, the success of offline approaches is dependent on what 
applications have been used to access encrypted content and the strength of the user’s 
password. Therefore, predicting whether it is possible to access encrypted data offline 
involves many variables and is difficult and prone to error. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
live acquisitions can be used to acquire encrypted data in a form that is accessible. 
Live investigations are therefore an effective method of preserving evidence that may 
otherwise not be accessible, and therefore can increase the completeness of the 
preserved evidence. However, live investigations are not perfect solutions since live 
tools and techniques are intrusive, meaning that they make changes to the system 
under investigation. Since the requirement states that it should be possible to assess 
which evidence is preserved and which is lost, also the maximum amount of digital 
evidence relevant to the investigation should be preserved, the need to assess what 
evidence is overwritten by performing a live investigation is discussed in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 5: COMPLETENESS AND INTRUSIVENESS  
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The completeness requirement described in Chapter 3 states that it should be possible 
to assess which evidence is preserved and which is lost, also the maximum amount of 
digital evidence relevant to the investigation should be preserved. The previous 
chapter demonstrated that during digital investigations involving encrypted evidence, 
a live response can preserve significantly more evidence than a traditional ‘pull the 
plug’ investigation. However, if a live investigation is performed then changes will be 
made to the suspect’s system since live techniques are inherently intrusive. This will 
result in some data being overwritten and therefore lost. Since the requirement states 
that ‘it must be possible to assess which digital evidence is preserved and which is 
lost’ it is therefore necessary to be able to determine which data has been overwritten 
by using live investigation techniques on a system. The ability to assess this also has 
implications for preserving the maximum amount of relevant digital evidence on a 
system since different live techniques will make different changes to the system. As a 
result an investigator needs to know the likely changes that will be made to the system 
in order to determine the most appropriate technique that will overwrite the least 
relevant data in the current investigation. This chapter develops a method for 
monitoring the changes made to test systems by live tools and techniques. The results 
of such experiments can assist an investigator in assessing the changes made to a 
system post-live investigation, and can also provide the knowledge needed for 
investigators to determine the most appropriate course of action during a live 
investigation in order to preserve the maximum amount of relevant digital evidence.  
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5.2 BACKGROUND 
5.2.1 Introduction 
In addition to the explanation of the completeness requirement mentioned in the 
introduction, Chapter 3 also discussed that in a traditional digital investigation, 
completeness can be assessed by adhering to guidelines that predetermine the scope of 
the investigation, i.e. by removing the power from a live machine the contents of the 
hard disk are exactly preserved, but the contents of memory and other volatile data are 
lost. The previous chapter showed that performing a traditional digital investigation 
when encrypted evidence is present may not result in the maximum amount of 
relevant digital evidence being preserved if offline access to encrypted evidence is not 
possible. It also explained that performing a live investigation can preserve encrypted 
evidence in an accessible form, and can therefore increase the completeness of the 
preserved digital evidence. However, live investigations will cause changes to the live 
system and as a result some data will be overwritten and therefore lost. This is 
unavoidable since live digital investigation techniques are intrusive, meaning that they 
change or overwrite potentially relevant digital evidence. There is no simple way to 
prevent changes to a live machine, since the write blocking approach (that physically 
preventing writes from being made to the disk) used in traditional digital 
investigations cannot be used during live investigations. As a result there is “no way 
to avoid making changes, since in order to conduct a live examination it is necessary 
to deploy tools on the live system to capture data, and such tools will make changes to 
the running system” (Sutherland et al., 2008). The amount of change caused will vary, 
depending on hardware and software configurations (Vidas, 2007), but even when just 
attempting one of the simplest of live responses, acquiring a memory image, “no 
software tool is capable of capturing the image of memory without, by the very act of 
its own execution, changing the content of memory” (Huebner et al., 2007).  
 The completeness requirement from Chapter 3 specifies that it should be 
possible to assess what evidence has been lost, and also that the maximum amount of 
digital evidence that is relevant should be preserved. Therefore, the changes caused by 
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using live tools and techniques should be capable of being assessed. Also an 
investigator should be able to determine which live techniques will minimise the 
amount of potentially relevant digital evidence that is overwritten and therefore lost in 
individual investigations.  
5.2.2 Existing Solutions 
It is suggested in Request For Comments (RFC) 3227 that in order to minimise the 
loss of digital evidence, collection should be performed in ‘order of volatility’ 
(Network Working Group, 2002), collecting the most volatile first, working towards 
the least volatile. An example order of volatility is provided in RFC 3227 for a typical 
system: 
• Registers and cache 
• Routing table, arp cache, process table, kernel statistics, memory 
• Temporary file systems 
• Disk 
• Remote logging and monitoring data that is relevant to the system in 
question 
• Physical configuration, network topology 
• Archival media 
 
Collection in this way attempts to minimise the loss of digital evidence by acquiring 
data in a particular sequence. However, it does not address the need for an 
investigator to be able to assess which evidence has been preserved and which has 
been lost due to the techniques used, i.e. explain the consequence of their actions 
(ACPO, 2007). 
 The need to assess what has been lost is explained in ACPO (2007) as “[an 
investigator] must be able to give evidence explaining the relevance and the 
implications of their actions”. It also states that “by profiling the forensic footprint of 
trusted volatile data forensic tools, an investigator will be in a position to understand 
the impact of using such tools and will therefore consider this during the investigation 
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and when presenting evidence”. ACPO (2007) does not suggest any specific means 
for determining the footprint of tools; however, it can be achieved by monitoring the 
changes made in test environments. If other literature is consulted, there are a number 
of techniques that can be used to monitor a test system and to record changes made by 
running a tool or performing a particular technique. These are described in the 
following section. 
5.2.3 System Monitoring Tools and Techniques  
This section describes three current tools and techniques that can be used for 
monitoring changes to a system and that could be used in a test environment to 
determine the forensic footprint of live investigation tools and techniques. The section 
concludes with a summary of the limitations of these three techniques. 
Live Logging Tools e.g. Filemon, Regmon, Procmon 
The live system monitoring tools Filemon and Regmon (Russinovich and Cogswell, 
2006a, b) can be run on a live system and used to record events relating to the file 
system and Registry respectively. The use of these tools has been described for 
monitoring changes to a system when dynamically analysing malicious software 
(Carvey, 2005). They can also be used during digital investigation research to 
investigate possible locations of artefacts left by particular pieces of software 
(Dickson, 2006a, b, c, 2007, van Dongen, 2007). These monitoring tools install 
drivers to log events, for example Filemon installs filem.sys which attaches to the 
device object for the mounted file system and intercepts and records file system 
requests (Russinovich and Solomon, 2005 p.706). Since they all install drivers, they 
therefore make their own changes to the system they are monitoring. 
The successor to Filemon and Regmon is Procmon (Russinovich and 
Cogswell, 2008) which works in a similar way but offers a number of improvements, 
including simultaneously recording both file system and Registry changes. Procmon 
records a massive amount of data in the form of extensive logs containing details such 
as the time of the event, process name, operation performed, path, etc. To illustrate the 
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extent of these logs, a run on an idle Windows XP system for 1 minute generated a log 
containing over 14,000 events. To process these large logs, advanced filters which 
form part of the software can be used to reduce the logs and monitor individual 
events, files or any other detail of interest. Procmon was used in Evans (2007) and 
Sutherland et al. (2008) to document changes made to test systems by some live tools, 
including: memory acquisition tools, e.g. dd; network status tools, e.g. fport; and, 
system status tools, e.g. psinfo.  
Forensic Package and Sort by Modification Date 
Another technique that can be used to detect changes made to a system by 
tools,techniques or malware under examination is, after the event, to conduct an 
examination of the disk of the test system using forensic software and to sort files on 
the disk by their attached metadata, i.e. modification date. This can be used to 
highlight files created and modified on the system within the time period in which the 
test was conducted. This technique has the advantage of being unintrusive since it can 
be run retrospectively on a disk image from the system under examination.  
InCtrl5 
InCtrl5 is a piece of monitoring software that allows the recording of changes made to 
a system during the installation of new software (Rubenking, 2000). The InCtrl5 
program requires installation prior to monitoring a software installation, but is then 
able to record changes “by running installation programs from within its tracking 
system” (Rubenking, 2000). It can also be used to monitor other changes to a system 
by creating snapshots before and after a certain action. InCtl5 produces a HTML 
report that reports Registry and file changes, including the stated modification date 
and size.  
Limitations of these techniques 
Both the live logging tools and the snapshot based approach of InCtrl5 are intrusive, 
since they run on the system being monitored. This means that to determine the 
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changes caused by the tools being tested, it is necessary to filter out the changes 
caused by the monitoring tools themselves. This can be performed either by the tools 
monitoring their own changes (Procmon), or by examining accompanying 
documentation28 (InCtrl5). The other issue with intrusive monitoring tools is that if 
changes to the memory of the test system are also of interest, e.g. how much data in 
memory has changed, the running of live monitoring tools makes this impossible to 
ascertain without running additional tests.  
The only un-intrusive technique described is the ‘sort by modification date’ 
technique, which has the separate problem of relying on Modified Accessed Created 
(MAC) times. This is a problem since, as Carrier (2005 p.12) points out, there is 
essential and non-essential data on a system, where essential data must be accurate in 
order for the system to function. Dates and times unfortunately fall into the non-
essential category and can be easily modified without affecting the operation of the 
system. This is particularly problematic in malware analysis since deliberate 
alterations of dates and times could take place to avoid detection. The InCtrl5 
snapshot based monitoring technique also has the limitation of failing to record 
changes that are made after the first snapshot but are undone before the second, e.g. 
the creation and removal of temporary files between snapshots. Also Procmon has 
been found to sometimes miss certain changes to the system being monitored, e.g. 
files related to restore points (Hargreaves, 2007).  
Since all monitoring methods can miss changes, another problem with these 
techniques is that it is difficult to validate the results from a single monitoring method. 
Also, no documented testing of any of the current techniques could be found, despite 
Procmon being used extensively for system monitoring, even in the forensic 
computing community. This lack of testing may be due to the challenges involved 
with attempting to test these monitoring techniques; if the tools are used concurrently 
on a system, attempting to compare the results is difficult since they produce output in 
very different formats that is difficult to cross-check. Also, since two of the 
                                                 
28
 The modifications caused by the installation of InCrtl5 are listed in the accompanying readme.txt 
included with the installation program. However, InCtrl5 does not monitor its own installation changes 
(Rubenking, 2000).  
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techniques are intrusive, if tools are run concurrently, it then becomes necessary to 
filter out two sets of changes from the reports generated by the three techniques.  
Nevertheless, validation such as this should be performed since, as described 
in Carrier (2003), it is important to verify the results from any digital investigation 
tool, which can be done either manually or using a second tool. While these 
monitoring methods are not digital investigation tools, if they are used to profile 
changes made by live investigation tools and techniques, the results could be used to 
determine if the techniques overwrite potentially relevant digital evidence and to 
determine the best course of action for a live investigation. It is therefore important 
that the results are correct and comprehensive and they should therefore be verified to 
the same extent as results from digital investigation and forensic tools.  
If monitoring methods fail to record changes that are made to the system, the 
investigator will be unaware of potential digital evidence that will be lost due to the 
live techniques and may perform an investigation and overwrite relevant evidence. 
Also, if changes are recorded that are caused by the monitoring techniques and are 
wrongly attributed to the live investigation techniques, then an investigator may 
choose not to perform a live investigation when it could have been used, and therefore 
digital evidence that could have been preserved using live techniques may be lost. 
 So, while these limitations are not as significant for previous uses of system 
monitoring (e.g. indicating where evidential artefacts of software may reside), for the 
purpose of profiling a live technique’s footprint on a system these limitations are 
relevant and it is important to know that the changes recorded in tests are correct and 
comprehensive.  
5.2.4 Summary 
Live investigation techniques are inherently intrusive, i.e. they will make changes to 
the system under investigation. This could affect the completeness of the amount of 
potentially relevant digital evidence that is preserved. To minimise this loss, evidence 
can be collected in order of volatility. However, this does not address the need of an 
investigator to identify and quantify the evidence that has been lost due to the live 
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techniques used, i.e. to explain the consequences of their actions. It also does not 
address the subtle differences in the data that is overwritten by using different live 
techniques. In order to do this, monitoring techniques can be used on test systems to 
determine the changes that investigators are likely to make to a system due to the use 
of live tools and techniques. 
 Monitoring a system can be performed using a number of methods: live 
logging tools such as Procmon; sorting files by modification date; or using a snapshot 
approach such as InCtrl5. However, individually these techniques have limitations 
that could result either in changes failing to be recorded or additional changes being 
recorded that are due to the monitoring method itself. While these changes are not as 
significant for previous uses of system monitoring, when used for determining the 
changes made by live investigation tools and profiling their footprints, a more robust 
methodology is necessary. 
5.3 METHODOLOGY  
5.3.1 Introduction 
This section describes the methodology used in this chapter. As shown in the previous 
section, it is necessary to determine the changes made to a system due to live 
investigation tools and techniques. This information enables an investigator to 
determine what course of action to take (i.e. which methods to use) during an 
investigation in order to preserve the maximum amount of potentially relevant digital 
evidence. It also assists an investigator in assessing what digital evidence has been 
lost after the live investigation has been performed. These aims can be achieved by 
profiling the footprint of live tools, i.e. determining what changes they make in a test 
environment. Existing methods of monitoring changes on a system were described in 
the previous section, but they were all shown to have limitations, including their 
intrusive nature and the difficulty comparing results from different methods. In this 
section, first the general methodology used to identify changes caused by live 
investigation tools and techniques is outlined, including the justification for the 
‘footprinting’ approach. Following this, the selection of live tools and techniques that 
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are profiled is explained. The actual development of a new system monitoring 
technique is described later in Section 5.4. 
5.3.2 General Methodology 
This chapter has so far explained the need to determine the changes caused by live 
tools and techniques in order to assess what digital evidence has been lost, and also to 
allow the most appropriate course of action to be taken during a live investigation. 
Determining the best course of action in an investigation is a function best performed 
by the investigator, due to the specific requirements of each individual investigation. 
However, it has been shown that it is possible to monitor live tools in a test 
environment and document the changes they cause. Using the results of tests 
performed, an investigator will be able to combine the information gained from 
testing tools with their knowledge of the specific case to more effectively determine 
the best course of action in an investigation. Also, monitoring of live tools in a test 
environment will allow an investigator, post-live investigation, to more effectively 
determine what changes were made. This is because monitoring test environments 
will provide a greater understanding of changes that normally occur on a system and 
changes that are likely to be attributable to live tools. The research in this chapter 
therefore focuses on identifying changes caused to test systems by live tools. 
 As explained in the previous section, there are several existing methods for 
monitoring systems which could be used to identify changes caused by live tools. 
However, as explained earlier, they have limitations, including the possibility of 
missing changes, the results being difficult to correlate, and consequently the results 
being difficult to validate. So, while the research in this chapter is concerned with 
identifying changes to test systems, it specifically focuses on developing a new 
system monitoring methodology that overcomes the limitations of the existing 
techniques. Therefore, while individual results from testing live tools will be obtained 
in the course of evaluating the new methodology, the main aim is the production of a 
methodology that will allow changes to be identified in a test environment. 
  Chapter 5 
 
 127 
  
  
 Although building a catalogue of the footprints of live tools is outside the 
scope of this research, a range of tools will be tested in order to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the methodology. This testing will also provide a starting point to the 
rigorous testing that is necessary for the extensive and ever changing range of live 
tools and techniques on a number of operating systems in a number of different 
configurations. The choice of initial test scenarios is described in the following 
section.  
5.3.3 Testing Live Tools and Techniques 
The methodology developed in Section 5.4 is used to profile the footprint of a number 
of live tools and techniques in a basic Windows XP SP2 environment. This section 
describes the choice of live tools and techniques that are tested. 
Live digital investigation techniques are tested based on the overall 
methodology for running live investigation tools described in Wait (2006), which 
involves:  
1) establishing a trusted command prompt;  
2) establishing a method for transmitting and storing the collected information; 
3) running various tools and creating hashes of the output. 
 
The first stage is establishing a trusted command prompt from which to launch tools. 
However, live tools may not necessarily be launched in this way since some tools are 
launched directly, e.g. the EnCase Enterprise servlet and FTK Imager. Therefore, a 
number of different means of launching a program are considered. In this research 
three techniques are investigated: double clicking an executable; using Start->Run and 
typing the path and program to be executed; and then finally opening a trusted 
command prompt and launching a program from it. Monitoring is performed from the 
point at which the prompt is already running, in order to see the effect of launching 
programs from the prompt, not of launching the prompt itself. All of these techniques 
are tested by running simple ‘hello world’ programs, which are compiled in both 32 
and 16 bit environments using Visual Studio and DJGPP respectively.  
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 Secondly, changes are investigated that are caused by connecting to the system 
in order to enable the transmission or storage of acquired data. Figure 17 shows the 
back of a PC and some common interfaces are highlighted. In this research the 
changes caused by connecting with USB and Firewire (IEEE 1394) are considered 
since USB is a popular interface for storing live acquired data and Firewire is of 
interest due to its direct memory access which can be used for memory imaging. 
Connection via USB in this research involves attaching a USB thumb drive to the 
monitored system. For the Firewire connection, a Linux based laptop is configured as 
it would be to perform Firewire memory imaging (emulating an iPod, as described in 
Chapter 2). In addition to making the Firewire connection, an image of the system’s 
memory is also obtained over the connection. In addition to these connections, since 
live investigation tools should be run from a static media (Adelstein, 2006) the 
changes caused by inserting a CD-ROM into a system are investigated. Connection 
via Ethernet is not considered in this research since only limited testing is performed 
to demonstrate the use of the developed methodology, and since USB and CD-ROMs 
are popular tool delivery methods, and Firewire is of interest due to its potential for 
memory imaging, these interfaces were prioritised.  
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Figure 17: The back of a PC with common ports highlighted. 
 
The final stage in Wait (2006) is running various tools to obtain information from the 
live system. Since changes caused by the operating system when programs are 
launched are investigated in an earlier stage, this focuses on changes caused by 
specific software that may be run as part of a live investigation. As described in 
Chapter 2, much of the information that can be obtained using live analysis tools such 
as pstools and fport etc. can now be obtained from acquired memory dumps of live 
systems. Therefore, these experiments include live memory acquisition tools such as 
dd and Fast Dump, and also results from monitoring some live analysis tools which 
are taken from the Helix live CD.  
In addition, before these three live investigation stages are monitored, systems 
are examined in an idle state to determine background changes that occur normally on 
a system. For this, test systems are set up and left idle for 10 minutes, 1 hour and 24 
hours. A list of background changes is produced and is used to exclude these 
background changes from the later tests. 
USB 
Ethernet 
Firewire 
Serial 
Parallel 
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5.4 DEVELOPMENT OF A SYSTEM MONITORING METHODOLOGY 
5.4.1 Introduction 
As mentioned in earlier sections there are a number of limitations of the currently 
available system monitoring techniques. These include the intrusiveness of the 
monitoring tools, which means it is necessary to separate out changes caused by the 
monitoring tools themselves and those caused by the techniques under test. They also 
include the risk of missing changes, either due to files being created and removed 
between snapshots, or relying on non-essential data. It is also difficult to compare the 
results between different methods. This section describes the development of a 
methodology that overcomes these limitations.  
5.4.2 Overall Approach 
The overall approach uses virtualisation to examine changes made by the live 
investigation techniques under test (the advantages of virtualisation were discussed in 
Chapter 1). The technique combines the approaches described earlier, with a 
significant modification to the snapshot based approach. This modification is that 
instead of creating snapshots on the live machine under test (as with InCtrl5), virtual 
machines (in this case VMware) are used so that snapshots can be created of the entire 
machine at particular states from outside the environment under test. This provides an 
unintrusive option for monitoring a test system. The modified snapshot approach still 
suffers from the limitation of missing changes that are made and undone between 
snapshots, however, this problem is addressed by also running Procmon inside the 
virtual machine between snapshots which will record all changes made, including the 
ones missed by the snapshot approach. This prevents the approach from being fully 
unintrusive, but since only one intrusive technique is used, and this can be monitored 
in separate tests, it is possible to filter out the changes caused by this single intrusive 
method. In addition, the snapshots29 created in this way are much more 
                                                 
29
 The snapshots discussed here should not be confused with the VMWare ‘Snapshot feature’ which 
creates a reference point in a virtual machine’s history, from which point changes are stored to a 
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comprehensive than other approaches since the entire disk and memory of the virtual 
machine is duplicated before and after the event being monitored. This full 
duplication of the disk allows different techniques to be applied retrospectively to 
determine the differences between the two snapshots, since it separates out data 
collection and analysis, which are discussed in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.4.3 respectively.  
5.4.2 Data Collection 
For each tool or technique to be monitored, a duplicate of a baseline virtual machine 
is created. The duplicated virtual machine is booted and configured to the state just 
prior to where changes to the system are to be monitored. The following steps 
describe the rest of the process. 
 
1. At the point at which changes needed to be monitored Procmon is launched. 
However, it is not yet set to log changes. The virtual machine is paused. 
2. A duplicate is created of the virtual hard disk file (.vmdk). 
3. A duplicate is created of the virtual memory file (.vmem). 
4. The virtual machine is resumed. 
5. The Procmon logging is started. 
6. The action/connection under test is performed. 
7. The Procmon logging is paused. 
8. The virtual machine is paused. 
9. A duplicate is created of the virtual hard disk file (.vmdk). 
10. A duplicate is created of the virtual memory file (.vmem). 
11. The virtual machine is resumed. 
12. The Procmon log is saved (including all events) as a Procmon Monitoring Log 
(PML) file. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
separate file rather than the machine’s virtual disk. The snapshots used here refer to manually created 
full duplicates of the files representing a virtual machine’s disk and memory (.vmdk and .vmem). 
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For simplicity, the copying of the files needed for the before and after snapshots is 
performed by before.bat and after.bat batch files. The latter is shown in Figure 18.  
 
 
Figure 18: after.bat, which is used to simplify creation of snapshots by copying the .vmdk and .vmem files to the ‘after’ 
subfolder. 
 
The Procmon logs are recovered from the virtual machine by connecting a USB 
device and saving the .PML file to it, since changes caused by connecting the USB 
stick are not relevant at this stage since the ‘after’ snapshot disk image records the 
state of the machine before these changes are made. Therefore, for each test, the 
following data is produced. 
 
\before\Windows XP Professional-flat.vmdk  The hard disk image before the event took place. 
\before\mem.vmem    The memory image before the event took place. 
\after\Windows XP Professional-flat.vmdk  The hard disk image after the event took place. 
\after\mem.vmem     The memory image after the event took place. 
logfile.pml      A Procmon log file of the live changes that  
took place on the system. 
5.4.3 Data Analysis 
Once the experimental data is collected, it needs to be processed to produce lists of 
changes caused to the system. Procmon logs (PML files) already consist of a list of 
changes; however, it is still necessary to process them in order to convert them into a 
format that can be combined with other methods, which simplifies later analyses. The 
disk images created before and after the event under test also require analysis in order 
to extract lists of changed files. The processing of the Procmon logs and also the two 
techniques that are used to extract file and Registry changes from the before and after 
disk images are discussed in the next three sub-sections. 
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Procmon Log Processing 
Due to the Procmon logs being saved in their complete form, i.e. including all events, 
it is necessary to filter them to highlight the details that are relevant. To do this, the 
saved PML logs are loaded into a version of Procmon on an analysis machine. 
Procmon filters are applied so that the logs are reduced to show only the relevant 
events. Different filter sets are used to separately show changes to files and changes to 
the Registry. File writes are filtered using the ‘Operation = WriteFile’ filter, which 
records any event where data is written to files. Registry changes are also filtered by 
the ‘Operation’ field, where events that cause writes to the Registry, e.g. creating keys 
and setting values, are included. The full list of Registry operations with descriptions 
is available in Microsoft (2008c) and the filters used to detect changes are: 
RegCopyTree, RegCreateKey, RegCreateKeyEx, RegCreateKeyTransacted, 
RegDeleteKey,  RegDeleteKeyEx, RegDeleteKeyTransacted, RegDeleteKeyValue, 
RegDeleteTree, RegDeleteValue, RegFlushKey, RegLoadKey, RegRestoreKey, 
RegReplaceKey, RegSaveKey, RegSaveKeyEx, RegSetKeyValueEx, RegSetInfoKey, 
RegSetValue, RegSetValueEx and RegUnloadKey. Other than the filters mentioned 
here, the default Procmon filters, which exclude $MFT, exclude Pagefile and others, 
are removed. After application of the filters, the subsets of the results are exported to 
Comma Separated Value (CSV) files, named files.csv and reg.csv. Since the logs 
record all changes as they occur, writes to an individual file or Registry entry can 
occur multiple times and therefore appear more than once in the logs. While the time 
of the event may be useful, for this method, only a summary list of files and Registry 
entries that have been changed is necessary. Therefore, the two CSV files are 
processed using a Perl script to remove fields that were not needed e.g. time of the 
event, sequence number, etc. and also to remove duplicate entries so that each file and 
Registry modification appears only once in the results.  
Snapshot comparison technique 
This technique identifies changes to the file system by traversing the file structure, 
calculating and outputting an MD5 hash of each file encountered. By generating these 
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lists of hashes it is possible to determine files that have changed between the 
snapshots. To obtain hashes, the disk images acquired before and after the event are 
mounted on the analysis machine and the tool md5deep (Kornblum, 2008) is used in 
recursive mode to output the hashes of the files. There are a number of ways to mount 
disk images: on a Linux system using the built in mount command, or on Windows  
using specialist software such as Mount Image Pro (GetData, 2008) or using 
VMWare’s disk mounting tool (VMWare, 2008)30. In this research the latter is used. 
The use of md5deep produces lists containing MD5 hashes followed by the 
full path of the file. These can be compared using Windows’ fc.exe or Linux’s diff, but 
these tools are not specifically designed for outputting a list of files that have different 
hashes, and in the output of the tools, each change is sandwiched between lines that 
do not contain changes. Therefore a short Perl script was developed and used to 
compare the two lists and to report those files that have changed between the 
snapshots. The output of fc.exe and the developed script is shown in Figure 19. 
  
 
 
Figure 19: Changes made between snapshots displayed with fc.exe (top) and the developed Perl script (bottom), the latter 
produces a cleaner, simpler list of changes. 
 
                                                 
30
 This requires a workaround where, the .vmdk file that configures the virtual hard disk is duplicated 
and manually edited to reference the location of the new duplicate virtual disk.  
Only 
WindowsUpdate.log 
has changed 
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Contents of the Registries from snapshots can be extracted using the reg.pl script from 
Carvey (2007b p.134). This script extracts the contents from Registry hives in the 
form shown in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20: Registry contents extracted using reg.pl. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 20, the data extracted from the Registry keys is difficult to 
interpret and is considerably different to the format of the Procmon logs, where each 
key is listed in full (including the sub-key written). This difference makes comparison 
with the Procmon logs difficult, and as a result another developed Perl script is used 
to format the extracted Registry data. This script converts the extracted Registry data 
into Comma Separated Value form so that it can be more easily read and manipulated. 
The output is of the format key, last written time, type, value, and due to its CSV 
format it can easily be tabulated as shown in Table 19.  
 
Key Last 
Written 
Type Value 
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion Wed Sep 
12 10:33:02 
2007 
  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\DevicePath  REG_EXP
AND_SZ 
%SystemRoot%\inf  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\MediaPath
Unexpanded 
 REG_EXP
AND_SZ 
%SystemRoot%\Media  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SM_Games
Name 
 REG_SZ Games  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SM_Config
ureProgramsName 
 REG_SZ Set Program Access and 
Defaults  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ProgramFil
esDir 
 REG_SZ C:\Program Files  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\CommonFil
esDir 
 REG_SZ C:\Program Files\Common 
Files  
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HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ProductId  REG_SZ 76487-338-5610986-22153  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WallPaper
Dir 
 REG_EXP
AND_SZ 
%SystemRoot%\Web\Wallpa
per  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\MediaPath  REG_SZ C:\WINDOWS\Media  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\ProgramFil
esPath 
 REG_EXP
AND_SZ 
%ProgramFiles%  
HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\SM_Access
oriesName 
 REG_SZ Accessories 
 
Table 19: Registry contents formatted to CSV format using the developed Perl script displayed in table form. 
 
Using this simpler CSV format, the differences between the Registries extracted from 
the before and after disk images can be more easily identified using another script. 
‘Sort by modification date’ based technique 
As described earlier, it is also possible to use forensic software to sort files from a 
disk image by their modification date and to report those which changed during the 
period in which the test was performed. To determine the timeframe from which to 
report file changes, the time could be manually recorded from the system clock at the 
point at which event monitoring begins. However, this can also be automated since 
the virtual machine’s memory is duplicated in addition to the virtual disk. This is 
performed before and after the monitored event and using the Volatility toolkit 
(Walters and Petroni, 2007) it is possible to recover the system time from the memory 
images automatically (using the datetime function of the Volatility toolkit)31. A 
challenge to using this Modified Accessed Created (MAC) times based approach is 
that most forensic tools are used though a graphical interface which makes automation 
of the process and outputting a specific format report difficult. However, The Sleuth 
Kit (TSK) (Carrier, 2009) (originally Linux only but also now with a Windows 
version) provides a series of command line tools for recovering information from a 
disk image. Using these tools, the ‘after’ disk image can be analysed using the 
                                                 
31
 The dates and times could also could be taken from the Procmon log. 
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command fls -F -u -r -p -o 63 –m,32 which indexes all the files in the disk 
image to a text file along with their metadata, separated by ‘|’, including MAC times, 
(with Modified time in column 12, and Created time in column 13). This file is 
processed with a Perl script to parse the output from fls, retrieve the times from the 
memory images using Volatility, convert them to the same format as in fls, and then 
filter the results by these times.  
5.4.4 Data Correlation: Manual and Automated 
As described above, all the outputs from the individual monitoring methods are either 
generated or formatted using Perl scripts. This means that the format of the outputs 
can be controlled so they are all similar and can therefore be compiled and compared 
to each other to produce comprehensive and validated results.  
Since this analysis is repetitive, time consuming and error-prone, and since it 
needs to be performed for all the experimental data collected, the process is automated 
as much as possible. This is achieved by the development of an automated toolkit 
written in Perl, the structure of which is shown diagrammatically in Figure 21. 
 
                                                 
32
 fls options do the following: 
-F: files only 
-u: display undeleted only 
-r: recursive 
-p: display full path 
-o: image offset (63 sectors into physical disk image) 
-m: display metadata, including MAC times 
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Figure 21: Simplified architecture of fully automated results processing and report generation. 
 
The core of the automated analysis is the Analyse.pl script which reads a 
configuration file that contains a list of directories in which generated experimental 
data is stored. For each experiment directory, the script mounts the before and after 
virtual disks and calls the developed Virtual Machine Snapshot Analysis Tool 
(VMSAT) to extract the Registry and disk changes from the two snapshots. The 
Analyse.pl script also formats the Procmon logs and identifies changed files based on 
their ‘modified time’ metadata from the ‘after’ disk image. Finally, additional scripts 
are used to combine the results from the three methods and summarise them in an 
HTML report. This automation allows multiple sets of experimental data for file 
changes to be automatically processed and reports generated. Sample output is shown 
in Figure 22 and Figure 23. 
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Figure 22: Main index page of the generated HTML report. 
 
Figure 23: Sample summary of file changes in the combined HTML report. 
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5.4.5 Extending to Real Systems 
One limitation of this methodology is that it can only be used on virtual machines. As 
described in Chapter 1, one of the limitations of virtual machines is that not all 
hardware can be virtualised, and in the case of this research, one relevant example is 
the Firewire port. As a result, it is necessary to adapt the technique for compatibility 
with real systems. The modified procedure requires tools to be run on the system 
under test in order to create duplicates of the disk and memory, and as a result this 
version of the technique is additionally intrusive. Also, since the images of memory 
and disk are obtained from a real system, it is not possible to ‘pause’ the machine as 
when virtual machines are used. Therefore, disk images acquired from real systems 
are not snapshots but are ‘smears’, where data may change between the start of 
acquiring an image and the end. Therefore, many of the advantages of the technique 
are lost when used on a real system. However, in a limited number of cases, this is 
necessary. The modified procedure is described below. 
 
1. The test system is configured with two hard drives, one to contain the 
operating system and another to store images of disks and memory. 
2. A baseline copy of Windows XP is installed to the system drive33. 
3. The system is booted to the point at which changes needed to be monitored 
and Procmon is launched (but is not yet set to log changes).  
4. The Procmon logging is started34. 
5. The memory of the system is imaged, using FastDump, to the second drive. 
6. The system hard drive is imaged live using dd to the second drive. 
7. The action/connection under test is performed. 
8. The memory of the system is imaged, using FastDump, to the second drive35. 
                                                 
33
 For ease of testing, after Windows was installed, the baseline installation was imaged to the second 
drive so it could be easily restored after each test. 
34
 In Procmon, the backing file for the log is set to the second drive rather than the pagefile (default). 
35
 This can also be achieved using the Ctrl Scroll Lock method described in Chapter 2, although the 
Procmon log must be saved first. 
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9. The system hard drive is imaged live using dd to the second drive36. 
10. The Procmon logging is paused. 
11. The Procmon log is saved (including all events) as a Procmon Monitoring Log 
(PML) file to the second drive. 
 
In order for these disk images from real systems to be used with the automated 
analysis software they need to be mountable. This is achieved by converting them 
using LiveView (CERT, 2007), which converts them to VMware compatible virtual 
disks and allows the same analysis technique used for virtual disks to be used for disk 
images from real systems. 
5.4.6 Summary 
Due to the limitations of current system monitoring techniques and the difficulty in 
correlating results from multiple tools, in order to monitor the 'footprint' of live 
investigation tools, a more advanced system monitoring methodology is necessary. 
This section has described two ways in which virtualisation can be used to monitor 
systems externally in an unintrusive manner. First, the virtual machine can be 
monitored for changes using a snapshot based approach that determines whether files 
have changed based on their MD5 hashes calculated before and after an event occurs. 
Second, changes to the virtual machine’s disk can be determined externally by 
examining the after snapshot for changed files by filtering the results by last modified 
date/time in files' metadata. However, the limitations of these individual approaches 
means that changes may be missed either due to files being created and deleted 
between snapshots or due to files being modified without updating the MAC times. 
As a result, these techniques have been supplemented by integrating a third, but 
intrusive technique (Procmon) into the monitoring process, which runs inside the 
virtual environment and logs changes made between the snapshots.  
                                                 
36
 This can also be achieved by powering off the system, booting to a CD such as Helix and imaging the 
hard drive, although reordering of the steps is necessary so this is the final stage. This may be desirable 
if examining malicious software since powering off provides a trusted operating system in which to 
acquire the second disk image. 
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The developed method also allows results from these three techniques to be 
automatically combined into a report allowing three-way comparison of the results. 
Despite the technique using virtual machines, it can also be extended to real systems. 
This is necessary for performing tests on hardware that cannot be virtualised, e.g. 
Firewire, or for analysis of malware which may detect that it is running in a virtual 
environment and not run correctly. However, the technique for real systems has 
additional limitations since it cannot be ‘paused’ and therefore, the live acquired 
images of disk and memory are ‘smears’ rather than snapshots. Nevertheless, this 
developed methodology provides a more comprehensive list of changes made to a 
system than using a single method. 
 
5.5 RESULTS: RUNNING PROGRAMS 
5.5.1 Introduction 
Using the developed system monitoring technique the different mechanisms for 
running software on a system were examined. As described in the methodology 
section, programs can be launched by double clicking, using the Run command on the 
Start menu, and also launched from a trusted command prompt. These situations are 
examined in this section and the results described. 
5.5.2 Running Programs: Double Click 
In the first instance the ‘hello world’ programs were copied to the desktop and 
changes were logged when they were launched by double clicking. Both 16 and 32 bit 
versions of the program were run and this was found to affect the artefacts created. 
For the 32-bit versions of the ‘hello world’ program, prefetch files37 for each of the 
‘hello world’ programs were created in C:\Windows\Prefetch\. Carvey (2007a) 
                                                 
37
 Prefetch files are created by the prefetcher which “tries to speed the boot process and application 
startup by monitoring the data and code accessed by boot and application startups and using that 
information at the beginning of a subsequent boot or application startup to read in the code and data” 
(Russinovich & Solomon, 2005). 
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describes that “XP can maintain up to 128 Prefetch files”, and during testing, after the 
creation of 128 prefetch files, no new .pf files were created.  
For the 16-bit version of the program, prefetch files for ‘hello world’ were not 
created. However, there was a prefetch entry for NTVDM.exe which is the “Windows 
support image” that allows 16 bit processes to run under 32 bit Windows (Russinovich 
& Solomon 2005). This prefetch file contained references to the 16 bit programs that 
were run. In experiments running hello1.exe – hello10.exe only 8 entries were stored, 
i.e. running hello9.exe & hello10.exe overwrote the entries for hello1.exe & 
hello2.exe. Therefore, if running a 16 bit process on a live machine the potential exists 
to overwrite an entry for a previously run 16 bit process in the ntvdm.exe prefetch 
entry. For all the 16 bit programs, temporary files were also created in 
C:\Windows\Temp of the form scs#.tmp, where # is a hexadecimal digit. However, 
for both 16 and 32 bit programs, there were two Registry locations where artefacts 
were left that referred directly to the executed programs. These were: 
 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache\ 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\ ..\ 
 
The first contained references for all the versions of hello[x].exe that were run with 
their full path. This is created by the Explorer.exe shell when the executable is run 
(Carvey 2005). The second location also contains entries for programs that have been 
run on the system, but is encoded using ROT13, which is trivial to interpret, since 
each character is simply shifted by 13 places. Each entry also had a binary value 
associated with it, the latter half being a Windows 64 bit hex value date and time 
describing the last time that the program was run (Farmer, 2007). These have not been 
found to be overwritten once a certain number is reached. However, further 
experimentation is necessary to guarantee this. 
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5.5.3 Running Programs: Start -> Run 
Programs were also launched using the Run command from the Windows start menu. 
The artefacts produced were the same as double clicking to execute a program. 
However there were some additional artefacts found. Entries were created in: 
 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\ 
 
This key contains references to the full path of executables run and they are stored in 
sub keys named a-z, therefore there are 26 possible entries, after which previous ones 
are overwritten. Each new entry assigned a letter is added to  
 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\RunMRU\MRUList 
 
In addition, if the files are not typed directly into the Start -> Run option, but are 
browsed using the dialogue box, there are also entries created in sub-keys a-z 
(maximum 26 entries) in: 
 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\ComDlg32\OpenSaveMRU\exe\ 
 
5.5.4 Running Programs: Trusted Command Prompt 
Applications can also be launched by first opening a command prompt then running 
programs from there. In this case, first a prefetch entry was created for cmd.exe and 
the Registry artefacts described in the previous two subsections were created for 
cmd.exe. When launching programs from the trusted command prompt, in the case of 
32 bit programs (only 32 bit processes were tested in this case), prefetch files were 
also created for each of the programs run from the command prompt. However, the 
following Registry keys contained references only to cmd.exe, not to the programs 
run from the command prompt: 
 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache\ 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\UserAssist\ 
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5.5.5 Running Programs: Summary 
Programs can be run in a number of different ways and each causes different disk and 
Registry changes to take place. For all programs run, prefetch entries were created on 
disk. In the case of 32 bit processes, one is created for each process run and in the 
case of 16 bit processes, they are run through NTVDM and therefore only this has a 
prefetch entry. However, in the latter, files are also produced in the Windows 
temporary folder for each program run. Registry changes also occur and record 
processes that have been run (e.g. the MUI Cache and UserAssist Registry keys). 
Running programs using Run from the Start Menu also added entries to RunMRU 
and, if the dialogue box was used to browse to another location, additional changes 
were made in the OpenSaveMRU key. When programs were launched from a 
command prompt, the prefetch files were created for each program run, but Registry 
entries were only created for cmd.exe, not the programs run from it. 
 There are a number of implications. All methods for launching software will 
create prefetch entries for the software run. However, during testing, after the creation 
of 128 prefetch files, no additional prefetch files were created, suggesting that 
evidence will not be overwritten in this way. Also, it has been shown that tools should 
ideally not be run using Start->Run since this will make additional entries in 
RunMRU which only stores a fixed number (26) of run programs and therefore may 
overwrite a record of a previously run application.  
 Further implications of these tests are that if it is necessary to run multiple 
tools and it is necessary or desirable to minimise entries in the Registry (in 
MUICache, UserAssist and RunMRU) then it is preferable to launch programs from a 
trusted command prompt since only one Registry entry will be created.  
 However, if just launching a single program, double clicking is preferable 
since it will make fewer prefetch entries. The possible need for an investigator to be 
able to launch a program by double clicking has implications for live tool design since 
it means that if parameters need to be passed to a tool, this should be achievable using 
means other than command line parameters, e.g. using a configuration file or 
designing programs with interactive shells. 
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5.6 RESULTS: CONNECTING TO A LIVE SYSTEM 
5.6.1 Introduction 
Using the developed system monitoring technique the different mechanisms for 
connecting to a system were examined. As described in the methodology section, 
inserting a CDROM, connecting a USB device and connecting via Firewire were 
considered. This section describes these results. 
5.6.2 Mounting a CD 
A CD was mounted containing the ‘hello world’ test programs used earlier. The 
changes made when the CD was inserted were monitored. Changes were made to the 
following Registry keys, but no identifiable information could be extracted: 
 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\MountPoints2 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Tracing\Imapi 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_IMAPISERVICE\ 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\IDE\CdRomHL-DT-ST_DVD+-RW_GSA-
H31L_______________1.05____\3031303030303030303030303030303030303130\Device 
Parameters 
 
Also, in the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\ShellNoRoam\MUICache Registry 
key, 8 entries were created, all of which began with @shell32.dll, and represent the 
tasks added to the user interface for an inserted CD. However, no maximum amount 
of entries stored in this key has yet been found. 
 
@shell32.dll,-8504 REG_SZ Auto&Play 
@shell32.dll,-12589 REG_SZ Files Currently on the CD 
@shell32.dll,-12590 REG_SZ Files Ready to Be Written to the CD 
@shell32.dll,-31353 REG_SZ CD Writing Tasks 
@shell32.dll,-31355 REG_SZ Write these files to CD 
@shell32.dll,-31234 REG_SZ These tasks apply to the files and folders you select 
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@shell32.dll,-31273 REG_SZ These links open other folders and take you quickly to 
useful places. 
@shell32.dll,-31275 REG_SZ This section displays the size, file type, and other 
information about a selected item. 
 
Locations containing data that specifically referenced the inserted CD are shown 
below. 
 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD Burning\Current Media 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD Burning\Current Media\TotalBytes 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD Burning\Current Media\FreeBytes 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD Burning\Current Media\Media 
Type 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD Burning\Current Media\UDF 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD Burning\Current Media\Disc Label 
HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\CD Burning\Current Media\Set 
 
This information may be important if a CD needs to be ejected in order to load an 
investigator’s toolkit on to the machine using another CD, since on removal of the CD 
the keys are deleted. Deleted Registry keys have not been investigated as part of this 
research but new values are written on inserting a different CD. It is possible that 
these may overwrite the details of the previously inserted CD. Note that these changes 
documented in this sections are for a CD inserted into a drive capable of writing CDs; 
there are far fewer made for standard CD drives. 
5.6.3 Attaching a USB Device 
Changes caused by connecting a USB device have been previously documented in 
Carvey and Altheide (2005) which described that on a Windows XP system, the 
setupapi.log in the system root is changed, as are the following Registry keys: 
  
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USB 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\USBStor 
HKLM\System\MountedDevices 
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Tests were performed to validate these changes. If the USB device is the first to be 
inserted then the usbstor.sys driver is installed (25.9KB) which will overwrite data in 
unallocated space. During testing it was found that references were added to 
setupapi.log, including references to the USB device’s Vendor ID, Product ID and 
serial number. However, these details were appended to setupapi.log, so an 
investigator adding a USB device will not overwrite any of the existing log. However, 
the changes added to the log totalled 1401 bytes of data, which may overwrite a small 
amount of data in slack and unallocated space. Also, a prefetch entry is created for 
RUNDLL32.EXE which executes DLLs and places them into memory, although an 
inspection of the prefetch entry with bintext (Foundstone, 2000) could not find any 
USB specific references. In addition to the Registry changes mentioned above, 
references to the attached USB stick were also found in: 
 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\DeviceClasses\ 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\STORAGE\RemovableMedia\ 
HKLM\System\MountedDevices 
5.6.4 Connecting a Firewire Device 
To examine the changes made by connecting a Firewire device the technique had to 
be modified for use on a real system instead of a virtual machine, as discussed in 
Section 5.4.5. A Linux based laptop was configured using the pythonraw1394 scripts 
from Bolieau (2006), connected to the system and the system’s RAM was imaged 
using the 1394memimage script, also from Bolieau (2006).  
 On connecting via the Firewire port, since it was the first use of the port, Serial 
Bus Protocol 2 (SBP2) drivers were installed for the port: 
 
WINDOWS\system32\dllcache\sbp2port.sys (43136 bytes)  
WINDOWS\SYSTEM32\DRIVERS\SBP2PORT.SYS (43136 bytes)  
 
There were also entries added to sysevent.evt log reporting an error of the SBP2 
driver: 
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112 19/11/2008 16:57:08 19/11/2008 16:57:08 4  Error 40  sbp2port  TEST-PC 
113 19/11/2008 16:57:15 19/11/2008 16:57:15 4  Error 40  sbp2port  TEST-PC 
 
There were also Registry changes related to the driver installation: 
 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{4D36E967-E325-11CE-BFC1-
08002BE10318}\0006  
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Class\{D48179BE-EC20-11D1-B6B8-
00C04FA372A7}\0000  
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\CriticalDeviceDatabase\gendisk 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\PCI\VEN_1033&DEV_00F2&SUBSYS_00CE1033&REV_
01\  
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\EventLog\System\sbp2port 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\sbp2port 
  
Since the Linux machine simulates the connection of an iPod, other changes made 
when connecting the Firewire cable were similar to inserting a USB stick. In the 
Windows folder, the file setupapi.log had 3232 bytes appended to it, describing the 
installation of drivers for an iPod, and Registry entries for the installed ‘iPod’ could 
be found in: 
 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\1394\Apple_Computer__Inc.&iPod\ 80E000024C0000 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum\SBP2\Apple_Computer__Inc.&iPod&LUN0\00004c0200000
e08 
5.6.6 Connecting to a Live System: Summary 
There are a number of ways of connecting to a live system. Programs are often run on 
a system from an investigator's CD ROM and this is advised in Adelstein (2006) since 
it is a read only medium. During the test scenario for CDs, a number of changes were 
made to the Registry and if the drive is capable of writing CDs, among these changes 
is information about the currently inserted CD. The consequences of this are that if an 
investigator ejects a CD already in the machine then digital evidence of that CD being 
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in the drive may be lost. While this is only likely to be relevant in a small minority of 
cases it is still a point worth noting. 
 Another option for getting programs on to a system, and data from it, is the 
USB port. Connecting a USB device makes changes to files on disk (setupapi.log) and 
to the Registry. The information added to setupapi.log and to the Registry is always 
appended, as yet with no identified limit. Therefore, the risk of overwriting evidence 
is limited to data in slack and unallocated space, which is overwritten as data is added. 
Since data is appended, USB devices (preferably read-only for tool delivery) could be 
considered in situations where the contents of the CD drive may be of interest. 
 Connection via Firewire produced similar changes to connecting a USB 
device, although since Firewire devices are not as popular as USB it may be more 
likely that the Firewire driver needs to be installed; which will overwrite more data in 
unallocated space since SBP2PORT.SYS is created twice on the system and changes 
are also made to sysevent.evt. There were also several Registry keys created and 
modified. Specific iPod related changes could be found in setupapi.log and 
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Enum.  
 There are also other connections that have not been considered in this 
research, for example Ethernet and e-SATA. Also, the specifics of connecting a USB 
hard drive rather than a thumb drive have not been examined. However, the developed 
methodology can be used in future to examine these interfaces on virtual and real 
systems. 
5.7 RESULTS: RUNNING LIVE INVESTIGATION TOOLS 
5.7.1 Introduction 
Using the developed system monitoring technique, a number of live investigation 
tools were examined. Acquisition tools for both disk and memory were examined, as 
were some analysis tools, e.g. pslist and psinfo. 
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5.7.2 dd for acquiring disk 
dd (from the Forensic Acquisition Utilities (FAU)) was executed from an already 
running command prompt and used to image a section of the hard disk to another 
drive. Running dd created only a single prefetch entry and single Registry change:  
 
WINDOWS\Prefetch\DD.EXE-1D9BD197.pf 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed 
5.7.3 FTK Imager for acquiring disk 
FTK Imager was executed and used to image the system drive of the virtual machine 
to a second drive. This created the following prefetch file: 
 
WINDOWS\Prefetch\FTKIMAGER.EXE-00778F2F.pf 
 
There were also several Registry changes made, including 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed. Also, The Registry key 
HKCU\Software\Smart Projects\AccessData Corp.\Version was created which 
describes the version of FTK Imager that was run. There were also Access Data 
specific entries created in HKCU\Software\AccessData. There were also a number of 
additional Registry entries created in this key that were deleted when the imaging was 
complete. These were: 
 
HKCU\Software\AccessData\FTK Imager\ProfUIS240\Profiles\FTK Imager\ControlBar  
HKCU\Software\AccessData\FTK Imager\ProfUIS240\Profiles\FTK Imager\ControlBar\data_size  
HKCU\Software\AccessData\FTK Imager\ProfUIS240\Profiles\FTK Imager\ControlBar\data_integrity 
HKCU\Software\AccessData\FTK Imager\ProfUIS240\Profiles\FTK 
Imager\ControlBar\block_0x00000000\data_0x00000000 
… 
HKCU\Software\AccessData\FTK Imager\ProfUIS240\Profiles\FTK 
Imager\ControlBar\block_0x00000000\data_0x00000058 
 
Therefore, running FTK Imager made significantly more changes than using dd. 
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5.7.4 dd for acquiring memory 
The modified version of dd obtained from the Helix Live CD was run from the 
command line and was used to image the memory of the test system. This produced 
the same results as the previous use of dd for disk imaging: a prefetch entry for dd and 
a change to the …\Cryptography\RNG\Seed Registry key. 
5.7.5 Fast Dump for acquiring memory 
FastDump (FD) (HBGary, 2008a) was run from the command line and used to 
acquire a memory image of the test system, and file changes consisted only of a 
prefetch entry: WINDOWS\Prefetch\FD.EXE-062D3D04.pf. There were no Registry 
changes detected. 
5.7.6 PSList 
PSList from SysInternals was run from the command line and listed processes running 
on the system. In addition to the prefectch entry caused by launching the tool 
(WINDOWS\Prefetch\PSLIST.EXE-08928D72.pf), one Registry entry was modified and 
another created. The created entry contained a flag to record that the End User 
License Agreement (EULA) for the software had been read and accepted on the first 
run of the program. 
 
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\RNG\Seed   (modified) 
HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\PsList    (created) 
5.7.6 PSInfo 
After running psinfo from the command prompt a number of prefetch files were 
created, as was a psinfo specific Registry key regarding acceptance of the EULA: 
 
WMIAPSRV.EXE-1E2270A5.pf 
WMIPRVSE.EXE-28F301A9.pf 
RUNDLL32.EXE-321A7019.pf 
RUNDLL32.EXE.451FC2C0.pf 
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HKCU\Software\Sysinternals\PsInfo\EulaAccepted (created) 
 
There were also 59 other Registry key changes, 20 of which were specifically 
attributed to the psinfo process by Procmon.  
5.7.7 WinAudit from Helix Live CD 
WinAudit produces a HTML report detailing various information about the system, 
including the system specification, the current date and time, up-time, size of RAM, 
size of disk, installed software, open ports, running programs and services. Executing 
WinAudit created one additional prefetch entry to the one for the WinAudit program: 
 
WINDOWS\Prefetch\WMIPRVSE.EXE-28F301A9.pf 
 
During testing there were also 132 Registry changes made, which is particularly 
significant when compared to the number of changes caused by disk and memory 
imaging. Particularly when much of the information obtained using WinAudit could 
be obtained from disk and memory images. 
5.7.7 Running Live Investigation Tools: Summary 
The changes reported in this sub-section exclude the Registry changes that are due to 
'running a program' which were discussed in a previous section. The disk acquisitions 
performed with dd and FTK Imager made different numbers of changes, with dd 
making fewer changes to the system than FTK Imager, which is unsurprising since 
FTK Imager uses a graphical interface and offers more features. 
 The memory of the test systems was acquired using dd from the Helix Live CD 
and also FastDump. Both made very few changes. dd made one file and one Registry 
change and FastDump just a single file change, which was a prefetch entry for itself. 
Both these tools had to be launched from the command line, which, as shown in a 
previous section, is not ideal due to the extra prefetch entry created. 
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 The results of memory acquisitions are particularly interesting when compared 
with the results from running live analysis tools. Pslist made fewer changes than 
expected: a single file change (prefetch) and two Registry changes, one related to 
EULA acceptance. Psinfo was also run, and created a number of prefetch and Registry 
entries, one Registry key specifically being related to EULA acceptance. Also 
WinAudit was run from the Helix Live CD which created two prefetch entries and a 
considerable number of Registry modifications.  
While these live analysis tools were previously the only way to obtain 
information from a live system, the additional changes made by these live analysis 
tools could now be considered to be unnecessary since much of the information 
obtained by running these tools can be recovered from a memory dump of a live 
system. This is particularly true if the changes caused by 'launching programs' are 
considered, since live investigation tools usually perform a single task and many of 
them are run sequentially to obtain a broad amount of information from a system. This 
is a problem since each piece of software run will produce a prefetch entry, and at 
least one addition to the Registry. Considering that in many cases these live 
investigation tools can be replaced by a memory acquisition and an offline (but still at 
the scene) analysis of that image, changes to the suspect system can be minimised by 
taking the memory acquisition approach and minimising the reduction in the 
completeness of preserved digital evidence. Some information obtained using live 
tools cannot be recovered from memory images and requires information from disk. 
However, if dd was modified to perform selective acquisition and could be configured 
to obtain files from which this additional information could be recovered e.g. Registry 
hives, then these files could also be analysed at the scene, but offline. This would 
allow reduction in completeness to be minimised further. This selective acquisition 
approach remains future work. 
 
  Chapter 5 
 
 155 
  
  
5.8 EVALUATION 
5.8.1 Methodology Evaluation 
This chapter has investigated the extent to which the completeness requirement 
explained in Chapter 3 can be satisfied for live investigations. The requirement states 
that it should be possible to assess which digital evidence is preserved and which is 
lost, and the maximum amount of digital evidence relevant to the investigation should 
be preserved. This means that the changes caused to a system due to live tools and 
techniques should be identifiable so that the evidence lost due to data being 
overwritten can be assessed post-live investigation. It is also important to know, 
before the investigation takes place, what changes are normally made by live tools, 
since this can assist an investigator in determining the most appropriate live technique 
to use in order to preserve the maximum amount of relevant digital evidence. The 
approach to achieve both of these was to develop a methodology to allow the 
monitoring of live tools in a test environment and to record changes made. This is 
now possible and a number of interesting results have been obtained.  
 However, there are limitations to this methodology. First, only a small 
selection of live techniques have been examined and there are many other live tools in 
use and many other methods of connecting to a live system. However, as discussed 
earlier in the chapter, the focus of this research was to develop a methodology to 
allow changes to be identified, rather than to provide a comprehensive testing of all 
available live techniques. This is therefore not considered to be a significant 
limitation. In addition, a broad range of different test situations have been examined, 
which demonstrates the versatility of the developed technique.  
Another limitation is that the tests were all performed on a single operating 
system: Windows XP Service Pack 2; and while this is a popular operating system 
choice, the changes made by tools running on different operating systems may change 
and also need to be examined. However, again, this can be achieved using the 
developed methodology and remains future work. Also, the test systems are basic 
installs of the test operating system, i.e. free of any other installed software, e.g. 
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antivirus. Therefore, they are unlikely to represent real life systems that will be 
encountered in the course of live digital investigations. However, the research carried 
out can be considered to be the first stages of testing, whereas in future, test systems 
can be constructed that better represent those that may be encountered during live 
investigations. It is also possible, post-live investigation to build a test system in a 
similar configuration to that examined, and use it to identify changes that were likely 
to have been made during the real investigation.  
Recording the footprint of live tools on test systems allows predictions of what 
changes will occur on real systems. However, the data that was changed on a system 
from a real investigation can be better inferred using information available on the 
system after the live investigation takes place. As a result, after a live investigation, it 
is still necessary to examine the system to determine what evidence has been lost. 
However, the results obtained from monitoring test systems also assist with this 
process, since an improved understanding is gained of the changes that are made to 
systems. This allows an investigator to draw conclusions about the cause of a 
particular artefact being found on the examined system (whether they were due to 
normal background activity or the live tools). Also, one of the implemented 
techniques (MAC times based approach) can be applied to acquired data from a live 
investigation, and changes made after the recorded time of the beginning of the 
investigation can be extracted. However, this MAC times based approach is 
insufficient on its own, since not all changes to the system will update MAC times. A 
complete methodology for identifying changes made post-investigation remains future 
work. 
Despite these limitations, for a live investigation, this test system based 
approach, and the prediction of likely changes is extremely useful. The approach 
provides information that can be used by an investigator to understand likely changes 
that will be caused by the tools used. This allows them to make a decision about the 
best course of action in order to preserve the maximum amount of potentially relevant 
digital evidence. The examination of test systems also assists after the investigation 
has taken place, since it increases understanding of artefacts left on the system and 
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allows some of the detected changes to be attributed to normal background processes 
and the actual changes caused by live tools to be identified.  
5.8.2 Monitoring Technique Evaluation 
The system monitoring technique described in this chapter was developed to record 
changes made to test systems and to overcome the limitations of existing monitoring 
techniques. The three existing techniques for system monitoring described were: live 
logging tools, snapshot based approaches and MAC times based analysis. Live 
logging tools are intrusive techniques that intercept system events and record them to 
logs, and experiments have shown that these techniques can fail to record some 
events, and this research has not found a conclusive explanation for this. The existing 
snapshot based approach (InCtrl5) is also an intrusive monitoring technique that has 
the disadvantage of not recording changes that are made and undone in between 
snapshots, e.g. the creation and deletion of temporary files. The MAC times based 
approach is the only unintrusive technique, but this will also miss changes where the 
file metadata has not been updated. 
 The developed approach significantly modified the snapshot approach so that 
it was an unintrusive technique based on the use of virtual machines. It also combined 
it with the two other approaches into a much more comprehensive monitoring 
methodology, where a broader amount of changes are captured. However, the overall 
technique has remained intrusive due to the reliance on live logging techniques 
(Procmon). However, since only one intrusive technique is used, filtering out changes 
caused by Procmon is straightforward, as it can be monitored running on its own, the 
changes recorded and filtered out from future results. Also, in future, the combined 
technique could be used to monitor a virtual machine from a completely external 
perspective by removing the live logging tools, if the limitations of the snapshot 
approach could be overcome. Procmon is currently necessary due to the snapshot 
approach missing changes that are made and undone between snapshots. The impact 
of this limitation could be minimised, if in addition to the live file set, unallocated 
space in the two snapshots was also examined for changes, which would capture files 
  Chapter 5 
 
 158 
  
  
created and deleted between snapshots. It may also be possible to run the live logging 
tools on the host system and to translate writes to the virtual machine’s disk file into 
changes made in the virtual file system. Alternatively, open source virtualisation 
software could be modified to record changes to the virtualised system as they occur. 
However, these improvements remain future work. 
Alternatively, the Procmon monitoring could still be used, but separated out. 
This would mean conducting two experiments for each technique under test. Using 
the developed scripts for formatting tool output and combining them into a single 
report, the Procmon log from one test could be combined with the virtual system 
monitoring results from another. If the same baseline virtual machine was used, the 
results should not be significantly different. Alternatively, by combining results from 
systems in slightly different configurations, the robustness of the results could be 
increased. This separation of the live logging tools would mean that the snapshot and 
MAC address experiment was completely unintrusive, which would also enable the 
analysis of changes to the memory of the virtual machine to take place, since it would 
not be affected by monitoring tools. In this research, only changes to disk have been 
considered, without examining changes to the memory of the system. This is because 
it currently cannot be preformed correctly without additional experiments, due to the 
use of the intrusive Procmon tool. This is not a problem in this research, as changes to 
memory are not discussed since current techniques do not preserve memory at all, and 
therefore the intricacies of losing a small part of memory due to the use of a particular 
tool are not considered. However, this will need to be examined in future and the 
proposed modifications to the technique discussed in this section will allow this. 
The developed approach also offers the advantage of combining the results 
from the three approaches into a single report. The purpose of this was to validate the 
results of each of the monitoring methods. However, this has not been fully achieved 
since the different methods often do not agree because each method misses certain 
changes. So, while the complete validation of the individual methods has not been 
possible, combining them produces a more comprehensive list of changes and 
highlights the need to correlate multiple monitoring techniques. 
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There are also some practical limitations of the developed monitoring 
technique to consider. One consequence of the thoroughness of the monitoring is that 
the space requirements are much greater: for each experiment, two additional copies 
of the virtual machine’s hard disk and memory are made, in addition to the log from 
the live logging software. There is also a time issue, where creating duplicates of 
virtual hard drives for the ‘before’ and ‘after’ snapshots is more time consuming than 
the live logging approach alone. However, due to the low cost of hard disk storage, 
the amount of data generated has not been a significant problem, neither has the time 
needed to create duplicates of the virtual hard disks since the timescale is in minutes 
rather than hours. 
There are also specific difficulties with the new snapshot based approach. 
When the virtual machine is paused immediately after performing some action or 
running a piece of software, the changes are sometimes not recorded due to caching of 
disk writes. This is not a problem in the overall approach since the live logging 
method does record them, and this has been addressed in this research by leaving a 
short time after the event to allow changes to be written. However, a more effective 
solution to this problem is still being sought. 
Finally, it is still a challenge to efficiently filter out background changes. 
While changes that occurred on an idle system were documented and excluded from 
results manually, it is not possible to say with certainty that files that normally change 
in the background do not also change as a result of actions performed on the system. 
This is a weakness of the methodology that can currently only be resolved through 
manual inspection of all background changes listed by the techniques, which is 
repetitive, time consuming and error prone. One way in which this process could be 
made easier is by replacing the HTML based reporting of the current system with a 
full interactive user interface, designed specifically for examining reported files for 
changes. However, this also remains future work.  
 Despite these limitations, the virtual machine snapshot approach provides a 
realistic alternative to live logging tools, particularly if a method of identifying 
changes made and undone between snapshots can be devised. Also, the automation of 
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the report generation, while improvements are needed, allows the changes made to a 
number of test systems to be easily examined and allows a three way comparison of 
results that would not be feasible if performed manually.  
 
5.9 CONCLUSIONS 
5.9.1 Summary 
The completeness requirement means that it should be possible to assess which digital 
evidence is preserved and which is lost, and the maximum amount of digital evidence 
that is relevant to the investigation should be preserved. Evidence lost can be easily 
assessed in a traditional digital investigation since it is pre-determined with procedure 
(‘pull the plug’) what will be preserved (the hard disk) and lost (memory). The 
previous chapter showed that in certain circumstances, e.g. Full Disk Encryption, this 
approach will not preserve the maximum amount of relevant digital evidence and 
therefore a live investigation should be performed.  
 Therefore, it is necessary to be able to assess which digital evidence is 
preserved and which is lost when a live investigation is performed. While in the Full 
Disk Encryption example a live investigation is capable of preserving more than a 
traditional investigation, there are subtleties within the live investigation: live tools 
are intrusive and therefore overwrite data and cause evidence to be lost, but some 
tools or techniques may make fewer changes and therefore preserve more digital 
evidence than others. Also, different tools make different changes and data that is not 
relevant in one investigation may be relevant in another. Therefore, a different choice 
of tool or technique in different investigations may allow the maximum amount of 
relevant digital evidence to be preserved for a particular investigation. It is therefore 
necessary to identify changes that are caused by performing different actions on 
systems, so that the most appropriate action can be chosen for the current 
circumstances. 
 This chapter has developed a methodology for monitoring live tools and 
techniques in a test environment to establish the changes that they make. This can be 
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achieved using existing methods: live logging tools, intrusive snapshots, or sorting 
files by their MAC times. However, each of these approaches has limitations that 
mean they may miss certain changes that are made to a system. Therefore, this could 
result in live investigations being performed that overwrite relevant data and 
consequently fail to preserve relevant digital evidence. The developed methodology 
combines the approaches into a single technique that uses each of the methods’ 
strengths to overcome the weaknesses of others, providing a more comprehensive set 
of results. 
 This developed methodology was used to examine a number of live tools and 
techniques in test environments and to record the changes made. The tests carried out 
can be grouped into ‘launching programs’, ‘connecting to a live system’ and ‘running 
live investigation tools’. A number of interesting results were found which are 
summarised in the following sub-sections. 
5.9.2 Launching Programs 
Changes caused by running programs in a variety of ways were recorded: launching 
by double clicking, using Run from the Start Menu, and also by launching from a 
trusted command prompt. The least intrusive way to launch programs depends on how 
many programs will be run. If more than one live tool will be run then a command 
prompt is better as it makes fewer changes to the Registry. However, if a single tool is 
to be run, then launching by double clicking is preferable since the Registry changes 
are the same but with one fewer prefetch file created. This is also an important point 
for developers of live tools since tools are often designed so that parameters are 
passed to live tools using the command line. If this is not always desirable then 
alternatives such as configuration files or interactive shells should be considered. 
5.9.3 Connecting to a Live System 
Options for connecting to a live machine were also considered. Information about the 
currently mounted CD was found in the Registry, but was deleted when the CD was 
removed e.g. for an investigator to load a toolkit. However, without investigating 
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deleted Registry keys it is not possible to know if information about previously 
inserted CDs would have been recoverable if an investigator’s CD had not been 
inserted. Therefore, in a small number of cases where the currently inserted CD may 
be relevant, it is important not to eject the current CD to load live tools on to a system.  
 Attaching a USB mass storage device and Firewire device was also considered 
and both made a number of changes to the disk and Registry of the system. However, 
from the tests performed, the amount of potential digital evidence that could be lost 
due to connecting these devices is minimal since all data written is appended and does 
not replace existing values. Therefore, the loss of evidence is limited to data in 
unallocated space, slack space or deleted keys in the Registry. 
5.9.4 Running Live Tools 
A number of live acquisition tools were also investigated. Two disk imaging tools 
were tested and dd was found to cause fewer changes than FTK Imager. Also, 
memory was acquired using dd (from Helix Live CD) and FastDump, both of which 
produced prefetch files for themselves and dd caused an additional Registry change. 
More significant is the difference between the amount of change caused by these 
memory acquisition tools compared to live investigation tools, with the latter 
producing many more changes. This is important since much of the information 
obtained by running live analysis tools can now be recovered from a memory dump 
using tools such as Volatility (described in Chapter 2). Therefore, by using memory 
acquisition tools, which have a smaller footprint, and then obtaining information from 
the acquired image offline (but still at the scene), fewer changes to the suspect system 
can be made, which minimises the reduction in completeness of the preserved digital 
evidence.  
5.9.5 Final Summary 
It has been shown that it is possible to assess the changes made by live tools in a test 
environment and, with the assumption that similar changes will be made on systems 
during actual investigations, it is therefore possible to predict the changes that will be 
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made to systems during actual live digital investigations. Further experimentation 
using test systems that better represent ‘real life’ machines can be performed to make 
this assumption more valid, and will allow better understanding of the changes caused 
by live tools and techniques. This will allow the evidence preserved and lost as a 
result of live investigations to be assessed and will also assist an investigator to decide 
the best course of action at the scene that will preserve the maximum amount of 
relevant digital evidence. An example of this would be using a live memory 
acquisition followed by an offline analysis of that memory image, rather than using 
live investigation tools which obtain the same information, but make far more 
changes. 
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CHAPTER 6: ACCURACY 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter 3 it was explained that in a digital investigation it should be possible to 
assess the amount of error associated with all techniques used to obtain and process 
digital evidence, and that amount of error should be acceptable in the context of the 
current investigation. This chapter considers the nature of error associated with digital 
evidence and how it can be assessed. It examines how repeatability can be used as a 
means of assessing the accuracy of techniques used to recover and process digital 
evidence, and shows that this is not usually possible for live digital investigations. 
However, this chapter also shows that in the context of live digital investigations 
involving encrypted evidence, other data can be recovered from a live machine that 
allows offline decryption of encrypted data. Since offline decryption is possible, this 
means that the acquisition of encrypted digital evidence can also be performed in a 
repeatable manner, allowing the accuracy of the processes used to be assessed.  
 
6.2 BACKGROUND 
6.2.1 Introduction 
A limitation of the explanation provided for assessing the accuracy of digital evidence 
described above and in Chapter 3, is that error in the context of digital investigation 
techniques (acquisition, analysis and presentation) has not been defined. The technical 
definition of error is “a measure of the estimated difference between the observed or 
calculated value of a quantity and its true value” (Oxford, 2008). The difficulty in 
using this definition of error for digital evidence is that a piece of digital evidence is 
generally not a value and the error cannot be expressed as x ± y. Also, since digital 
evidence is always an abstraction of something physical (see Chapter 2), and it is not 
possible to view the actual data directly, this would make it impossible to assess the 
error in any digital investigation, since the ‘true’ value of the data cannot be known. 
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This section explores how error associated with digital evidence can be assessed in a 
meaningful way.  
6.2.2 Error in Specific Aspects of Digital Investigations 
There are several papers that discuss error related to digital evidence and each focuses 
on error associated with a particular aspect of a digital investigation. Carrier (2003) 
considers the introduction of error due to analysis tools (which are used to “translate 
data through one or more layers of abstraction until it can be understood”). Two types 
of analysis tool error are described. One is tool implementation error which is due to 
programming and tool design errors. The other is abstraction error, which is 
introduced “because of simplification used to generate the layer of abstraction” and 
when “abstraction is not part of the original design”. An example of this in a 
traditional digital investigation would be the skin colour based detection feature of X-
Ways Forensics (X-Ways, 2009), where files below a certain threshold are not 
displayed. This separation of files based on skin colour removes files from the view of 
the investigator in a way that is not part of the original operating system design. Since 
this approach for filtering relevant files is imperfect, this could filter out files that are 
important to the investigation, and the technique could therefore introduce abstraction 
error. However, abstraction layers do not necessarily introduce error and are described 
in Carrier (2003) as “lossless” (zero error)38 or “lossy” (error greater than zero).  
Carrier (2003) also mentions other types of error that are not due to analysis 
tools, including “errors introduced from the attacker covering his tracks, from faulty 
imaging tools, or from an investigator misinterpreting the results of a tool”. However, 
they are not discussed in detail. 
Casey (2002a) also discusses error in digital investigations, focusing on error 
in digital evidence obtained from networks. Similarly to Oxford (2008), Casey 
(2002a) describes error as “the difference between the true value and the 
measured/recorded value”.  
                                                 
38
 ASCII is an example of a lossless abstraction layer 
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Casey (2002a) discusses ‘temporal uncertainty’, (where ‘uncertainty’ is 
described as the “probable upper bound of the error”) which can be caused by clock 
offset (either small drift or deliberate tampering) and by also limits in resolution, for 
example a record of “connections to/from a suspect’s computer that are totalled every 
ten minutes”. This means that from this data “it is not possible to distinguish between 
a Web site that the suspect accessed for ten minutes and a Web site that was only 
viewed for a few seconds.”  
Casey (2002a) also discusses ‘uncertainty in origin’, which could be confused 
with the authenticity requirement used in this research. However, due to the way in 
which ‘uncertainty in origin’ is discussed in Casey (2002a), in this research, this term 
relates to the accuracy requirement. In the examples given in Casey (2002a), the term 
‘uncertainty in origin’, rather than being concerned with identifying the physical 
evidence from which the digital object was obtained, relates to the events that caused 
the digital object to have its current value. For example, Casey (2002a) describes that 
the ‘from’ header in an e-mail could be falsified and has a high degree of uncertainty, 
and also that there is difficulty in using an IP address to determine an individual 
machine that is behind a Network Address Translation (NAT) device. In these 
examples, the digital evidence artefacts are the e-mail header and the IP address 
respectively. The origin of both, using definitions in this research, is considered to be 
the physical evidence from which it was obtained, likely a server. Showing that the 
digital objects were obtained from a particular server would therefore be part of the 
authenticity requirement. However, “uncertainty in origin” as referred to in Casey  
(2002a) i.e. determining the uncertainty in what actual events caused digital objects to 
have their current values, relates to accuracy. This is because, if there are multiple 
events that could cause the same state of digital data, there is an actual, true event that 
caused it, and one or more other events that did not. Considering why these digital 
objects have the states that they do, the ‘from’ entry in an e-mail header found on a 
server could have its value for a number of reasons, including that it came from that 
sender; or that it came from a different address and the header has been falsified. 
Equally, a reference found to the IP address of a NAT device could actually be caused 
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by connections from one of several machines behind that device. Discussing error in 
terms of a set of alternative reasons for a digital object having a particular value leads 
to a general definition of error for digital investigations.  
6.2.3 Defining Error in Digital Investigations 
In Chapter 2, it was explained how interactions with the real world and other digital 
devices can cause digital events to occur, which in turn create digital evidence 
artefacts, e.g. a person typing a URL into Internet Explorer (physical event) will 
trigger software code to execute, including an Application Programming Interface 
(API) call that creates a Registry entry (digital event) in the TypedURLs Registry key 
that contains the text typed into the address bar (digital evidence artefact). Chapter 2 
also described that the aim of a digital investigation is to “make valid inferences about 
a computer’s history” (Carrier, 2006a), where a computer’s history is defined as “a 
sequence of its previous states and events” (Carrier, 2006a). Since digital data on a 
system is usually as a result of interaction with another digital device or the real 
world, it is often necessary in an investigation to infer about these past external 
interactions of the computer being examined. Therefore, a computer’s history is 
defined from Carrier (2006a) as “a sequence of its previous states and events”, and an 
event can be any “occurrence that changes the state of the system”. ‘Events’ can 
therefore include digital events on the system, e.g. API calls or automatic pop-ups, 
interactions with other digital devices, e.g. connection to a USB device or the receipt 
of an e-mail, and also real world events, e.g. a user launching a program, clicking an 
HTML link, or typing some text.  
 Since the history of a computer is not fully recorded (Carrier and Spafford, 
2006), it is necessary during a digital investigation to infer about previous events in a 
computer’s history by formulating and testing hypotheses using the currently 
available digital evidence. Therefore, modifying the Oxford (2008) definition of error 
and using the main aim of a digital investigation and the idea that a computer has a 
history, the error associated with digital evidence can be defined as the difference 
between the inferred history and the true history of the examined digital evidence. 
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This error cannot be expressed as a definite value, e.g. x ± y, but can be expressed as 
uncertainty (possible error) in the inferred events, i.e. alternative possible 
hypothesised events that explain the current state of the examined digital evidence. 
For example, cached images from a prohibited web site (digital evidence) could be 
found in a user’s cache because the site was intentionally visited, or because it was 
opened automatically in the background by another site (alternative possible events). 
While this explanation of the definition of error has discussed inferring 
incorrect events in a computer’s history, these are errors only in high level 
hypotheses. In order to form these high level hypotheses about sequences of events, it 
is necessary to first form and test lower level hypotheses to “abstract data into files 
and complex data structures” (Carrier, 2006a), for example, the hypothesis that a 
particular piece of data embedded in a file represents the time it was modified, or that 
the typed URLs in the Registry need to be interpreted as Unicode characters. 
However, these are also included in the proposed definition of error since it is the 
difference between the inferred history and true history of the examined digital 
evidence. The history of the examined digital evidence includes events such as the 
acquisition of the digital data from the original physical evidence and the 
interpretation of this raw data to produce the digital objects in a form that can be 
analysed. Therefore, incorrect interpretations/abstractions of raw data can also be 
considered to be alternative hypotheses to that which assumes data structures are 
interpreted correctly and deterministically by the tools used to translate raw data into a 
form that can be understood. 
6.2.4 Assessing Error in Analysis in Digital Investigations 
Determining and explaining what caused the examined digital evidence to have its 
current state is part of the analysis stage of a digital investigation, e.g. determining 
whether pictures were intentionally downloaded or were part of an automatic pop up. 
Error in analysis is present if incorrect events are induced from the available digital 
evidence. Casey (2002a) proposes a means to specifically address the problem of 
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quantifying the certainty in digital evidence using a ‘Certainty Scale’ from C0 to C6. 
This is shown in Table 20.  
 
Certainty 
level 
Description/Indicators Certainty 
C0 Evidence contradicts known facts. Erroneous/incorrect 
C1 Evidence is highly questionable. Highly uncertain 
C2 Only one source of evidence that is not protected against tampering. Somewhat 
uncertain 
C3 The source(s) of evidence are more difficult to tamper with but there is 
not enough evidence to support a firm conclusion or there are 
unexplained inconsistencies in the available evidence. 
Possible 
C4 Evidence is protected against tampering or multiple, independent 
sources of evidence agree but evidence is not protected against 
tampering. 
Probable 
C5 Agreement of evidence from multiple, independent sources that are 
protected against tampering. However, small uncertainties exist (e.g. 
temporal error, data loss). 
Almost certain 
C6 The evidence is tamperproof and unquestionable.  Certain 
 
Table 20: Certainty scale described in Casey (2002a). 
 
A scale such as this is useful in estimating uncertainty in analysis and coming to 
conclusions; for example, if the Internet history on a machine contains references to 
prohibited web sites and a server log (outside the control of the suspect) records 
access to that site from the suspect’s machine, the hypothesis of the machine 
accessing that site would be given a certainty scale of C4-C5. However, the subtleties 
of this example, i.e. to determine whether the suspect intentionally accessed the site 
requires further digital objects to be examined e.g. typed URLs, bookmarks etc. 
Therefore, the Certainty Scale can be applied to a specific hypothesis, e.g. the 
machine accessed the prohibited site, and can also then be re-applied to new 
hypotheses as they arise, e.g. the suspect deliberately accessed the site. The scale is 
therefore best used to assess the certainty of specific conclusions.  
However, this scale alone does not address the problem of assessing the 
accuracy of lower level hypotheses, since in order to use multiple independent sources 
  Chapter 6 
 
 170 
  
  
for low level analyses, it is necessary to be able to run different tools on the same 
data, in which case, what is necessary is repeatability. Repeatability also allows 
multiple, independent sources in terms of a different examiner running the same 
analysis tool to check the results, i.e. that an examiner used the tool correctly. 
 Uncertainty in high and low level hypothesis formation and testing, can 
therefore be addressed in traditional digital investigations since the data is preserved 
at a low level of abstraction. The raw data can be examined using multiple tools or 
manually to translate it into a form that can be understood. If multiple tools agree or 
the manual reconstruction of the information can be shown, this allows the alternative 
hypothesis of incorrect interpretation/abstraction to be ruled out from the history of 
the examined digital objects. Also, the analysis can be performed by multiple 
examiners who can repeat the low level analysis techniques to determine if they were 
performed correctly. They can also repeat the high level analysis, which allows 
investigators to form and test their own individual hypotheses about sequences of 
events that caused digital objects to have particular values. The data that supports or 
refutes these hypotheses can be evaluated against a Certainty Scale, either 
introspectively or using one such as that in Table 6.1 and a decision can be made 
about which hypothesis is most likely. The Certainty Scale also assists with making a 
decision about what error is acceptable in the current investigation. Therefore, 
assessing uncertainty in the analysis stage of a traditional digital investigation relies 
on a combination of repeatability and a scale against which to judge the certainty of 
conclusions drawn. 
Both repeatability and Certainty Scales can also be used to assess accuracy in 
the analysis stage of a live digital investigation, but only if the acquisition and 
analysis stages are separated. This is because once an image is acquired from a live 
machine, it has the same properties as digital evidence acquired in a traditional digital 
investigation, i.e. the live image can be exactly copied in full and any analysis 
performed can be repeated on duplicate copies by independent examiners who can 
interpret the raw data and form and test different hypotheses. The difficulty in 
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determining the accuracy during live investigations therefore lies in the acquisition 
stage. 
6.2.5 Assessing Error in Acquisition in Digital Investigations 
A simple acquisition is an exact bit stream copy of the source data, i.e. the output 
should be the same as the input, and the input should equal the actual digital data. If 
any of these are not equal then this is an abnormal event in the history of the acquired 
and therefore examined digital object. In a traditional digital investigation it is not 
usually necessary to consider alternative histories of the acquisition since it is 
performed using tested, trusted software. Also, it can be verified at any time that the 
output is equal to the actual digital data, since the original evidence is still available. 
Furthermore, it is performed in a trusted environment, so there is no reason for the 
input provided to the acquisition process to differ from the actual data. It is also 
possible to repeat the acquisition many times and verify newly acquired data against 
existing images or the original evidence. 
However, this is not the case during a live acquisition since it is performed on 
a machine that is running and the acquired evidence “represents a snapshot of a 
dynamic system that cannot be reproduced at a later date” (Adelstein, 2006). The 
acquired image can therefore be verified only against itself rather than against the 
original media (Casey and Stanley, 2004). Not only can live data change between 
consecutive acquisitions, but live acquisitions are particularly problematic in the 
context of this research i.e. when encryption is involved. This is because, as shown in 
Chapter 4, when acquiring encrypted evidence, ‘pulling the plug’ on a machine 
running file system, virtual disk or full disk encryption, means that the decrypted form 
of the evidence is no longer accessible and cannot be re-acquired to validate the live 
acquired data.  
In a live acquisition, not only could the output of acquisition tools not equal 
the input, which introduces uncertainty, but also the operating system itself is 
untrusted (Carrier, 2006b, Kenneally and Brown, 2005). This means that the input 
data to the acquisition process may not equal the actual data. The normal behaviour of 
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an operating system is to provide the acquisition process with input that is equal to the 
actual data. However, acquired data can also have an alternative history where the 
data provided by the operating system as input to the acquisition process is 
manipulated in some way to add data, or more commonly to hide data. This is a 
common technique used by rootkits which can also be specifically designed for anti-
forensics (Bilby, 2006) and can modify the operating system to hide files, folders, 
Registry entries and processes.  
Therefore, by performing a live acquisition, extra elements of uncertainty are 
introduced. This uncertainty takes the form of an alternative history of the examined 
digital evidence where the output of the acquisition tool has not duplicated the input 
data correctly (faulty imaging tools, e.g. missed one or more sectors), and/or the 
operating system has supplied data to the acquisition process that does not represent 
the data on the system (‘faulty’ operating system). These elements of uncertainty 
currently cannot be ruled out, making the assessment of error and therefore 
assessment of accuracy difficult. 
6.2.6 Summary 
One of the requirements described in Chapter 3 is that during a digital investigation it 
should be possible to assess the amount of error associated with all techniques used. 
This section has defined the error associated with digital evidence based on its main 
purpose in a digital investigation, which is to “make valid inferences about a 
computer’s history” (Carrier, 2006a). Therefore, based on this aim and the definition 
in Oxford (2008), error associated with digital evidence is defined as the difference 
between the inferred history and the true history of the examined digital evidence. The 
possible error or uncertainty is expressed as alternative possible events that explain 
the current state of the examined digital evidence. This definition and expression of 
error has the advantage that it can be used to assess error in both the analysis and 
acquisition stages of a digital investigation. This is because it considers events in the 
history of the examined digital evidence, which includes both its change in state on 
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the system in question, and its change in state from raw data on the physical evidence, 
to acquired raw data, to data in a form that can be understood. 
 Error in the analysis stage of a digital investigation has been discussed and it 
was shown that it can be assessed; this is because the data that is being analysed can 
be exactly duplicated and can be examined by multiple investigators who can form 
and test their own hypotheses and reach their own conclusions about the most 
probable events that created pieces of digital evidence. They can also qualify their 
conclusions based on the agreement of different sources that support that conclusion 
using a Certainty Scale such as that in Table 20. 
The analysis stage does not present a particular problem for live 
investigations, since if the acquisition and analysis stages are separated, then data 
acquired from a live system has the same properties as data acquired in a traditional 
digital investigation. These properties are that data can be exactly duplicated and 
examined multiple times by multiple parties. However, uncertainty can be introduced 
during the acquisition stage of a live digital investigation, since it is difficult to 
demonstrate that in the history of the examined digital evidence, during the 
acquisition process, the actual data on the system was not captured incorrectly. This 
could either be due to acquisition tool error or the operating system supplying data to 
the acquisition process that does not represent the actual data on the system. The 
accuracy of a live investigation is therefore dependent on demonstrating the accuracy 
of the acquisition stage. As a result, this research examines how the accuracy of the 
acquisition of digital evidence from live systems using encryption can be assessed.  
 
6.3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter examines how encrypted digital evidence from a live system can be 
acquired in a way that allows its accuracy to be demonstrated using repeatability, 
since this is used successfully in traditional digital investigations. The proposed 
approach involves recovering data from the live system that allows the encrypted data 
to be decrypted offline in a trusted environment. This means that since the decryption 
is done offline, data is static and the inputs to the decryption process are constant. 
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Decryption can be therefore performed in a repeatable manner in a trusted 
environment allowing the accuracy to be assessed and alternative hypotheses of faulty 
acquisition tools or manipulated operating systems to be ruled out. The only data used 
where the accuracy cannot be determined through repeatability is that which is used to 
allow offline decryption, since that data is acquired from a live system and will no 
longer exist after the power is removed. However, the accuracy of this particular piece 
of digital evidence can be assessed in another way: it can be demonstrated to be 
correct if it successfully decrypts the encrypted data, since if it were not correct then 
the data would not decrypt.   
 First it is shown how such information can be obtained from a live machine 
that is running an encryption product that allows recovery keys to be exported as part 
of the product’s design. It is then shown how these keys can be used offline to recover 
the decrypted contents of an encrypted drive. This is demonstrated using BitLocker in 
Windows Vista. Secondly, since not all products offer such a key recovery feature, it is 
also shown how decryption keys can be recovered from the memory of a live system 
which are then used to decrypt encrypted data offline in a repeatable manner. This is 
demonstrated using TrueCrypt. 
 This approach for key recovery from memory differs from that discussed in 
Chapter 2 (locating copies of the key or passphrase on the disk or in the surrounding 
area) where keys are searched for on the powered down disk or on physical media at 
the crime scene. The approach described in this chapter is different since a live 
investigation is used specifically to recover keys prior to the power being removed, 
rather than hoping that they can be subsequently located post-seizure. The following 
two sections describe the GUI based key recovery using BitLocker and key recovery 
from a memory dump using TrueCrypt. 
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6.4 GUI BASED KEY RECOVERY: BITLOCKER 
6.4.1 Introduction 
This section demonstrates how the recovery keys of Windows Vista’s BitLocker can 
be obtained by performing a live investigation. These keys can then be used offline to 
obtain a disk image of the decrypted data in a repeatable manner allowing the 
accuracy of the acquisition stage to be assessed using repeatability.  
 
6.4.2 BitLocker Background 
BitLocker is the Full Volume Encryption feature built into particular versions of 
Windows Vista (Enterprise and Ultimate). It offers five different modes which differ 
in how the decryption keys are protected: Trusted Platform Module (TPM) only, TPM 
& PIN, TPM & USB, TPM & PIN & USB and USB only. These were explained in 
detail earlier in Section 4.4.4. Regardless of the mode in use, Windows Vista will 
always provide the option for a recovery key. The purpose of this is to allow access to 
encrypted data if the decryption keys are lost, the PIN is forgotten or the encrypted 
volume is moved to another system (Microsoft, 2006b). Therefore, the recovery key 
will unlock the volume without the need for the PIN to be supplied or the USB stick 
or TPM to be present.  
 During the BitLocker life-cycle recovery keys are created prior to encrypting 
the drive and can be stored on USB drives, any other accessible folder, or printed 
(Microsoft, 2006b). Even though they are created prior to the encryption, it is also 
possible to create additional copies of these recovery keys at any point after the 
volume has been encrypted. This can be performed simply, using a graphical user 
interface in Vista, which is described in Section 6.4.4. 
 
6.4.3 Identification of BitLocker 
Before obtaining recovery keys for BitLocker, it first needs to be identified. As 
mentioned earlier, BitLocker is only available in Enterprise and Ultimate editions of 
  Chapter 6 
 
 176 
  
  
Vista (Microsoft, 2006f) so identification of other versions of Vista can rule out the 
presence of BitLocker39. If Enterprise or Ultimate versions are installed, due to the 
requirement for a 1.5 Gigabyte system partition which must remain unencrypted 
(Microsoft, 2006b), drive partitioning such as this may be the first sign to indicate the 
presence of BitLocker. There are also scripts that can be run on a live system that 
report the status of each volume and will describe if BitLocker is running (HogFly, 
2007, Microsoft, 2007b). The output of the built in Microsoft script is shown in Figure 
24 and shows a protected volume.  
 
 
Figure 24: Results of running the built-in manage-bde.wsf script identifying encrypted volumes on a live system. 
6.4.4 Obtaining Recovery Keys 
Once BitLocker has been detected, the recovery keys can be obtained using the 
graphical user interface. This can be accessed through the Control Panel and the 
option ‘Manage BitLocker Keys’ in the ‘Security’ sub-section. The interface is shown 
in Figure 25.  
                                                 
39
 This can be achieved on a live system using the psinfo tool or by examining the system properties 
through the Control Panel. 
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Figure 25: The ‘Manage BitLocker Keys’ graphical interface. 
 
Using this interface, a copy of the recovery keys can be created on an attached USB 
device. Sample recovery keys are shown in Figure 26. 
 
 
Figure 26: The format of BitLocker Recovery Keys. 
6.4.5 Acquisition of a Powered Off System Using Recovery Keys 
After seizure, in the TPM only scenario, the machine can be booted normally with no 
intervention and in the other scenarios the recovery keys can be provided (typed using 
the Function keys). After this, the system can be booted in order to create a logical 
disk image. However, this is not a desirable way in which to recover evidence since it 
boots an already powered off system in order to perform a live investigation which 
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makes unnecessary changes to the original evidence and will affect the completeness 
of the preserved evidence. 
 Changes to the original evidence can be avoided by creating a physical disk 
image of the original drive (in encrypted form) and converting it to a VMware virtual 
machine disk file using LiveView (Kaplan, 2007). At this point, the virtual machine 
disk image can be booted which causes Vista to enter recovery mode since the 
hardware has changed. Entering the recovery key boots a virtual version of the 
original system and makes it possible to create a logical image in unencrypted form. 
Note that in this case, even in the TPM only scenario, the recovery keys are necessary 
since the TPM is not present in the virtual machine used to boot the disk image. A 
disadvantage of this approach is that it relies on the suspect’s operating system, which 
as described earlier could introduce uncertainty. There is also the problem that even 
after booting the virtual copy of the machine it is possible that a Windows password 
will then be necessary in order to log on to the system, which may not be available. 
To resolve these problems a second virtual machine can be created40, Vista 
Ultimate edition installed and the converted image from the original machine added to 
the new system as a second virtual drive. By booting into this freshly installed virtual 
Vista machine and using the BitLocker interface it is possible to unlock the drive 
using the recovery keys and produce a logical, unencrypted image of the original 
drive using a trusted operating system41. This method also has an advantage over 
connecting the original physical drive through a write blocker to a real Vista system to 
perform this drive unlocking, since the initial disk imaging stage remains the same as 
any other investigation. This disk image is then used for the entire analysis and 
recovery of evidence. This may be useful if those performing the analysis and 
attempting to gain access to the encrypted data are not the same as those who 
performed the initial disk imaging. 
                                                 
40
 Which needs to be done only once. 
41
 It is also possible to mount the virtual drive on a real system using software such as Mount Image 
Pro. Neither offer particular advantages and it depends on the software available. 
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6.4.6 Evaluation 
There are a number of limitations to this approach; most significantly that few 
encryption implementations offer such an easy to access key recovery system, and as 
a result, this technique does not generalise well. There are also potential problems to 
using this approach for BitLocker on Windows Vista, if User Account Control (UAC) 
is enabled. The goal of this feature is to enable users to run standard privilege 
accounts, only escalating privileges to administrator when necessary (Microsoft, 
2006e). UAC has implications for obtaining the recovery key since running the 
BitLocker management tool requires administrator privileges. If the account is an 
administrator then the keys can be obtained since running processes as administrator 
only requires clicking ‘Allow’ in the UAC prompt. However, if the account is a 
standard user then a password is required to access the mechanisms to create backups 
of BitLocker recovery keys. 
Also, this method may violate the End User License Agreement from 
Microsoft, since even the Windows Vista Ultimate License states that BitLocker may 
not be used with Virtualization Technologies (Microsoft, 2008a). However, in a 
forensic computing situation it is unknown how this will affect law enforcement. 
It is also conceivable that the suspect’s operating system could be modified to 
supply a false recovery key that will not decrypt the drive. However, this is 
speculation and has not been investigated. 
6.4.7 Summary 
BitLocker Recovery Keys can be recovered from Windows Vista using the built in 
GUI regardless of the mode used. This allows a disk image of the encrypted system to 
be acquired in decrypted format in a trusted environment. This allows the accuracy of 
the acquisition to be demonstrated since the technique is repeatable. The live acquired 
data can be shown to be the same as the offline acquired data. 
 However, there are problems, including the difficulty obtaining keys if UAC is 
enabled and the user account does not have administrator privileges. Despite this, the 
principle of key recovery followed by an offline decryption to assess the accuracy of 
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live acquired images is sound and if a more flexible key recovery approach (one that 
would generalise) could be used then many of the limitations of the approach could be 
overcome.  
 
6.5 MEMORY IMAGE BASED KEY RECOVERY: TRUECRYPT 
6.5.1 Introduction 
The previous section showed how decryption keys could be recovered from a system 
running BitLocker using the built-in interface. This section describes a technique for 
recovering the keys from a memory dump of a system, and uses them to demonstrate 
the accuracy of live acquired disk images. This is demonstrated using the popular, 
open source product TrueCrypt.  
6.5.2 TrueCrypt Background 
Introduction 
TrueCrypt is a “software system for establishing and maintaining an on-the-fly-
encrypted volume” meaning that “data are automatically encrypted or decrypted right 
before they are loaded or saved, without any user intervention” (TrueCrypt, 2008b). 
TrueCrypt has become a popular tool for encrypting data with over 8 million 
downloads (December 2008) (TrueCrypt, 2008a). 
Version History 
At time of writing TrueCrypt is at Version 6.1a, having last been updated in 
December 2008 (TrueCrypt, 2008f). Various features and bug fixes are implemented 
between versions. Also the default encryption scheme changes: Cipher Block 
Chaining (CBC) was used prior to V. 4.1, Liskov, Rivest & Wagner (LRW) for V.4.1 
- 4.3a and it currently uses XOR Encrypt XOR based, Tweakable Codebook Mode, 
Ciphertext Stealing, (XTS) (V.5.0 onwards). Another important difference is that in 
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the most recent versions (V.5.0 onwards), TrueCrypt offers more advanced options 
than just creating an encrypted container42, which are discussed below. 
 
Encrypted container: This is an encrypted file stored on disk that contains an 
entire file system that can be mounted as a drive letter in order to be accessed 
(Virtual Disk Encryption in Chapter 4). 
 
Encrypted Volume: Here an entire partition on a drive is encrypted. However, 
the partition table is still accessible in the clear, even during a ‘dead’ analysis. 
The partition is visible to Windows as a drive letter but appears unformatted. 
The decrypted partition can then be mounted with TrueCrypt as a different 
drive letter. 
 
Encrypted Drive: Here the entire drive is encrypted including the partition 
table. The entire drive from sector 0 onwards appears as random data. The 
drive is not accessible to Windows as a drive letter but can be seen through the 
Control Panel disk management tool. 
  
System Partition or Drive: Here either the drive or the partition containing the 
operating system is encrypted. 
The TrueCrypt Decryption Process 
This section describes the operation of TrueCrypt and how containers are decrypted. 
This is necessary to understand the details of the key recovery technique used later. 
 TrueCrypt encrypted containers appear to contain nothing but random data and 
have no file signature. Prior to Version 6 of TrueCrypt the first 512 bytes of a 
TrueCrypt container are actually a header43, but are encrypted using a Header Key so 
still appears to be random data. TrueCrypt decrypts the header using a user-supplied 
                                                 
42
 Encrypted containers are referred to as Encrypted Virtual Drives in Chapter 4. 
43
 The start of containers from Version 6 onward is still a header, but data begins at offset 131072 . 
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password or keyfile, salt44 from offset 0-64 (bytes) and then the process of trial and 
error using different encryption and key derivation algorithms and modes of 
encryption (CBC, LRW, XTS etc.). Successful decryption of the header is when bytes 
64-67 decrypt to the ASCII string ‘TRUE’. The entire header is then decrypted which 
in the case of XTS mode, contains the Master Key and Secondary Master Key (Tweak 
Key) needed to decrypt the actual contents of the container, from the ‘Data Area’ 
which begins at offset 512 prior to Version 6. 
XTS Encryption Mode 
As mentioned in the version history, since TrueCrypt Version 5.0, LRW mode has 
been replaced with XTS. This section outlines this encryption mode’s operation but 
full details are available in IEEE (2007). The data to be stored is divided into data 
blocks greater than 128-bits. Each of these data blocks is then divided into 128-bit 
sub-blocks. XTS uses two keys (key1 and key2) and each plaintext sub-block is 
encrypted with key1. However, before and after the actual encryption the sub-block is 
XORed with a tweak value calculated using the index of the block, the index of the 
sub-block and key2. This tweak value is calculated by encrypting the data block index 
with key2. This is then multiplied by 2 to the power of the sub-block index, modulo 
the polynomial x128 + x7 + x2 + x + 1. The overall process is depicted in Figure 27. 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Salt is used to prevent pre-computation of password hashes. 
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Figure 27: XTS encryption of a single sub-block. 
6.5.3 Methodology 
The technique described in this section demonstrates the accuracy of a live acquired 
disk image of encrypted data using key recovery from a memory dump. The 
encrypted data is referred to as an encrypted container throughout this section, but the 
same technique can be applied to containers, volumes and drives, including those 
containing the operating system. 
The live acquired image of the contents of the encrypted container can be analysed 
but if it then becomes necessary to demonstrate the accuracy of the acquisition then an 
additional process can be carried out. Decryption keys can be recovered from the 
memory dump and used to decrypt the offline encrypted container. This can then be 
compared against the live acquired image and shown to be consistent, demonstrating 
the accuracy of the live acquired image since the decryption of the offline container 
was performed in a trusted environment and can be repeated.  
This is illustrated in Figure 28 and the full methodology that allows the recovery 
of keys and demonstration of the accuracy of acquired images of encrypted 
containers, from the point of encountering a live system, is: 
 
1. Identify the type of encryption software on the system, to determine whether 
the technique needs to be applied. 
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2. From the live machine, acquire the contents of the encrypted container. 
3. From the live machine, acquire the physical memory. 
4. Offline, recover keys from memory image. 
5. Decrypt the offline encrypted data using the recovered keys. 
6. Determine if the decrypted offline copy is consistent with the live acquired 
image. 
 
 
Figure 28: The overall approach for demonstrating accuracy of live acquired images. 
 
6.5.3 Key Recovery Technique 
One of the stages in the above methodology is the recovery of decryption keys from 
memory. There are a number of options for this, which are described in the following 
section. However, the specific technique used is not critical to the overall 
methodology. 
Existing Key Recovery Techniques  
There are a number of existing techniques to recover information from memory that 
may allow access to encrypted data. While not decryption keys, an anonymous work 
(anon, 2007) and Bolieau (undated) describe that some Full Disk Encryption packages 
cache plaintext passwords at offset 0x417 in memory images, including PGP Desktop. 
TrueCrypt can also cache plaintext passwords in the TrueCrypt driver memory if the 
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“cache passwords and key files in memory” option is selected (TrueCrypt, 2008d). 
However, these options are limited to particular products.  
 TrueCrypt key recovery from a Linux memory dump is described in Walters 
and Petroni (2007), where the operating system’s data structures are parsed and the 
master keys recovered from a clearly identifiable variable. This approach has also 
been extended to Windows in Kaplan (2008) where the TrueCrypt driver is located in 
memory and the keys extracted from particular offsets.  
 Also Halderman et al. (2008) describes a key recovery method that 
specifically takes into account bit errors introduced during cold boot memory 
acquisition techniques (See Chapter 2.3.4). The approach involves searching for data 
other than the key (the key schedule which stores pre-computed data for rounds of 
encryption for performance reasons) and using it to recover the key. 
Since the approaches in Kaplan (2008) and Halderman et al. (2008) were not 
made public until late into this research, the following sub-sections describe the 
development of an additional key recovery technique.  
Overview of Developed Key Recovery Approach 
The overall developed key recovery approach uses a linear scan of a memory image, 
using each consecutive position in that image, extracting possible keys according to 
an identified pattern and attempting to decrypt the container. The correct keys are 
identified when the container successfully decrypts. In this sense the overall approach 
of the technique can be described as a dictionary attack on the key from a limited key 
space generated from the memory of the system. The overall key recovery approach is 
shown in Figure 29 and the following subsections describe each of the stages of 
developing the key recovery methodology. 
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Figure 29: Depiction of the linear scan approach to key recovery. The keys used to perform test decryptions actually slide one 
byte at a time, rather than 256 as shown here. 
Setup of test environment 
For the development of this technique VMware Workstation was used to create a 
virtual Windows XP Professional machine. TrueCrypt was installed on the virtual 
machine and an encrypted container created with the password set to be ‘password’. 
After mounting the container the virtual machine was shut down and rebooted. The 
encrypted container was mounted using TrueCrypt and the appropriate password. 
With the container mounted, the virtual machine was paused and a copy of the .vmem 
file representing the virtual system’s RAM created. 
Identifying patterns in memory 
During the initial setup, when an encrypted container is created, the TrueCrypt 
graphical interface displays parts of the keys used to encrypt the container, as shown 
in Figure 30.  
 
Figure 30: Parts of the keys displayed by the TrueCrypt GUI on creation of an encrypted container. 
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It is this property of TrueCrypt, rather than it being open source that allowed the 
pattern matching to be easily developed. Without this shortcut, establishing patterns in 
memory is much more complex and is discussed later in the evaluation section. Since 
the keys are known, they can be easily identified in the memory dump and a clear 
pattern in memory identified, as shown in Figure 31. Experiments showed the first 
256 bit block to be the Master Key for the container and the second 256 bit block to 
be the Secondary Key for XTS (keys are reversed prior to Version 4.3a, see 
Hargreaves and Chivers (2008b)). 
 
 
Figure 31: Part of a memory image showing the Primary and Secondary Master keys. 
 
It should be noted that the Header key cannot be found at all in memory. This is 
because the Header key is only necessary for TrueCrypt to decrypt the container 
header and extract the Master and Secondary keys, which are then used to decrypt the 
rest of the container. Therefore, once the Master and Secondary keys are stored in 
memory, the Header key is no longer needed and can be erased.  
Once the patterns of the keys are identified, it is simply necessary to linearly 
scan memory, extracting keys in this pattern until the correct keys are found. 
However, it is first necessary to find a way to identify the correct keys.  
Identifying Correct Keys 
This key recovery technique uses known plaintext to identify the correct keys. During 
normal TrueCrypt operation the string ‘TRUE’ is used to show correct decryption of 
the header. From the header, the Master and Tweak keys are extracted, known to be 
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correct and are used to decrypt the data in the container. A similar known plaintext 
approach was developed to test for correct Master and Secondary keys; although, 
there are alternatives which are mentioned later in the future work section. Suitable 
plaintext was identified by creating, mounting and imaging several containers, and 
examining the images for consistent plaintexts. Offsets 3-7 of a mounted, decrypted 
10 Megabyte FAT formatted container, decrypted to ASCII ‘MSDOS’, as shown in 
Figure 32. These correspond to offsets 515-519 of the encrypted container (skipping 
0-512 which is the TrueCrypt header encrypted by the Header Key and not 
accessible). 
 
 
Figure 32: Known plaintext on FAT16 file systems. 
 
Larger, FAT32 file system based containers were also examined and the known 
plaintext ‘MSDOS’ can still be used. However, NTFS containers have the string 
‘NTFS’ at offsets 3-6 which needs be used to identify correct decryption of the data 
area of an NTFS formatted container. 
 There are also differences depending on whether a container, volume or disk is 
encrypted. As described above, for a container, the known plaintext file system data is 
located 3 bytes into Sector 1 (sector numbers begin at 0). For an encrypted volume the 
known plaintext is in Sector 64, Sector 1 for an encrypted Drive and Sector 63 for 
System Partitions and Drives. A summary of positions for the TrueCrypt headers and 
known plaintexts is shown in Table 21.  
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Mode Sector on disk containing 
TrueCrypt header 
Sector on disk containing 
known plaintext 
Container Variable Variable45 
Volume 63 64 
Drive 0 1 
System Partition 62 63 
System Drive 62 63 
 
Table 21: Positions and indexes of known plaintext in different modes of TrueCrypt. 
Decrypting the container from the master keys 
Software was developed in C that used sample AES decryption code from Devine 
(2006) which after implementing the modes of operation, allowed parts of the 
container to be decrypted from supplied keys. The developed software is compatible 
with LRW mode and the newer XTS encryption mode. Since the known plaintext 
strings (‘MSDOS’ and ‘NTFS’) are located at offsets 3-7 of the known-plaintext 
sector, and AES decrypts in blocks of 128-bits, the known plaintext resides in the first 
block of the data area of the encrypted container. This means that only one block 
needs to be decrypted. 
Automating key recovery 
Once a means of identifying correct keys was developed it was then necessary to 
automate the process of trying test keys so it could be applied to the entire memory 
dump. Software was developed in C, to scan through the whole of memory, using 
each 48 byte block as Master Keys and Secondary Keys in a fixed pattern, as shown 
earlier in Figure 29. The ‘window’ from which keys were obtained moves through 
memory one byte at a time, so for example in a 512 Megabyte memory image:  
 
512 × 1024 × 1024 = 536,870,848 bytes 
536,870,848 – 64 (‘window’ size) = 536,870,848 
 
                                                 
45
 Position is variable on disk since containers can be stored in various places in the file system. 
However, the TrueCrypt header is in Sector 0 of the container and the known plaintext is in Sector 1 of 
the container.  
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This means there are 536,870,848 possible key positions in the full 512 Megabyte 
memory dump. 
As mentioned, the developed software only decrypts the first block of the data 
area of the container since that is all that is needed to determine if the keys are correct 
or not and allows significantly faster operation. 
6.5.4 Results  
Key Recovery 
The developed software successfully recovers encryption keys from a memory dump 
of a live system. It has been tested on and successfully used with memory dumps 
obtained from VMware and using dd. Figure 33 shows the output of the getkeys 
program. 
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Figure 33: Keys recovered from a live memory dump. 
 
The software recovered keys from 512 Megabyte memory images in an average of 1½ 
minutes on an Intel Core 2 Duo, 1.9GHz. A memory dump that did not contain keys 
was provided and the software scanned the entire memory dump and reported that no 
keys were found in 18 minutes. This gives a scanning rate of approximately 480,000 
keys per second or 27 Megabytes per second. Significant further optimisations are 
possible and are discussed later. 
Comparison with Live Acquired Image 
Once the keys are recovered it is then necessary to decrypt the entire container or 
volume in order to compare it with the live acquired version. The TrueCrypt program 
derives the header key from the user supplied password and a salt value in the 
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TrueCrypt header, which is then used to decrypt the master and secondary key stored 
in the header. It is not therefore possible to use the recovered master and secondary 
keys to directly open the container. However, as described in Walters and Petroni 
(2007) “with a few minor changes to the [TrueCrypt] mounter, we can use the 
extracted cryptographic information to mount the volume offline without the 
password.” Another approach is to extend the decryption code used to test for known 
plaintext and use it in a loop to decrypt the entire container or volume. This second 
approach is used to decrypt the container which can be analysed in the usual manner 
or compared against the already analysed live acquired image.  
Comparison of two acquired images of a mounted encrypted container (one 
acquired from the live system using dd, the other acquired offline by decrypting the 
container using keys extracted from memory) showed the containers to be identical. 
This can be seen by the hashes in Figure 34. 
 
 
Figure 34: MD5 hashes of live acquired container and offline decrypted container. 
   
However, comparison of two acquired images of a system running TrueCrypt Full 
Volume Encryption showed the acquired images not to be identical. This is due to live 
systems constantly changing, as discussed in Chapter 5. However, using the same 
technique used in Section 5.4.3, md5deep (Kornblum, 2008) can be used to obtain 
hashes of individual files on the acquired image. The hashes of files in both acquired 
disk images can then be compared. The results from an acquisition of a Full Volume 
encrypted system are shown in Figure 35 and show that 4 files changed between the 
live acquisition and the system being powered off. The differences were identified 
using the developed software md5listcompare. 
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Figure 35: Differences between the live acquired Full Volume Encrypted drive and the offline decrypted version. 
 
For the files on the encrypted disk that are not listed in the figure above, their 
accuracy has been demonstrated since the offline acquired versions are consistent with 
those acquired from the live system. The offline acquisition can be performed 
multiple times using different acquisition tools which reduces the likelihood that the 
image is incorrect due to faulty imaging tools. 
 However, regarding the files that have changed between the images, these 
could be excluded from the investigation as the live acquired versions cannot be 
shown to be the same as those obtained in a repeatable manner using a trusted 
operating system. However, if the files are important to the investigation, the files can 
be inspected more closely and the parts of the files that are the same can be used, with 
just the parts of the files that have changed excluded. It may also be possible to 
explain the discrepancies in detail, for example the change to logon.scr (see Figure 
35) occurred 10 minutes after the acquisition began which was when the screensaver 
on the live machine activated (in practice this activation of the screensaver should be 
prevented). The extent of the differences between the live and dead images therefore 
depends to a certain extent on the actions of the investigator, although in this case the 
changes caused by running dd (prefetch file, Registry changes, etc.) were recorded in 
both the live and dead acquisitions since the live imager acquired the parts of the disk 
that contained those changes after they were made.  
 However, other software running on the system may increase the number of 
differences, e.g. antivirus scans, Windows updates etc., although it should still be 
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possible to explain these differences. Also the longer the system is running before the 
power is removed the longer the system has to make changes to the drive. However, 
given that no differences were found with the live and dead acquired encrypted 
containers, differences are most likely to be a concern with Full Volume Encryption. 
In these cases background changes to the system are very small in relation to the total 
size of the data that is preserved. In this example a small 4 Gigabyte drive was used 
and still only 0.09% (3809953 bytes) was different.  
 Referring back to Section 6.2.5, it was explained that by performing a live 
acquisition, extra elements of uncertainty were introduced: the output of the 
acquisition tool could incorrectly replicate the input (faulty imaging tool), but also 
that the live operating system could provide the acquisition tool with incorrect data 
(‘faulty’ operating system, e.g. a rootkit). In addition to addressing the alternative 
hypothesis of a faulty imaging tool, by acquiring data offline using a trusted operating 
system, this eliminates the possibility of data being hidden due to the operating 
system behaving incorrectly (i.e. due to a rootkit) since rootkits cannot operate while 
the compromised operating system is not running and hidden files will be visible. This 
method therefore provides the opportunity to eliminate both of these alternative 
hypotheses since the encrypted data can be reacquired multiple times using multiple 
tools (addresses faulty acquisition tools), and it is possible to detect if the live 
operating system is incorrectly reporting its state, since when the offline acquisition is 
performed the suspect operating system is not running and therefore it is not possible 
for installed rootkits to run (addresses ‘faulty’ operating system).  
6.5.5 Evaluation of this Key Recovery Approach 
There are a number of limitations to this particular key recovery approach. One 
practical limitation is that the software has been developed only for AES in LRW and 
XTS mode. TrueCrypt supports a number of other algorithms including Serpent and 
Twofish. It could be argued that as the number of algorithms and modes increase, the 
number of combinations that need to be tried for each test key makes using this 
approach more of a challenge (Kaplan, 2008). Since the technique is simple and fast 
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due to only needing to decrypt a single block, even increasing the time by nine using 
three algorithms in three modes (AES, Serpent and Twofish with CBC, LRW and 
XTS), key recovery should still be possible in less than 5 hours. There are also many 
optimisations possible: sliding the key window more than 1 byte at a time; performing 
a simple entropy test on data prior to trying decryption, and rewriting the code to use 
multiple CPU cores or multiple machines; all of which will reduce the time taken to 
recover keys. In addition, at the stage where encryption is identified on a system, it 
may be possible to determine this information. TrueCrypt, for example, allows the 
properties of mounted containers to be viewed on a live machine, which describes the 
type of encryption (Container, Volume, Drive), the encryption algorithm and the 
mode used. This is shown in Figure 36. 
 
 
Figure 36: Properties of a mounted encrypted container identified on a live system. 
 
A specific limitation of the linear scan approach is that it relies on keys being stored 
in consistent patterns in memory. It is conceivable that keys could be split in memory; 
however, this is simply a more complex pattern that would need to be identified. 
Introducing a random element to the storage location of keys is one way to hamper the 
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use of this technique. However, by design, keys need to be constantly accessible to 
on-the-fly encryption products, and even if the key was split over randomly spaced 
locations, the encryption software would need to keep track of these. In this situation, 
to recover keys it would be necessary to have a greater understanding of the internal 
operation of the software in question, but as described in Kaplan (2008), “given 
enough time, both the secret key and the exact details of each cryptosystem’s 
operation can be discovered”. 
 Also, the known plaintext used to identify successful decryption of the 
container is non-essential data, meaning that this can be changed without hampering 
the operation of the container. However, it is possible to change the scanning process 
so that the known plaintext used is essential data46 or use statistical techniques to 
identify possible correct decryptions.  
 While this key recovery approach has been developed for only one product 
(albeit two versions), the work in Halderman et al (2008) has shown that keys are also 
available in memory for BitLocker, FileVault and dm-crypt. It also stands to reason 
that due to the inherent design of any on-the-fly encryption software, the keys have to 
be accessible in order to perform decryption, since the same keys are used for each 
block they need to be constantly accessible. Therefore, any product that does not 
decrypt all of the plaintext at once and decrypts data as it is needed is susceptible to 
some key recovery approach. 
 In addition to its generalisability, this approach overcomes the limitations of 
the GUI based approach where UAC could prevent keys from being recovered. While 
dd memory acquisition techniques require administrator privileges, a Firewire 
memory acquisition could be performed without needing to provide a password to 
UAC. It also is not affected by the use of duress keys, provided the seizure is 
performed when the real encrypted data is mounted, rather than the duress data. This 
is because the technique will recover the keys from memory that allow the currently 
mounted encrypted container to be decrypted offline.  
                                                 
46
 Such as the starting address of the root directory or number of FATs (Carrier 2005 p.214) 
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 However, it is necessary to obtain the memory dump from the system while 
the encrypted data is in use i.e. in the case of container or volume encryption, it needs 
to be mounted. However, this is implementation specific since TrueCrypt securely 
wipes the keys once volumes are dismounted. Also, for any system volume, removing 
the keys from memory is not possible until the system is shut down. 
 The identification of key patterns in memory for this product was trivial, not 
due to the open source nature of TrueCrypt but because the GUI design reveals part of 
the keys during the creation of containers. However, any open source product could 
be modified to display this data in this way to assist in determining key patterns. For 
closed source products, a number of approaches are still being explored including 
reducing a memory dump to data that has changed before and after mounting a 
container and correlating memory dumps from multiple systems mounting the same 
container. Also, the use of a debugger may allow these keys to be viewed as the 
program executes. However, this is ongoing work.  
Another limitation that is unrelated to the accuracy requirement but is 
important practically, is that it cannot be known in advance if the keys can be 
successfully extracted from memory, e.g. memory may not have been correctly 
acquired. The acquisition of and key recovery from memory is therefore presented as 
an additional step as well as acquisition of the mounted encrypted containers and 
volumes. The key recovery is used if necessary to defeat challenges about the 
accuracy of an otherwise unverifiable live container image. However, a solution to 
this limitation is provided in Hargreaves and Chivers (2008a), where keys are verified 
offline but still at the scene, allowing live imaging to be avoided if necessary; but this 
is outside the scope of this research. 
 Finally, as mentioned earlier, limitations of this specific key recovery 
approach are not critical to the overall methodology for demonstrating accuracy of 
acquired encrypted containers or volumes since alternative or multiple key recovery 
techniques can be substituted.  
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6.5.6 Key Recovery Summary 
The accuracy of live acquired encrypted data has been demonstrated by recovering 
decryption keys from a dump of the system’s memory which was acquired at the same 
time. These recovered keys can be used to decrypt the static, offline data in a 
repeatable manner in a trusted environment, and the decryption can be used to verify 
the live acquired image. The only data that cannot be verified through repeatability is 
data that is inconsistent due to unavoidable changes on the live system and also the 
acquired memory image. As discussed earlier, files that are inconsistent due to the live 
system changing files can be inspected more closely to determine the exact nature of 
the discrepancies. Regarding the memory image, the only part of it that is used as 
evidence is the decryption key, the accuracy of which is evident since it successfully 
decrypts the encrypted data. In the Certainty Scale in Casey (2002a), this particular 
digital evidence artefact (the decryption key) achieves C6 (the highest level of 
certainty), meaning it is “tamperproof and unquestionable”. This key recovery 
approach has been demonstrated using the open source product TrueCrypt for all 
modes of operation: container, volume and drive encryption.  
6.6 EVALUATION 
Both methods of key recovery shown in this chapter, GUI based and linear memory 
scanning, have shown how encrypted data can be accessed offline in a trusted 
environment where the process is repeatable. Using repeatable techniques and trusted 
environments are existing and accepted ways in which accuracy of acquisitions can be 
assessed. 
 Therefore, while there are specific limitations of individual approaches, e.g. 
UAC for the GUI based approach on Vista and countermeasures for key recovery 
from memory, e.g. splitting the key, the multitude of approaches for obtaining keys 
means that if the encrypted data is being used on the live system, then keys must be 
stored somewhere and will be recoverable.  
 Allowing the accuracy of encryption to be assessed in this way reduces the 
possible error by eliminating the alternative hypotheses that the analysed digital 
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evidence has its value because the operating system supplied incorrect information to 
the live acquisition tool, e.g. due to the presence of a rootkit. This is because in the 
offline environment any malware on the evidence being examined cannot run. It can 
also eliminate possible error introduced due to the acquisition tool not operating 
correctly, since once the offline data is decrypted, multiple acquisition tools can be 
used to acquire data and it can be shown to be the same as the live acquired data.  
Referring back to Casey’s certainty levels (Section 6.2.4), use of this method 
increases the certainty in the live acquired encrypted disks from C2 (“only one source 
of evidence that is not protected against tampering”) to C5 (“multiple independent 
sources that are protected against tampering, however small uncertainties exist” (in 
this case these small uncertainties are the differences between images due to 
unavoidable file changes on a live system)). 
However, this method does not fully address the logic bomb problem, where 
software could be configured to erase data47 on the system given certain conditions 
e.g. adding a USB stick or running a certain piece of software. However, systems that 
are used to store encrypted data still need to be usable and preventing the use of USB 
sticks will reduce the usability of the system. It may also be possible to address this by 
examining the system prior to inserting a USB stick or running software to search for 
such ‘logic bombs’ or to examine the acquired images for traces left by the use of 
logic bomb software. However, this remains future work. 
 A consequence of relying on offline repeatability to demonstrate accuracy of 
data from live acquisitions of encrypted data (i.e. performing a dead acquisition) is 
that this approach does not generalise to other live investigations e.g. demonstrating 
the accuracy of a memory dump or the accuracy of live investigation tools such as 
psinfo. However, an alternative approach is possible to assess the accuracy of 
acquisitions: the Certainty Scale in Casey (2002a), (see Section 6.2) uses multiple 
sources of evidence during the analysis stage to test a particular hypothesis about the 
history of digital data. However, this approach could also be applied to hypotheses 
                                                 
47
 Logic bombs could also lock the system, revert the data to its encrypt data or crash the system but 
this would not result in inaccuracy since that event would obviously have happened and would prevent 
the live investigation from progressing.  
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about the history of digital evidence during the acquisition stage i.e. whether the 
collected data has its value due to a manipulated operating system or a faulty imaging 
tool. To do this, memory could be acquired using multiple tools that use different 
sources to acquire an image, for example a dd based approach and the use of Firewire. 
Comparing the results could increase the certainty level from C2 (only one source of 
evidence that is not protected against tampering) to C4 (multiple, independent sources 
of evidence agree but evidence is not protected against tampering). This has the 
potential to allow a system to be screened for processes that may make it behave 
abnormally, therefore establishing if results from running further live tools on the 
system are likely to contain error due to the operating system misrepresenting its state. 
This is a promising area for future work, but generalising the assessment of accuracy 
of digital evidence for general live investigations, rather than those involving the 
acquisition of encrypted data, is outside the scope of this research.  
 
6.7 CONCLUSIONS 
One of the requirements in Chapter 3 was explained as it should be possible to assess 
the amount of error associated with all techniques used to obtain and process digital 
evidence, and that amount of error should be acceptable in the context of the current 
investigation. In this chapter, the error associated with digital evidence has been 
defined as the difference between the inferred history and the true history of the 
examined digital evidence, where possible error or uncertainty is expressed as 
alternative events that explain the current state of the examined digital objects.  
 This definition and expression of error has the advantage that it can be used to 
assess error in both the analysis and acquisition stages of a live digital investigation. 
This chapter has focused on the error in the acquisition stage of a digital investigation, 
since error in the analysis stage is concerned with interpretation of the acquired data 
and can be assessed by using multiple techniques that can be repeated by multiple 
examiners. If there are any differences in interpretation, the alternative hypotheses for 
the existence or state of digital evidence artefacts can be compared and the most 
probable decided on. It is then up to those making the decision to consider whether 
  Chapter 6 
 
 201 
  
  
the uncertainty is sufficiently small in the context of the current investigation to come 
to a decision. 
 The accuracy of the acquisition stage of a traditional digital investigation can 
also be assessed using repeatability since the original evidence is still accessible and 
the acquisition can be repeated in trusted environments using multiple tools and the 
results shown to be the same, which eliminates uncertainty about the acquisition 
methods or operating system functioning correctly. However, in a live acquisition, 
possible error, or uncertainty can be introduced either due to live acquisition tools 
operating incorrectly or by the operating system providing the acquisition tool with 
data that is not consistent with that on the system. This introduces a number of 
alternative hypotheses that explain the examined digital evidence having its current 
state. This uncertainty cannot normally be addressed for live investigations. 
 However, this chapter has shown that in the context of live digital 
investigations involving encryption it is possible to assess accuracy of live acquired 
copies of encrypted data. This is possible if at the same time as the live acquisition 
takes place, information is recovered from the live system that allows encrypted data 
to be decrypted offline in a trusted environment. This allows the accuracy of the 
acquisition to be assessed since offline decryption and offline acquisition are 
repeatable techniques, the output from which can then be used to validate the live 
acquired image. In this case, the only information used where the accuracy cannot be 
assessed through repeatability is data from the live disk that changed between being 
acquired and the system being powered off, and that which allows decryption of the 
encrypted data. However, the information that allows decryption is known to be 
correct since if it were not, then the encrypted data would not decrypt successfully.  
 This chapter has demonstrated recovery of this information from live systems 
and offline decryption in two ways. First, the built in graphical interface was used to 
export keys, which were then used to decrypt data offline. This was demonstrated 
using BitLocker on Windows Vista. The second approach involved obtaining a 
memory dump at the same time as the live acquisition of the mounted encrypted data. 
From this memory dump, decryption keys were extracted that allowed the offline 
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decryption of the encrypted data. The reason this is possible, and why it can be 
generalised, is that on-the-fly decryption is performed on a system as data is required, 
and the same key is used for all data. This means that the key needs to be stored 
somewhere for the encryption system to operate, and it can therefore be recovered.  
 Therefore, in summary, for live digital investigations involving encryption, the 
accuracy of the live acquisition of encrypted data can be assessed by recovering 
information that allows it to be also decrypted offline. This offline decrypted copy can 
then be acquired multiple times using multiple tools and compared to the live acquired 
data, eliminating the uncertainty that the operating system or live acquisition tool was 
behaving abnormally.  
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CHAPTER 7: AUTHENTICITY 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the authenticity requirement for digital evidence. This 
requirement specifies that the origin of digital evidence should be provable. The 
origin of digital evidence was explained in Chapter 3 to include demonstrating that it 
comes from a particular piece of physical evidence, since all digital evidence is an 
abstraction of something physical and ultimately the physical evidence can be 
connected to a real person. Also, authenticity is concerned with demonstrating what 
processes that have been used to obtain data from the physical evidence and then 
translate it through various layers of abstraction into a form that can be interpreted. 
The requirement also stipulated that accusations of tampering should be easily 
refutable.  
 These requirements are satisfied in a traditional investigation since the original 
physical evidence from where the digital evidence was obtained is still available and 
acquired evidence can be compared to the original. Also, records of all processes 
applied can be shown to be correct as they can all be repeated, and the same final 
result obtained. For a live investigation this is not the case since the original evidence 
may not be accessible, either because it was erased on removal of the power, e.g. 
memory or has reverted to a state that means it cannot be accessed e.g. encrypted data. 
The chapter shows that two aspects of this requirement can be satisfied for live 
investigations using existing techniques: digital evidence can be shown to be 
produced by running particular processes using digital evidence bags; and that 
accusations of tampering of acquired evidence can be refuted using cryptographic 
hashes. The chapter therefore focuses on developing a method to demonstrate that 
digital evidence was obtained from a particular piece of physical evidence, which 
assists in allowing the recovered digital evidence to be traced to a person. 
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7.2 BACKGROUND 
7.2.1 Authenticity in Traditional Digital Investigations 
As described in Chapter 3, the authenticity requirement for digital evidence specifies 
that the origin of digital evidence should be provable, both in terms of coming from a 
particular piece of physical evidence and also being produced by running particular 
processes. In addition, accusations of tampering should be easily refutable.  
 Revisiting the traditional digital investigation process described in Chapter 2, 
after seizing the physical evidence, usually a full disk image is created of the contents 
of the seized computer’s hard drive and this image is then analysed. The image that is 
analysed can be shown to be the same as the data on the seized physical evidence by 
computing a cryptographic hash of both, e.g. using MD5 or SHA1. This demonstrates 
that the acquired disk image, and therefore digital evidence extracted from it, 
originated from the seized physical evidence. Since the disk image can be shown to be 
the same as the original physical evidence, this prevents accusations of tampering 
with the disk image, since if the image is altered in any way, the hashes of the data 
stored on the physical evidence and on the disk image would not match. Accusations 
of tampering with the original physical evidence prior to imaging are countered using 
the principle of ‘continuity of evidence’, where it is documented who has had access 
to the physical evidence and at what stage. This is able to “provide continuity and 
assure provenance of the item from the time the item was seized to the time the item is 
used as evidence in court” (Turner, 2005). Demonstrating that digital evidence was 
obtained from the disk image by running particular processes is also achieved by 
thoroughly documenting actions performed. During the analysis, actions performed 
are recorded in detail, meaning that a third party could repeat those actions on the disk 
image and achieve the same results. This demonstrates that the final digital evidence 
artefacts obtained were as a result of running particular processes. This process of 
demonstrating authenticity in traditional digital investigations is shown 
diagrammatically in Figure 37.  
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Figure 37: Tracing digital evidence artefacts back to a piece of physical evidence in a traditional digital investigation. 
 
In a live investigation, if the acquisition and analysis stages are separated, 
documentation and repeatability can also be used to demonstrate that the obtained 
digital evidence artefacts are obtained as a result of running particular processes on 
the disk image. Therefore, the problem of demonstrating authenticity of digital 
evidence in a live digital investigation lies in the acquisition stage. This is because 
data acquired during a live investigation may not be accessible on the original 
physical evidence after the power is removed. Therefore cryptographic hashes cannot 
be used to demonstrate that the acquired evidence came from a particular piece of 
physical evidence because there is no original data to hash (memory) or it has reverted 
to a different state (encrypted data). This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 38.  
 
 
Figure 38: Tracing digital evidence artefacts back to a piece of physical evidence in a live investigation. 
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7.2.2 Authenticity in Live Digital Investigations 
It can be shown that data is produced as a result of running particular processes by 
documenting steps performed and by running known tools from read only media such 
as CD-ROMs. Combinations of tools are often combined into toolkits which execute a 
set of tools in a particular order and record a log of all actions performed. Toolkits 
such as these can be found on the Helix Live CD. 
Also, these logs can be made tamperproof if hashes are calculated at the time 
of creation. Turner (2005) describes a format for Digital Evidence Bags (DEB), which 
allows information to be attached to acquired evidence in the form of a ‘tag file’. The 
information is protected from tampering by incorporating a ‘tag seal number’ which is 
a hash of the current information in the tag.  
Digital Evidence Bags can be used not only to attach information such as the 
name of the investigator and the date and time of capture to the acquired evidence, but 
also to allow ‘real-time evidence capture’ where command line instructions supplied 
to a live machine can be captured directly into Digital Evidence Bags along with the  
time, the name and hashes of the commands run and hashes of the output from the 
tools (Turner, 2007). This provides a means to demonstrate that the data acquired is as 
a result of running particular processes.  
Since tampering accusations from the point of acquisition can be refuted by 
creating hashes of acquired evidence, and the processes run on the live system can be 
recorded by capturing command line instructions using a format such as Digital 
Evidence Bags, the remaining difficulty in demonstrating authenticity of live acquired 
evidence is showing that it came from a particular piece of physical hardware. 
 Some acquired data has embedded information that could be used to identify 
the physical origin, for example BIOS information such as make, model and serial 
number of the computer system can be obtained from memory dumps (Mcquown, 
2008). However, live acquisitions may not necessarily be an acquisition of memory 
and such identifying information may not always be found in acquired data, e.g. an 
acquired mounted encrypted container will not contain such information.  
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It is possible to demonstrate the authenticity of live acquired containers using 
key recovery and offline decryption techniques described in Chapter 6, since the 
original evidence becomes accessible and the original physical origin can be 
demonstrated in the same manner as traditional digital investigations. However, in 
cases where the key patterns have not yet been identified, there is another approach 
that can be used to demonstrate the physical origin of live acquired digital evidence.  
 
7.3 METHODOLOGY 
7.3.1. Overall Technique  
This research demonstrates that live acquired data can be shown to come from a 
particular piece of physical evidence even though the original data on the physical 
evidence is not longer available or accessible. The overall approach is to modify an 
acquisition process to also obtain unique system identifiers at the time of acquisition 
that will still be accessible after the power is removed from the system. At the time of 
the acquisition, the live acquired evidence can be cryptographically hashed with these 
identifiers. After the seizure, during the analysis stage, the live acquired image can be 
re-hashed with the seized physical evidence and the hashes shown to be the same as 
those produced from the live acquisition. This demonstrates that the live image was 
acquired on the seized physical evidence, which is shown diagrammatically in Figure 
39.  
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Figure 39: The overall methodology for demonstrating the origin of a piece of live acquired digital evidence. 
 
7.3.2 Choice of Process for Proof of Concept 
The technique described in the previous subsection is demonstrated in this research 
using a prototype, proof of concept implementation. This is achieved by modifying a 
live acquisition tool to include the hashes of system identifiers. There are a number of 
tools that could be used, for example tools for the acquisition of physical memory or 
for the acquisition of mounted encrypted containers. Both are of interest since, as 
described earlier it is possible to obtain a great deal of information from acquired 
memory images and are increasingly likely to be performed. Therefore, memory 
dumps would be a useful proof of concept tool. However, in the context of this 
research, the live acquisition of mounted encrypted evidence is particularly of interest. 
For the proof of concept development, dd from the Helix Live CD is used as an 
example since it can be used to acquire both physical memory and mounted encrypted 
containers.  
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7.4 DEVELOPMENT OF PROOF OF CONCEPT TOOL 
7.4.1 Introduction 
This section describes the development of a prototype tool that combines dd from the 
Helix Live CD with system identifiers in order to demonstrate the origin of live 
acquired data. 
7.4.2 Overview: Two-Stage Methodology 
The process of demonstrating the origin of live acquired data has two stages: live and 
dead. First, during the live investigation, a process is run that launches the acquisition 
tool dd, obtains some system identifiers, and hashes the acquired image with these 
identifiers. Then, later in an offline environment, the same system identifiers are 
obtained from the seized physical evidence. Offline, the live acquired image is then 
hashed with the system identifiers recovered from the powered off physical hardware. 
This latter process can be repeated at any time and the live acquired data can therefore 
be shown to have originated from the seized physical evidence.  
Due to this design, the system identifiers need to be accessible even after the 
power is removed, and even in cases where Full Disk Encryption is in use. Since in 
this case the contents of the drive will not be accessible after the power is removed, 
the use of software identifiers such as the Windows Product Key is not possible. It 
would be possible to generate a hash of some of the encrypted data that will be 
available after the power is removed and use this as a unique identifier. However, as 
described in Hargreaves and Chivers (2008a), in some cases it is difficult to obtain 
encrypted data from a live machine since the encryption software often transparently 
decrypts it. It is therefore desirable to use hardware identifiers, since these will be 
consistent when the machine is live and running the suspect’s operating system, and 
when the system is accessed offline during the later analysis stage of the investigation. 
There are a number of additional requirements for the system identifiers that are used: 
they should be unique to the system and difficult or impossible to tamper with.  
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7.4.3 Choice of Hardware Identifiers 
This section describes possible hardware identifiers that can be used to identify a 
machine. 
MAC Address 
One option is the Media Access Control (MAC) address of the computer. This is the 
physical hardware address attached to Network Interface Cards (NIC). The MAC 
address of the network card can be easily accessed on a live suspect Windows 
machine using ipconfig /all, and post-seizure, in a controlled environment48 
using ifconfig –a, see Figure 40. Also, the BIOS of some machines can report 
the MAC address of built in network cards. 
 
 
Figure 40: Displaying the MAC address under Linux. 
 
However, the MAC address of network cards can be changed under both Windows 
(Gorlani, 2008) and Linux. The changes to MAC addresses are not permanent and are 
specific to the running operating system. If the suspect is using a modified MAC 
address, this would have the consequence that during the live acquisition, the 
modified MAC address would be obtained, but during the offline analysis in a 
controlled environment, the true (but different) MAC address would be obtained.  
                                                 
48
 Controlled environment refers to booting the machine using a Linux CD such as Helix 
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Hard disk identifiers 
A hard disk has more than one identifier, the Volume Serial Number, and the 
Manufacturer’s Hard Drive Serial Number, which are discussed below.  
 
Volume Serial Number: This serial number is a 32 bit number assigned to a partition. 
It is created when the partition is formatted and is derived from the time of the format 
(Wilson, 2005). Therefore, a drive with more then one partition would have more than 
one Volume Serial Number. This value is displayed when running a simple dir 
command, as shown in Figure 41.  
 
 
Figure 41: Volume Serial Number displayed with ‘dir’. 
 
Therefore, the Volume Serial Number can be easily retrieved from a live system. 
However, if the drive or volume has been encrypted, the Volume Serial Number will 
not be accessible to a later offline analysis, since the Volume Serial Number is stored 
within the partition itself (at offset 0x43 of sector 0 of the partition). 
Also, the Volume Serial Number can be changed using the tool VolumeID 
(Russinovich, 2006). However, unlike the changing of MAC addresses, these changes 
would still be present after a reboot and if encryption is not considered, could be used 
to link live acquired data to a specific machine. However, in this research, encryption 
does need to be considered.  
 
Manufacturer’s Hard Drive Serial Number: This is the serial number of the drive 
that is set during its manufacture. It can be retrieved using software such as HD Tune 
(EFD Software, 2008) and is often printed on the label of the drive (shown in Figure 
42 and Figure 43). Unlike the MAC address, no technique has been identified that can 
be used to change the manufacturer’s serial number. 
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Figure 42: Manufacturer’s serial number shown using HD Tune. 
 
 
Figure 43: The same serial number obtained from the label of the drive. 
 
Since no technique could be found to alter the manufacturer’s hard drive serial 
number and it can be accessed during a live investigation and during a later offline 
analysis, this is currently considered to be the best choice to identify a particular 
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machine. The following two sub-sections describe the implementation of the two 
stages of the proof of concept tool. 
 
7.4.4 The Live Side 
As described earlier, the proof of concept implementation uses dd to acquire the 
contents of an encrypted container and combines the acquisition with the output of a 
tool that obtains the manufacturer’s hard drive serial number. In this implementation, 
combining this functionality into a single tool is achieved using Perl. While Perl is an 
interpreted scripting language that requires software such as ActivePerl to be installed 
on a Windows machine to run scripts, it is possible to convert these scripts to self-
contained executables using the tool Perl2Exe (IndigoSTAR Software, 2008). This 
was used to produce the executable acquire_and_authenticate.exe which makes calls 
to other software using the ‘system’ command or the ‘backtick’49, as shown in Figure 
44. The contents of the mounted encrypted volume are acquired using dd from the 
Forensic Acquisition Utilities (Garner, 2007).  
 
 
Figure 44: Calls to dd and md5 from the Perl script. 
 
The manufacturer’s hard drive serial number is retrieved on a live machine using a 
Visual Basic script that uses code from Wilson (2006). This code is shown in Figure 
45. 
 
set svc = getobject ("winmgmts:root\cimv2") 
set objEnum = svc.execQuery ("select * from win32_physicalMedia") 
                                                 
49
 ‘System’ returns the called program’s exit code, whereas ‘backticks’ return the program’s output. 
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for each obj in objEnum 
wscript.echo obj.GetObjectText_ 
next 
Figure 45: Code that recovers the manufacturer’s serial number. 
 
The combined hash is obtained by calling a program that calculates the MD5 hash of 
input provided to it. First a hash is calculated of the acquired data50, and then a hash of 
the serial number obtained using the earlier script. The output of the tool includes 
these two hashes and then a single hash of the combined two hashes, as shown in 
Figure 46. This hash can be documented and written to a text file.  
 
 
Figure 46: Output from the live tool. 
7.4.5 The Dead Side 
With the combined hash recorded, and the live acquisition performed, the system can 
be powered off and seized. During the later analysis, the live acquired data can be 
demonstrated to originate from the seized hardware by recovering the manufacturer’s 
serial number and re-hashing this serial with the live acquired image.  
There are a number of options for recovering the manufacturer’s serial number 
for a hard drive. For some drives it is printed on labels placed on the outside of the 
hard disk itself, and it can therefore be recovered easily. However, this is not the case 
for all drives and in these cases, it is possible to recover the serial number by booting 
to a Linux based CD (which allows the drive to be mounted as read only to prevent 
changes) and using: hdparm -i /dev/sda, the output of which is shown in Figure 47.  
                                                 
50
 Since the hash is calculated of the acquired data, not the actual data, there are no difficulties due to 
the data continuously changing.  
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Figure 47: Output from hdparm –i /dev/sda to obtain the manufacturer’s serial number. 
 
With the serial number obtained, the offline verification of the acquired evidence’s 
origin can be achieved using the developed executable, offline_authenticate.exe, 
which is another Perl2Exe converted Perl script that takes the path of the acquired 
image and the text string of the hard disk serial number and calculates the combined 
hash. If this is identical to the hash obtained during the live acquisition, then the live 
acquired image can be shown to have come from that piece of physical evidence. 
 
7.5 RESULTS 
The prototype tool was tested on a live system running BestCrypt (where key recovery 
from memory is not yet possible). A test system was built51 and an encrypted 
container was created using BestCrypt. 
 The Perl wrapped version of dd was used to acquire the contents of the 
encrypted container and the hashes were displayed on screen. The hashes were 
documented and the screen photographed (shown in Figure 48). The system was then 
powered off. 
 
                                                 
51
 In this case a real system was built rather than using virtual machines so that the hard drive serial 
number could be photographed. 
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Figure 48: Photograph of the output from the live tool. 
 
For the offline stage, the hard drive was removed from the system and the 
manufacturer’s hard drive serial number recorded from the label (Figure 49). This 
serial number was entered into the offline authentication software as shown in Figure 
50 and the outputted hashes compared to those obtained during the live investigation.  
 
Figure 49: Photograph of the physical drive’s serial number. 
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Figure 50: Output of the offline tool which is the same as that produced on the live system (Figure 48), which links the live 
acquired disk image to the seized hardware. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 48 and Figure 50, the hashes produced at the time of the live 
investigation by the acquisition tool which were documented and photographed agree 
with those produced using the seized hardware that is available for repeated 
inspection in controlled environments. If the image was acquired from a different 
system to the one seized, the hashes would not match as shown in Figure 51. 
 
 
 
Figure 51: Hashes produced do not match if the image was not acquired from the seized system. 
 
This demonstrates that the live acquired image came from the hardware in the 
possession of the investigator that can be linked to a suspect using traditional means.  
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7.6 EVALUATION 
This developed approach allows live acquired data to be demonstrated to come from a 
particular piece of physical evidence. This is part of the authenticity requirement, as 
explained in Chapter 3: the origin of digital evidence should be provable, both in 
terms of coming from a particular piece of physical evidence and also being produced 
by running particular processes. In addition, accusations of tampering should be 
easily refutable. In this research only the physical origin has been considered, since 
running particular processes can be demonstrated using the principles used in Digital 
Evidence Bags (Turner, 2006, , 2007) and it may also be possible to determine 
processes run on a system during a live investigation by the changes made to the 
system by the processes run (see Section 9.3). Also, if the acquisition and analysis 
stage of digital investigations are separated then accusations of tampering with digital 
evidence can be refuted since the hash of the analysed data can be shown at all stages 
to be the same as when it was first acquired.  
 There are some limitations to this approach. First, administrator privileges are 
required to obtain the hard drive serial number, and these may not be available. In this 
case it would be necessary to revert to using the MAC address or other hardware 
configuration information such as disk sizes to establish a link between the live 
acquired data and the seized physical evidence.  
Also, as described in the previous chapter, the operating system may not 
provide accurate information to live investigation tools. If the operating system 
behaves abnormally and provides false information e.g. a false hard drive serial 
number, when the offline analysis is performed in a controlled environment and the 
system does behave normally, the hashes will not match and the origin of the live 
acquired data will be difficult to prove. However, this would involve modifying the 
operating system to return a modified hard drive manufacturer’s serial number, and a 
means of achieving this has not been found. Even if this is achieved, it is still possible 
to use multiple identifying factors to counter this. Hashes could be obtained of the 
volume serial number, the MAC address and even hard disk sizes. While some could 
be changed, or rendered inaccessible offline by encryption, being able to access and 
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hash acquired data with several of the multiple factors could increase confidence that 
the acquired data came from the seized hardware. As a result, future work involves 
exploring further options available to link live acquired data to physical evidence. It 
also may be possible to use the real-time capture implementation of Digital Evidence 
Bags and integrate the hashing of physical evidence identifiers to demonstrate the 
physical origin of acquired digital evidence into the DEB framework. However, 
prototype DEB tools are not yet available and this remains future work.  
There are also limitations of the particular implementation: the Perl proof of 
concept is clumsy since it makes calls to other software to perform much of the 
functionality. If the technique is developed into a real tool then obtaining hardware 
identifiers and computing combined hashes should be integrated into the acquisition 
tool itself. Also, in this implementation, the hard drive serial numbers can only be 
obtained for IDE drives using the current script. However, code has now been found 
to obtain SATA serials (Napalm, 2006) but has not yet been integrated into the  
developed authentication programs. 
Also, referring back to Chapter 5, the changes caused to a system by dd were 
determined to be minimal (single prefetch entry and single Registry change). Future 
work will involve examining the changes caused by the additional functionality of 
calculating MD5 hashes and obtaining hardware identifiers. Identifying these changes 
is necessary for any ‘real’ implementation of this prototype tool. 
Also, it is important to emphasise that this ‘physical identifier approach’ is not 
sufficient on its own to demonstrate authenticity. It is possible to ‘cheat’ the system 
by using a modified version of the aquire_and_authenticate.exe that would take a 
fake memory dump as input that contains some fabricated evidence. This modified 
acquire_and_authenticate.exe could be run on the suspect’s system instead and would 
produce a combined hash of the faked evidence with the suspect’s hardware. When 
this is examined offline, this fake evidence will be authenticated as coming from the 
suspect’s machine. Therefore, the approach described in this chapter needs to be used 
in conjunction with a technique such as digital evidence bags which records the name 
and hash of the process run on the suspect machine. This means that it can be shown 
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that the evidence was obtained using the ‘standard build’ of 
acquire_and_authenticate.exe, which is known to acquire data from the machine on 
which it is running; not to take any custom input and generate a combined hash. The 
question still remains of how to demonstrate that the Digital Evidence Bag software 
has not been tampered with, but using procedural measures such as running from a 
read only medium such as a CDROM, multiple investigators signing documents to 
certify that certain software was run, or even videoing the procedure live, it is possible 
to demonstrate the authenticity of live acquired data.  
Finally, while this ‘hardware hashing’ approach is useful in the context of this 
research (acquiring live encrypted data), and can be extended to apply to memory 
acquisitions and other live acquisitions saved to removable storage media, it is not yet 
known how this approach could be applied to demonstrate the physical origin of other 
types of digital evidence, for example packet capture on a network. Nor can it be 
applied to a memory image acquired over a Firewire connection since the physical 
identifiers of the source system cannot be obtained in the same way. However, live 
acquisitions of disk or memory to a USB storage device or other removable media 
represents a significant proportion of live acquisitions and this is therefore a useful 
technique. Also, as described earlier, BIOS information and other identifying material 
may be used to determine the origin of acquired memory dumps, including in the case 
of Firewire acquisitions. Nevertheless, demonstrating physical origins of other types 
of digital evidence remains future work. 
 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The authenticity requirement means that the origin of digital evidence should be 
provable, both in terms of coming from a particular piece of physical evidence and 
also being produced by running particular processes. In addition, accusations of 
tampering should be easily refutable. It has been shown that two aspects of the 
authenticity requirement can be satisfied using existing techniques. Specifically that 
digital evidence can be shown to be obtained as a result of running particular 
processes using Digital Evidence Bags, which can create a tamperproof record of 
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processes run and their output. Also, accusations of tampering with the acquired 
evidence can be refuted if cryptographic hashes are created of the acquired evidence, 
which can be checked throughout the life of a piece of digital evidence. 
 However, demonstrating the physical origin of live acquired evidence is 
difficult, particularly in the case of encrypted data, since the original data is not 
accessible once the power is removed. This chapter has shown that by hashing live 
acquired evidence with some unique physical property of the computer system, in this 
case the manufacturer’s hard drive serial number, the physical origin can be 
demonstrated, even without access to the original data in unencrypted form.  
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CHAPTER 8: EVALUATION 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the research performed, and evaluates it against the original 
research hypothesis of digital evidence obtained from live investigations involving 
encryption can be shown to be reliable. Chapters 4 to 7 have examined each of the 
requirements used to assess the reliability of digital evidence and each chapter has 
evaluated the extent to which the requirement can be satisfied. This chapter provides a 
summary of the conclusions of the previous chapters, and evaluates them against the 
original research hypothesis. The chapter first considers the overall methodology used 
to test the proposed hypotheses, followed by evaluations of the methodologies used to 
examine each of the requirements that are used to assess the reliability of digital 
evidence, and also to determine if they support the original hypothesis.  
 
8.2 METHODOLOGY EVALUATION 
Digital evidence was defined in Chapter 2 as a set of reliable digital objects that 
support or refute a hypothesis. Therefore, this research was concerned with 
determining whether digital objects recovered using live techniques from systems 
using encryption could be considered to be reliable, and therefore used as digital 
evidence. The research hypothesis was that digital evidence obtained from live 
investigations involving encryption can be shown to be reliable. In order to test this 
hypothesis a measure of reliability was needed. As discussed in Chapter 2, digital 
evidence is used for digital investigations and forensic digital investigations, and each 
demand different levels of reliability of digital evidence. A higher degree of digital 
evidence reliability is needed to convict someone in a criminal court than in a 
corporate environment to come to a decision about a violation of an acceptable use 
policy, where the consequences of the decision are very different. Even within a 
forensic digital investigation, there are differences between the standard of evidence 
necessary for a decision in civil and criminal cases, where balance of probabilities 
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and beyond all reasonable doubt are used respectively. Therefore, whether digital 
evidence is convincing enough to come to a decision is dependant on the decision to 
be made and the person making the decision. As shown in Chapter 1, the reliability of 
digital evidence is therefore context sensitive and subjective. This presented a 
problem for this research since adopting a subjective view of digital evidence 
reliability means that this hypothesis could not be tested. However, in Chapter 3 it 
was shown that there is an alternative approach, where standards or requirements can 
be used to “ensure quality” and to “guarantee to those not involved of reliable results” 
(Pollitt, 1995). It was shown in Chapter 3 that there are number of existing standards 
or requirements that are currently used to assess the reliability of digital evidence, e.g. 
the ACPO guidelines, and since reliability is already assessed in this way, it was 
assumed that reliability of digital evidence can be assessed using a set of standards or 
requirements. Once this was established, it was then necessary to identify appropriate 
requirements.  
 
8.3 REQUIREMENTS EVALUATION 
Based on the assumption that the reliability of digital evidence could be assessed 
using standards or requirements, it was necessary to identify appropriate 
requirements. Existing requirements were examined but they were found to have 
limitations. Many were produced by those involved in forensic digital investigations 
and as a result they contained legal specific terminology, for example “chain of 
custody” (Sommer, 1998). This was not appropriate in this research since general 
requirements for digital evidence were needed, since digital evidence is used for 
forensic digital investigations and also general digital investigations, where the results 
do not need to be presented in court. Also, some of the existing requirements were 
written before live investigations became necessary and as a result the requirements 
were based around an approach where only the disk is considered to contain evidence. 
The consequence of building requirements on the assumption of evidence being only 
on disk, is that requirements such as “evidence should not be altered” (Pollitt, 1995) 
can then be used, since discarding memory by disconnecting the power is not 
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considered to be altering evidence. Once it is accepted that memory can contain 
relevant digital evidence, requirements such as this become impossible to satisfy.  
 As a result, existing requirements were not considered appropriate and it was 
necessary to produce technology neutral and general requirements for assessing the 
reliability of digital evidence. As a basis for this, a set of requirements for assessing 
the reliability of machine generated evidence was found in Miller (1992) that had the 
potential to be applied to assessing the reliability of digital evidence. These 
requirements were adapted to apply to digital evidence by considering the processes 
that make up a digital investigation to be equivalent to the machines in Miller (1992). 
From these, a set of general requirements for assessing the reliability of digital 
evidence were proposed, which were: 
 
Authenticity: it should be possible to demonstrate the origin of digital evidence, both 
in terms of coming from a particular piece of physical evidence and also being 
produced by running particular processes. In addition, accusations of tampering 
should be easily refutable; 
 
Accuracy: it should be possible to assess the amount of error associated with all 
techniques used to obtain digital evidence, and that amount of error should be 
acceptable in the context of the current investigation; 
 
Completeness: it should be possible to assess which evidence is preserved and which 
is lost, and the maximum amount of digital evidence relevant to the investigation 
should be preserved. 
 
However, the hypothesis that these are the requirements for assessing the reliability of 
digital evidence has the limitation that it can never be demonstrated conclusively that 
it is correct, only that a counterexample has not yet been found. Therefore, to 
determine if the requirements could be shown to be incorrect, existing requirements 
and standards were examined and compared to those proposed, since if the proposed 
  Chapter 8 
 
 225 
  
  
requirements were incorrect, then there would be significant inconsistencies with 
existing requirements. Requirements were selected to be examined that were in 
current use, taken from peer reviewed literature, or produced by experts in the field. 
These were discussed in Chapter 3 and found either to agree with the proposed 
general requirements, or it was shown how they were specific means of satisfying the 
proposed requirements e.g. “chain of custody” (Sommer, 1998) is shown as a way of 
demonstrating authenticity. Other requirements such as “evidence should not be 
altered” (Pollitt, 1995) were shown to be inappropriate for reasons discussed earlier. 
Also, the requirements that were specific to law, for example, only seizing evidence 
allowed by law (Mocas, 2004), were shown not to apply to all digital investigations 
and therefore inappropriate for general requirements for assessing the reliability of 
digital evidence.  
 From this examination of existing requirements it was not possible to find a 
valid counterexample, thus supporting the hypothesis that these requirements were 
suitable as general requirements for assessing the reliability of digital evidence.  
However, one of the challenges of proposing general requirements for assessing the 
reliability of digital evidence is that there is an extremely broad range of sources of 
digital evidence, including PCs, network devices, mobile phones etc. Therefore, it is 
possible that counterexamples may be found in other specific sub-categories of digital 
investigations. However, given the sample of existing requirements to which these 
proposed requirements were compared and shown to be compatible with, it is believed 
that any changes that are found to be necessary over time to these requirements, due 
to their generalised nature, will be minor adjustments to phrasing and explanation of 
the requirements.  
Therefore, since contradictory examples to assessing reliability of digital 
evidence using these three requirements were not found, in the remainder of the 
research, the reliability of digital evidence obtained from live investigations involving 
encryption was assessed against the three criteria of completeness, accuracy and 
authenticity. 
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8.4 COMPLETENESS EVALUATION 
The completeness requirement stated that it should be possible to assess which digital 
evidence is preserved and which is lost, and the maximum amount of digital evidence 
relevant to the investigation should be preserved. This requirement was examined 
over two chapters, Chapters 4 and 5. The requirement was first examined from the 
perspective of whether a live digital investigation or a traditional digital investigation 
should be performed to preserve the maximum amount of relevant digital evidence. In 
order to assess relatively what was preserved and lost by performing a particular type 
of investigation, it was considered whether offline access to encrypted data was likely 
using the approaches described in Chapter 2. Several of these techniques for gaining 
access to encrypted evidence were case specific, e.g. persuade the suspect to provide 
decryption keys, and therefore it was not possible to generalise about whether offline 
access to encrypted evidence would be possible for certain types of product, and 
therefore whether a live investigation would increase the completeness of the 
preserved evidence. Also, these case specific approaches make assumptions, e.g. that 
the suspect would co-operate and provide keys. These factors are difficult to predict 
and therefore were not of use in determining whether a live investigation should be 
performed. There were also approaches that were product implementation specific, 
e.g. find a vulnerability in an algorithm in use. The likely success of these specific 
approaches also could not be generalised and as a result were not considered in this 
research. The limitation of not considering product specific approaches is that offline 
access to encrypted evidence may be possible for particular implementations. 
Therefore, without taking product specific approaches into account, a live 
investigation could be performed when it was not necessary. However, in order to 
address this problem, a database of encryption products, including any vulnerabilities 
that allow offline access, would need to be developed. This would require a team of 
researchers to maintain, including keeping it up-to-date and controlling access. 
Therefore, this was not considered to be a feasible approach in this research.  
 However, the remaining offline approaches were explored as to whether 
general conclusions could be drawn about the likelihood of successfully gaining 
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access to encrypted evidence. It was found that the success of three of the approaches 
was affected by the amount of the disk that remains accessible after the power is 
removed: locating copies of data in unencrypted form; locating copies of the password 
or key; and intelligent password attacks. Encryption products were therefore 
categorised based on this property (the amount of the disk that remains accessible) 
and the categories identified were: 
 
Manual file encryption A user selects a single file for encryption. 
Folder encryption All files contained within a particular folder are 
automatically encrypted. 
Virtual drive encryption A virtual drive is created which is stored as a single 
file on the user’s file system and all data stored to this 
virtual drive is automatically encrypted. 
Full Volume Encryption52 An entire partition is encrypted, but other partitions 
and the partition structure are accessible. 
Full Disk Encryption The entire disk is encrypted, including the partition 
table. 
 
By examining which locations were left on the disk after a traditional digital 
investigation approach was used (‘pull the plug’), for each category, the effect on the 
investigation in terms of the completeness of the digital evidence preserved could be 
determined, with some categories preserving less digital evidence than others. The 
areas of the disk rendered inaccessible by pulling the plug may or may not contain 
relevant digital evidence. However, in this research it was assumed that the encrypted 
evidence was relevant and therefore access was needed to it. This is a valid 
assumption because even if the encrypted content was not relevant to the 
investigation, access would be needed to it in order to determine this. As a result, if 
                                                 
52
 This category was identified during the research. The initial categories used were based on 
WinMagic (2005) which proposed four original categories, which did not include a distinction between 
Full Volume Encryption and Full Disk Encryption. 
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data could not be accessed because it was encrypted then completeness was assumed 
to have decreased.  
 In addition to which locations were encrypted and therefore inaccessible after 
the power is removed, it was also considered how useful the locations remaining 
would be in assisting with offline approaches to gaining access. The different product 
categories were examined and some left areas of the disk accessible that could contain 
information that would be useful in obtaining access to encrypted data on the disk 
during an offline examination, e.g. C:\temp, or the Windows Registry. However, other 
factors also affect the likelihood of gaining access using these approaches. These 
include the suspect’s technical ability, the complexity of their password, and their 
understanding of the precautions necessary when using encryption, e.g. erasing 
temporary files. It was therefore found that if a system is encountered in a live state 
and encrypted data is accessible, given the variables involved in attempting to predict 
whether offline access will be possible, the most effective method to obtain encrypted 
data in a form that is accessible is to perform a live acquisition. 
 However, there are more complexities to the completeness requirement once 
the decision has been made to embark upon a live investigation. These complexities 
were explored in Chapter 5. This was necessary since any live investigation is 
inherently intrusive and all actions performed on a live system will make changes to 
the system under investigation, which will overwrite data and decrease the 
completeness of the preserved digital evidence. Chapter 5 examined how these 
changes caused by live techniques could be assessed. Understanding changes caused 
by live tools and techniques makes it possible to predict which particular live 
technique should be used in an investigation to attempt to maximise the preservation 
of potentially relevant digital evidence. Since different tools overwrite different 
evidence, this means that depending on what needs to be preserved for the current 
investigation, techniques can be chosen and used that overwrite only data that is 
known to be irrelevant. Due to the diversity of system configurations, predictions may 
not be exactly correct and therefore being able to assess changes post-live 
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investigation is also necessary in order to determine which data has been overwritten 
and on the system in question after the live investigation has been performed.  
 The approach used to assess the evidence preserved and lost was to develop a 
methodology to monitor a test system and record the changes made to it. This 
monitoring methodology was used to record the changes made by running programs 
(including live investigation tools) and also connecting to the system in a variety of 
ways. However, the limitation of this approach is that these are records of changes 
made to simple test systems only, and further work is necessary to extend these 
predictions, and consider changes that are made to systems in configurations that are 
encountered in real investigations. However, the developed techniques and 
methodology will assist in performing this future work. 
 Therefore, completeness can be increased and decreased by performing a live 
investigation. If encrypted evidence is encountered on a live system, it is difficult to 
predict if offline approaches for gaining access to this encrypted digital evidence will 
be successful, whereas performing a live acquisition can preserve this information in a 
form that can be analysed. However, performing a live investigation will overwrite 
data on the system and decrease completeness. The assessment of this decrease in 
completeness caused by performing a live investigation can be achieved by testing 
tools in advance using the developed methodology. This allows changes to be 
predicted and therefore the best course of action decided upon for the current 
investigation, which attempts to minimise the loss of relevant digital evidence. It also 
assists in demonstrating post-live investigation, what changes were actually made and 
what evidence was lost. 
 
8.5 ACCURACY EVALUATION 
Chapter 6 examined the accuracy requirement for digital evidence, which was 
explained as it should be possible to assess the amount of error associated with all 
techniques used to obtain and process digital evidence, and that error should be 
acceptable in the context of the current investigation. However, this explanation has a 
limitation, since ‘error’ in the context of digital investigations was not defined. 
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Therefore, the concept of error in digital investigations was reviewed in Chapter 6 and 
then defined as the difference between the inferred history and true history of the 
examined digital evidence, where error is expressed as alternative events that explain 
the current state of the examined digital objects. This definition can be used to assess 
error in the acquisition and analysis stages of a digital investigation. However, this 
research did not consider error in the analysis stage of live investigations, since if the 
acquisition and analysis stages are separated; once live data is acquired, the remainder 
of the investigation process is no different to data acquired in a traditional 
investigation. This means that once data is acquired from a live system to a storage 
medium, it has the same properties as digital evidence from a traditional digital 
investigation, in that it can be exactly duplicated and examined multiple times by 
multiple examiners. Therefore, this research has concentrated on assessing the 
accuracy of the acquisition stage of a live investigation involving encrypted evidence.  
 This research showed that it is possible to assess the accuracy of live acquired 
data from systems using encryption, if, at the time of seizure, in addition to the 
mounted encrypted data, other information is acquired that allows offline decryption 
of the encrypted data. This was demonstrated by obtaining recovery keys from 
BitLocker in Windows Vista, and also recovering decryption keys from a memory 
dump of TrueCrypt. Both of these techniques allowed the encrypted data to be 
decrypted offline in a repeatable manner in a trusted environment. This offline 
acquired copy was then used to demonstrate the accuracy of the live acquired data 
since it eliminates alternative hypotheses that examined digital objects (the acquired 
data) have their values due to the operating system misrepresenting its state or the 
acquisition tool being faulty. The only digital object that is used as evidence, whose 
accuracy cannot be demonstrated in this way, is the data that allows offline 
decryption, and the accuracy of this is proven by its ability to decrypt the data. 
 There are however, two main limitations to this approach (excluding 
limitations of specific offline decryption approaches, e.g. TrueCrypt key recovery 
only being implemented for certain algorithms). First, is that it does not address the 
logic bomb problem, i.e. a piece of software could be installed so that when a certain 
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action is performed e.g. an investigator plugs in a USB stick, this causes data to be 
erased or manipulated, the system to be locked or the system crashed so that data 
reverts to its encrypted state. Only the first of these is an accuracy problem since it 
changes the history of the examined digital objects by changing their state, whereas 
the others prevent the data from being acquired at all. The second limitation is that the 
accuracy of a live acquisition has not been assessed using only live techniques, and an 
offline decryption and acquisition was necessary to allow accuracy to be assessed 
using repeatable methods. This is possible only for live acquired encrypted evidence, 
since after ‘pulling the plug’ the original data is inaccessible rather that permanently 
erased. So while the accuracy of digital evidence from live investigations involving 
encryption can be assessed by comparing it to the offline decrypted data, this 
approach can not be generalised to other live investigations, e.g. acquisition of 
memory or the output of live tools such as pslist.  
However, a general approach to assessing accuracy may be possible using an 
alternative method. As described in the conclusions section of Chapter 6, the 
Certainty Scale in Casey (2002a), which can be used during the analysis stage of an 
investigation to compare multiple sources of evidence to test and describe confidence 
in a particular hypothesis, could also be applied to live acquisitions. In this case 
multiple live acquisition tools that acquire data using different sources could be used 
and the results compared e.g. a Firewire acquisition and a dd based acquisition. If 
mapped to the Certainty Scale in Casey (2002a), by using multiple tools, this would 
increase the certainty in the acquired data since data could be verified by multiple 
sources. Also, if the accuracy of a memory image can be assessed, it is then possible 
to begin to determine whether the system is ‘behaving normally’ i.e. there are no 
suspicious processes whose function cannot be explained. This would allow an 
investigator to search for traces of logic bombs, determine if the system is behaving 
normally for the purposes of determining changes caused by live tools, and also 
screen a system for processes that may affect the results of other live tools later run on 
the system. However, this remains future work, but highlights the importance of 
memory acquisitions in demonstrating accuracy of results obtained from live systems.  
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 Therefore, if live acquisition is separated from analysis and presentation, the 
error associated with processes that analyse and present live acquired evidence can be 
assessed in the same way as in a traditional investigation. Also, the accuracy of the 
live acquisition of encrypted evidence can be demonstrated if information is recovered 
from the live system that allows offline decryption. This allows the accuracy of the 
live acquired copy to be verified by comparing it to the offline acquired copy, which 
was obtained in a trusted environment where the process and can be repeated, which 
therefore eliminates alternative hypotheses of the acquisition tool being faulty or the 
operating system providing false information to the acquisition tool. However, 
limitations remain, since there is possible error due to logic bombs erasing relevant 
data, which may or may not be significant depending on the individual investigation. 
In addition, this could be addressed with future work.  
 
8.6 AUTHENTICITY EVALUATION 
The authenticity of digital evidence from live investigations involving encryption was 
examined in Chapter 7. This requirement stated that it should be possible to 
demonstrate the origin of digital evidence, in terms of coming from a particular piece 
of physical evidence and also being produced by running particular processes. In 
addition, accusations of tampering should be easily refutable. Of the three aspects of 
the authenticity requirement, two could already be addressed for live investigations 
using existing techniques. First it can be demonstrated that data is produced as a result 
of running particular processes by maintaining a record of processes run and the 
output captured using a technology such as digital evidence bags. Also, accusations of 
tampering after acquisition can be refuted by creating hashes of acquired evidence 
which can be recalculated at any time and the evidence shown to be unchanged. The 
limitation of this is that accusations of tampering prior to acquisition cannot be refuted 
using technology. However, this is the case regardless of whether a live investigation 
is performed, since in a ‘pull the plug’ investigation, evidence could be manipulated 
prior to the power being removed, and tampering at the scene is possible in real-world 
forensics. This problem can be addressed procedurally using multi-person teams of 
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investigators and it would also be possible to video the entire seizure to record all 
actions performed at the scene. Therefore, accusations of tampering prior to 
acquisition were not considered in this research. 
 Since two aspects of the authenticity requirement could already be addressed, 
this research focused on demonstrating that live acquired data came from a particular 
piece of physical evidence. This was achieved by modifying the acquisition process to 
obtain unique physical identifiers of the system (in this case the hard drive’s 
manufacturer’s serial number) and to cryptographically hash the acquired data with 
these identifiers. Since these identifiers are available before and after the power is 
removed from the system, during the later analysis, even though the original data is 
not available (e.g. it is encrypted or erased when the power is removed) it is still 
possible to obtain the physical identifiers from the seized evidence. It is then possible 
to perform the same hashing operation and show that the live acquired evidence came 
from the seized piece of hardware, which can be connected to the suspect. 
 Therefore, authenticity can be demonstrated for live acquisitions using a 
combination of technological and procedural techniques. It can be demonstrated that 
data is produced as a result of running particular processes, either procedurally or 
using a technology such as Digital Evidence Bags, accusations of tampering after 
acquisition can be refuted by creating hashes of acquired evidence, which can be 
recalculated at any time and the evidence shown to be unchanged, and the physical 
origin can be demonstrated by hashing evidence with physical identifiers of the 
system which can be repeated at any time which demonstrates that the acquired digital 
evidence came from a particular piece of physical evidence.  
 
8.7 CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, the original research hypothesis was digital evidence obtained from live 
investigations involving encryption can be shown to be reliable and this research has 
proposed that reliability of digital evidence can be assessed in terms of three criteria: 
authenticity, accuracy and completeness. It is been shown that for a live investigation, 
authenticity can be satisfied by recording the processes run, either procedurally or 
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using a technology such as Digital Evidence Bags; that acquired evidence has not 
been tampered with after acquisition by creating cryptographic hashes of the acquired 
evidence; and that the acquired evidence came from a particular piece of physical 
evidence by hashing acquired digital evidence with physical identifiers such as 
manufacturer’s hard drive serial number. It has also shown that the accuracy of digital 
evidence from live investigations is dependant on demonstrating the accuracy of the 
acquisition stage. This was shown to be possible by acquiring specific information, in 
addition to the mounted encrypted data, which later allows the static encrypted data 
that remains when the power is removed to be decrypted offline in a repeatable 
manner in a trusted environment and compared to the live acquired copy. This 
additional information can be in the form of recovery keys or a memory dump, from 
which decryption keys can be extracted. While this approach cannot be extended to 
general live acquisitions, in the context of live investigations involving encryption, 
this technique allows digital evidence to be acquired in a form that can be analysed 
and the accuracy of that acquisition to be assessed. It has also been shown that live 
investigations can increase the completeness of the preserved digital evidence, and 
assuming the encrypted evidence is considered relevant to the investigation, will 
preserve the maximum amount of digital evidence relevant to the investigation. It has 
also been shown that it is possible to assess the evidence that is preserved and lost by 
monitoring live tools and techniques in test environments and recording the changes 
made. This testing assists an investigator in determining the best course of action 
during a live investigation using predictions about what will be overwritten by 
particular live tools and techniques. Also, the results obtained from footprinting live 
tools and also other software that is found on systems e.g. antivirus, increases 
investigators’ understanding of the changes that occur on a system, which assists with 
the analysis of the machine post-live investigation, to identify changes made and 
therefore potential digital evidence that was not preserved. While the test 
environments examined do not yet truly reflect the real systems on which live tools 
are run, the developed methodology makes this future work possible.  
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Therefore, referring back to the original hypothesis of digital evidence 
obtained from live investigations involving encryption can be shown to be reliable, 
despite the use of these requirements to assess reliability and the success of the 
implemented solutions to satisfy them, it is important to remember that in reality, the 
reliability of digital evidence is subjective and context sensitive, as discussed at the 
beginning of this chapter and in Chapter 3. So while reliability can be assessed against 
requirements, it is necessary for those requirements to address the context sensitivity 
of digital evidence reliability. The requirements proposed allow for this, for example, 
the requirement for accuracy states that it must be possible to asses error, and that this 
error should be acceptable in the context of the current investigation. Also, the 
completeness requirement states that the maximum amount of relevant evidence 
should be preserved, where what is considered relevant digital evidence will change 
depending on the investigation. Also, when considering authenticity, it is possible for 
the person collecting evidence to subvert the collection process, by introducing, 
altering or removing evidence. It is therefore necessary for decisions about these 
factors to be made for individual investigations: whether the error is acceptable, 
whether something relevant was not preserved, or whether the person who collected 
the evidence performed the evidence collection properly. This is the responsibility of 
those making the decision, which will in turn depend on the decision to be made. 
Therefore, it is not possible to broadly say whether digital evidence obtained from live 
investigations involving encryption is reliable, because it depends on the 
circumstances in which it is used. However, this research has provided structured 
criteria that allow this reliability to be assessed and has also demonstrated the use of 
these criteria in the context of live investigations involving encryption and shown the 
extent to which each can currently be met if the most reliable evidence possible is 
aspired to.  
 
  Chapter 9 
 
 236 
  
  
CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS 
9.1 CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter provides a summary of the contributions of this thesis, discusses 
future work and provides a summary of the work performed and the conclusions 
drawn. 
9.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This research has tested the hypothesis of digital evidence obtained from live 
investigations involving encryption can be shown to be reliable, which has involved 
investigating the strengths and weaknesses of performing live investigations of 
systems that use encryption. While it is not possible to say that digital evidence from 
live investigations involving encryption is reliable, since this is investigation 
dependent, it has been possible to produce a set of criteria, against which reliability 
can be assessed. The explanations of these requirements for digital evidence have 
been clearly defined and the research as a whole acts as an example of how they can 
be used. 
 Also, categorisations of encryption product have been validated and it has 
been shown how these affect the locations on disk that become inaccessible. It has 
also been shown how these categories affect offline approaches to attempting to gain 
access to encrypted digital evidence.  This research showed that it is difficult to 
predict the success of offline approaches and therefore offline access may or may not 
be possible. However, live investigations allow data to be preserved in all cases and 
particularly in the case of Full Disk or Full Volume Encryption, are likely to offer a 
significant increase in completeness.  
 The adverse affect on completeness by performing live investigations has also 
been explored. A methodology and software tool has been developed that simplifies 
the process of recording changes made to test systems. These allow the footprints of 
live tools to be determined. Testing also produced some specific results, including the 
advantages of acquiring an image of memory followed by extracting information such 
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as processes running from the image, rather than using live investigation tools such as 
pslist to produce the same information.  
 A general definition for error in digital investigations has also been proposed, 
which was lacking in current literature. A clear definition of error in digital 
investigations based around alternative hypotheses for digital objects having their 
current state provides direction for the expression of error when presenting digital 
evidence. After defining error, it was clear that in a live investigation, the alternative 
hypotheses for acquired data having its current state were the operating system 
providing false information to the acquisition tool, or the acquisition tool obtaining 
data incorrectly. To address this problem, a method was developed that used 
repeatability and the use of trusted operating systems as means of demonstrating the 
accuracy of live acquired copies of encrypted evidence. This involved acquiring 
specific information from the system at the same time as a decrypted copy of the 
encrypted evidence, which allowed offline decryption of the static encrypted data. 
This was demonstrated in two ways: using the built in GUI of BitLocker and 
recovering decryption keys from a memory dump of a system running TrueCrypt. 
This approach can be extended for all on-the-fly encryption systems.  
 Finally, it has also been shown how physical origin of live acquired data can 
be demonstrated by integrating physical identifiers that are available before and after 
‘pulling the plug’ into the acquisition process. 
 Many of these contributions have resulted in peer reviewed publications. 
Obtaining recovery keys in order to allow later access to Windows Vista Bitlocker 
encrypted data was discussed in Hargreaves and Chivers (2007) and Hargreaves et al. 
(Hargreaves et al., 2008). The latter also discussed the difficulty in gaining offline 
access to EFS encrypted files on Windows Vista. The key recovery approach to 
demonstrating accuracy of acquired digital evidence was discussed in Hargreaves and 
Chivers (2008b), where the ‘linear scan’ approach to key recovery was introduced. 
This key recovery approach was also used in Hargreaves and Chivers (2008a) to 
demonstrate how live imaging could be avoided in cases where it is impractical, such 
as when very large amounts of data are involved. Both papers on key recovery also 
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included other aspects of this research, including the types of offline approaches for 
gaining access to encrypted evidence.  
 
9.3 FUTURE WORK 
This research has also opened up many opportunities for further work. First, the 
criteria proposed for assessing the reliability of digital evidence could be applied to 
other types of digital evidence. An obvious example would be mobile phones since 
evidence is often obtained using a live investigation, i.e. using the operating system of 
the system under investigation to recover evidence, and no literature could be found 
on the reliability of digital evidence obtained from mobile phones.  
One of the most interesting areas for future work is determining the footprint 
of live investigation tools and techniques. The developed methodology can be used to 
identify changes made to test systems and can be used to predict the locations of 
artefacts left by a live investigation. However, an individual post-live investigation 
analysis of a machine is still necessary for each case. Developing an optimised and 
standard methodology for performing this later analysis would speed up an 
investigator’s ability to assess the changes made by the live tools used and determine 
which digital evidence may have been lost. Standardising this part of the analysis does 
not suffer from the same difficulties as attempts to standardise general digital 
investigations (including problems such as the diversity in investigations and the 
number of different questions to be answered), since only a single question is being 
asked – what changes were made to the system due to the investigators actions? 
The actual methodology and software developed for live tool testing also 
enables other future work; firstly, they can both can be significantly improved. The 
methodology could be changed so that the live logging tools are not used, which 
would make the monitoring completely unintrusive. However, for this to be possible, 
other changes would need to be made, as described in Chapter 5, for example, the disk 
caching problem overcome, and an inspection of changes in unallocated space. 
Making the method completely unintrusive offers the advantage that changes to 
memory could be monitored simultaneously, since the memory of the system would 
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not be modified by the monitoring tools. The analysis of changes caused could also be 
improved, with more experiments into ‘background changes’, and more significantly, 
a modification of the reporting environment from a simple HTML report to a full GUI 
that allows recorded changes to be easily inspected to determine if they are relevant. 
Also, there is the potential for further automation. VMware offers an API which has 
not yet been fully explored, but at least allows virtual machines to be paused and 
resumed from the command line. This is a small optimisation but it may allow one-
click snapshot generation, simplifying the collection of test data. 
The developed system monitoring methodology, improved or otherwise, could 
be used to examine additional live investigation tools and techniques e.g. other 
memory acquisition tools, connecting via Ethernet, etc. It could also be used to 
examine them in greater detail: repeating the tests, using systems with different 
background software running e.g. antivirus, and on different service packs\operating 
systems. These may or may not make significant differences to the changes caused 
but experimentation is needed to determine this.  
Identifying changes caused by live tools also has implications for the 
authenticity requirement; specifically that by identifying the changes made by live 
tools, it may be possible to use the artefacts that remain on a system after a live 
investigation to support investigators’ records of their actions performed on the live 
system. 
 Also, the methodology and tools developed could be used to significantly ease 
a popular area of digital investigation research: determining the forensic artefacts left 
by pieces of software. Using the developed methodology and tools it is possible to 
generate comprehensive reports detailing the changes caused by performing actions 
on a system, e.g. running Skype from a USB stick. If the tools are improved in the 
manner described earlier, recorded changes could be inspected through an interface 
designed for highlighting these changes, allowing relevant changes to be easily 
identified. The automated nature of the tools, particularly if the VMware API can be 
utilised, allows these reports to be very easily generated, allowing the 
investigator/researcher to concentrate on the analysis of the recorded changes. 
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 This also raises a question about how to store and present these changes. This 
problem applies to changes caused by live investigation tools and also artefacts left by 
pieces of software. One of the difficulties is presenting the results in a form that is 
useful. Currently this achieved by interspacing file or Registry paths between text that 
explains the cause of the change. A standard, structured format for storing and 
disseminating this type of information would enable querying and visualisation tools 
to be built on top of this standard format, which would allow different methods for 
displaying this information to be developed. This has the potential to improve the 
process of sharing this type of information, which is extremely common in digital 
investigation research.  
 Additional future work is possible due to the research into accuracy of digital 
evidence. The demonstration of accuracy through key recovery was only performed 
for two products. Key recovery from memory has already become a popular area for 
research, with alternative approaches to the developed linear scan technique already 
published. There are an increasing number of on-the-fly encryption products available 
and key recovery approaches will be possible until keys are stored securely in 
hardware. However, developers of on-the-fly encryption software are aware of key 
recovery approaches and are modifying the way in which keys are stored in memory 
to defeat simple approaches. Therefore, developing key recovery techniques is likely 
to be a continuous source of future work. Also, research can be performed into 
demonstrating accuracy in live investigations that do not involve encrypted evidence, 
i.e. where offline data recovery is not possible. Applying a Certainty Scale such as 
that in Casey (2002a) has the potential to allow accuracy of digital evidence obtained 
from live acquisitions to be assessed by acquiring data from multiple sources and 
correlating the results. Exploring the anti-forensic techniques for different memory 
acquisition techniques would increase the understanding of what could cause acquired 
data from memory to have its state, and given the known technical expertise of the 
suspect, likelihood could be provided by an experienced investigator of these 
alternative explanations.  
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 Finally, future work that is possible due to the research into demonstrating the 
authenticity of live acquired digital evidence includes exploring the procedural 
mechanisms used to demonstrate how live evidence was obtained, including requiring 
technological solutions such as video capture and Digital Evidence Bags, and how 
these could be used to increase confidence in the origin of live acquired digital 
evidence.  
 
9.4 FINAL SUMMARY 
Traditional digital investigations, i.e. ‘pulling the plug’ have the advantage of 
preserving the contents of the computer’s hard drive at a specific point in time, since 
while the power is removed no data can be written to the disk. However, when the 
power is removed, this means that volatile data, including data in memory is lost. This 
also has implications for investigating systems that are using encryption since while 
decrypted content may be accessible when the system is running, once the power is 
removed, the decrypted content, which may include all of the drive, may revert to its 
encrypted state and therefore become inaccessible.  
 As a result, this has led to the use of live investigations, where the computer 
system is investigated while it is still running, using the operating system of the 
suspect’s machine. Such investigations are useful when encryption is involved since 
when a live investigation is performed, the investigator has the same access to the 
system as the suspect had prior to the investigator taking physical control of the 
machine. Therefore, if encrypted data was accessible to the suspect at the time of the 
seizure, then the investigator would also have access to the decrypted content. 
 However, there are a number of difficulties with live investigations, including 
the difficulty in trusting the data supplied to the live tools; the inherent intrusiveness 
of live techniques; the difficulty in verifying the output of live tools; and also ensuring 
that no evidence is missed. Due to these difficulties it is possible that digital evidence 
from live investigations is used when it should not be, or is not used when it could be; 
either way potentially resulting in an incorrect decision being made. Given that live 
investigations are a useful technique for addressing the problem of encrypted 
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evidence, but have associated difficulties, the aim of this research was therefore to 
determine the role that live investigations could play when encrypted evidence is 
involved. The research hypothesis that was tested was digital evidence obtained from 
live investigations involving encryption can be shown to be reliable.  
 To test this hypothesis, this research first defined reliability as being assessed 
using three requirements: authenticity, accuracy and completeness. The remainder of 
the research evaluated evidence from live investigations against these three criteria. 
The requirement of authenticity was discussed in Chapter 7 and was shown to be 
satisfied by recording the processes run, using hashes to demonstrate that acquired 
digital evidence has not been tampered with, and hashing live acquired evidence with 
hardware identifiers to demonstrate its physical origin. Accuracy was discussed in 
Chapter 6 and it was demonstrated how certain sources of error in live acquisitions of 
encrypted data could be eliminated by also obtaining other specific information at the 
time of the live acquisition that allowed the static encrypted data to be decrypted later 
during an offline examination in a repeatable manner using a trusted operating system. 
This eliminates alternative hypotheses that acquired data contains error due to a 
manipulated operating system or faulty acquisition tools. However, potential error 
remains in that the investigators actions triggered a ‘logic bomb’ that manipulated 
evidence in some way prior to acquisition. This may or may not be significant 
depending on the specific investigation. Completeness was discussed in Chapters 4 
and 5 and it was shown to be significantly increased by performing a live 
investigation, since this can preserve data in a form that can be analysed rather than 
being encrypted. However, live investigations also overwrite data on the live machine, 
and the significance of this will depend on the specific investigation. A software 
monitoring tool and a methodology has been developed that assists in predicting these 
changes and identifying which evidence has been overwritten on the system after the 
live investigation has been performed.  
 Therefore, it is possible for digital evidence from live investigations involving 
encryption to be considered to be reliable, but as discussed in the evaluation chapter, 
reliability of digital evidence depends on the specific investigation and the importance 
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of the decision being made. However, this research has provided structured criteria 
that allow the reliability of digital evidence to be assessed and the research as a whole 
has demonstrated the use of these criteria in the context of live digital investigations 
involving encryption and shown the extent to which each can currently be met.  
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APPENDIX A 
There are many process models that are used to represent a digital investigation. This 
appendix summarises them in table form. In this research, the simplest process model 
from Carrier (2003) is used, which is acquisition, analysis and presentation. Using 
this model does not consider preparation for performing a digital investigation, since 
a process model of the digital investigation itself is sought.  
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Carrier (2002) Farmer (1999) Palmer/DFRWS(2001) Mandia et al (2003) NIJ (2001) Reith et al (2002) Carrier & Spafford (2003) Baryamureeba & Tushabe (2004) 
O' 
Ciardhuain(2004) Beebe & Clark (2005) 
   Pre-Incident Preparation   Operational Readiness Operational Readiness   
      Infrastructure Readiness Infrastructure Readiness   
   Detection  Identification Detection and Notification Detection Awareness  
      
Confirmation and 
Authorisation  Authorisation  
     Preparation   Planning Preparation 
        Notification  
   Initial Response       
   Response Formulation  Approach 
Strategy 
   Incident Response 
Acquisition Secure and Isolate         
      
Physical Crime Scene 
Phase Physical Crime Scene Investigation (1)   
  Identification      Search and Identify  
          
 Record the scene Preservation   Preservation Preservation    
          
 Search for evidence Collection Duplication Collection Collection   Collection Data Collection 
 
Collect and package 
evidence      Digital Crime Scene Investigation (1)   
 Maintain chain of custody       Transport  
        Storage  
      Survey Confirmation   
      Documentation    
      Search and collection Submission   
       Digital Crime Scene Investigation (2) (Identification)   
       Authorisation   
       Physical Crime Scene Investigation (2)   
       Digital Crime Scene Investigation(3)   
       Reconstruction   
   Investigation      Data Analysis 
   Security Measure Implementation       
   Recovery       
Analysis  Examination  Examination Examination   Examination  
  Analysis  Analysis Analysis   Hypothesis  
          
      Reconstruction    
Presentation  Presentation    Presentation Communication Presentation Findings Presentation 
        Proof/defence  
      Review Review   
   Reporting Reporting Reporting   Dissemination  
   Follow up  Return Evidence    Incident Close 
 
Table 22: Comparison of process models for digital investigations. 
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